This theory of internal evidence, though founded on analogy, is yet essentially different in almost all respects from that view of the subject which Bishop Butler has given, in his most valuable and philosophical work on the analogy between natural and revealed religion. His design was to answer objections against revealed religion, arising out of the difficulties connected with many of its doctrines, by showing that precisely the same difficulties occur in natural religion and in the ordinary course of providence. This argument converts even the difficulties of revelation into evidences of its genuineness; because it employs them to establish the identity of the Author of Revelation and the Author of Nature. My object is quite different. I mean to show that there is an intelligible and necessary connexion between the doctrinal facts of revelation and the character of God (as deduced from natural religion), in the same way as there is an intelligible and necessary connexion between the character of a man and his most characteristic actions; and farther, that the belief of these doctrinal facts has an intelligible and necessary

tendency to produce the Christian character, in the same way that the belief of danger has an intelligible and necessary tendency to produce fear.

Perhaps it may appear to some minds, that although all this should be admitted, little or no weight has been added to the evidence for the truth of revelation. These persons have been in the habit of thinking that the miraculous inspiration of the Scriptures is the sole point of importance: Whereas the inspiration, when demonstrated, is no more than an evidence for the truth of that system which is communicated through this channel. If the Christian system be true, it would have been so although it had never been miraculously revealed to men. This principle, at least, is completely recognized with regard to the moral precepts. The duties of justice and benevolence are acknowledged to be realities altogether independent of the enforcements of any inspired revelation. The character of God is just as immutable, and as independent of any inspired revelation, as these duties; and so also are the acts of government proceeding from this charac

ter. We cannot have stronger evidence for any truth whatever, than that which we have for the reality of moral obligations. Upon this basis has been reared the system of natural religion as far as relates to the moral character of God, by simply clothing the Supreme Being with all the moral excellencies of human nature in an infinite degree. A system of religion which is opposed to these moral obligations, is opposed also to right reason. This sense of moral obligation then, which is the standard to which reason instructs man to adjust his system of natural religion, continues to be the test by which he ought to try all pretensions to divine revelation. If the actions ascribed to God by any system of religion present a view of the divine character which is at variance with the idea of moral perfection, we have no reason to believe that these are really the actions of God. But if, on the contrary, they have a strong and distinct tendency to elevate and dilate our notions of goodness, and are in perfect harmony with these notions, we have reason to believe that they may be the actions of God; because they are

intimately connected with those moral convictions which form the first principles of all our reasonings on this subject. This, then, is the first reasonable test of the truth of a religion—that it should coincide with the moral constitution of the human mind. But, secondly, we know, that, independently of all moral reasoning or consideration, our minds, by their natural constitution, are liable to receive certain impressions from certain objects when present to them. Thus, without any exercise of the moral judgment, they are liable to the impressions of love and hatred, and fear and hope, when certain corresponding objects are presented to them. And it is evident that the moral character is determined by the habitual direction which is given to these affections. Now if the actions attributed to God by any system of religion, be really such objects, as when present to the mind, do not stir the affections at all, that religion cannot influence the character, and is therefore utterly useless: If they be such as do indeed rouse the affections, but at the same time give them a wrong direction, that religion is worse than useless-it is

pernicious: But if they can be shown to be such as have a necessary tendency to excite these natural emotions on the behalf of goodness, and to draw the current of our affections and wills into this moral channel, we are entitled to draw another argument, from this circumstance, in favour of the truth of that religion; because we may presume that God would suit his communications to the capacities and instincts of his creatures. The second test, then, of the truth of a religion, is—that it should coincide with the physical constitution of the human mind. But, farther, there is much moral evil and much misery in the world. There are many bad passions in the mind; and there is a series of events continually going forward, which tend to excite a great variety of feelings. Now, a religion has one of the characters of truth, when it is accommodated to all these circumstances,-when it offers pardon without lowering the standard of moral duty; when its principles convert the varied events into opportunities of growing in conformity to God, and of acquiring the character of happiness; and when it tem