embarkation of fresh troops on board a fleet equipping at the port of Genoa for Naples, and sent orders to his generals in Italy to desist from further operations. The archduke forwarded similar instructions to Gonsalvo, accompanied with a copy of the powers intrusted to him by Ferdinand. That prudent officer, however, whether in obedience to previous directions from the king, as Spanish writers affirm, or on his own responsibility, from a very natural sense of duty, refused to comply with the ambassador's orders; declaring "he knew no authority but that of his own sovereigns, and that he felt bound to prosecute the war with all his ability, till he received their commands to the contrary."

16 Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 13, sec. 3.-Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 4.-St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII., p. 171.—Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 75.-D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 2, chap. 32.-According to the Aragonese historians, Ferdinand, on the archduke's departure, informed Gonsalvo of the intended negotiations with France, cautioning the general at the same time not to heed any instructions of the archduke till confirmed by him. This circumstance the French writers regard as unequivocal proof of the king's insincerity in entering into the negotiation. It wears this aspect at first, certainly, but, on a nearer view, admits of a very different construction. Ferdinand had no confidence in the discretion of his envoy, whom, if we are to believe the Spanish writers, he employed in the affair more from accident than choice; and, notwithstanding the full powers intrusted to him, he did not consider himself bound to recognize the validity of any treaty which the other should sign, until first ratified by himself. With these views, founded on principles now universally recognized in European diplomacy, it was natural to caution his general against any unauthorized interference on the part of his envoy, which the rash and presumptuous character of the latter, acting, moreover, under an undue influence of the French monarch, gave him good reason to fear.-As to the Great Captain, who has borne a liberal share of censure on this occasion, it

Indeed, the archduke's despatches arrived at the very time when the Spanish general, having strengthened himself by a reinforcement from the neighboring garrison of Tarento under Pedro Navarro, was prepared to sally forth and try his fortune in battle with the enemy. Without further delay, he put his purpose into execution, and on Friday the 28th of April, 1503, marched out with his whole army from the ancient walls of Barleta; a spot ever memorable in history as the scene of the extraordinary sufferings and indomitable constancy of the Spanish soldier.

The road lay across the field of Cannæ, where, seventeen centuries before, the pride of Rome had been humbled by the victorious arms of Hannibal," in a

is not easy to see how he could have acted otherwise than he did, even in the event of no special instructions from Ferdinand. For he would scarcely have been justified in abandoning a sure prospect of advantage on the authority of one, the validity of whose powers he could not determine, and which, in fact, do not appear to have warranted such interference. The only authority he knew was that from which he held his commission, and to which he was responsible for the faithful discharge of it.

17 Neither Polybius (lib. 3, sec. 24, et seq.) nor Livy (Hist., lib. 22, cap. 43-50), who give the most circumstantial narratives of the battle is precise enough to enable us to ascertain the exact spot in which it was fought. Strabo, in his topographical notices of this part of Italy, briefly alludes to "the affair of Cannæ" (тà ñɛpì Kávvas), without any description of the scene of action. (Geog., lib. 6, p. 285.) Cluverius fixes the site of the ancient Cannæ on the right bank of the Aufidus, the modern Ofanto, between three and four miles below Canusium, and notices the modern hamlet of nearly the same name, Canne, where common tradition recognizes the ruins of the ancient town. (Italia Antiqua, lib. 4, cap. 12, sec. 8.) D'Anville makes no difficulty in identifying these two (Géographie ancienne, abrégée, tom. i. p. 208), having laid down the ancient town in his maps in the direct line, and about midway, between Barleta and Cerignola.

battle which, though fought with far greater numbers, was not so decisive in its consequences as that which the same scenes were to witness in a few hours. The coincidence is certainly singular; and one might almost fancy that the actors in these fearful tragedies, unwilling to deface the fair haunts of civilization, had purposely sought a more fitting theatre in this obscure and sequestered region.

The weather, although only at the latter end of April, was extremely sultry; the troops, notwithstand- · ing Gonsalvo's orders on crossing the river Ofanto, the ancient Aufidus, had failed to supply themselves with sufficient water for the march; parched with heat and dust, they were soon distressed by excessive thirst; and, as the burning rays of the noontide sun beat fiercely on their heads, many of them, especially those cased in heavy armor, sank down on the road, fainting with exhaustion and fatigue. Gonsalvo was seen in every quarter, administering to the necessities of his men, and striving to reanimate their drooping spirits. At length, to relieve them, he commanded that each trooper should take one of the infantry on his crupper, setting the example himself by mounting a German ensign behind him on his own horse.

In this way, the whole army arrived early in the afternoon before Cerignola, a small town on an eminence about sixteen miles from Barleta, where the nature of the ground afforded the Spanish general a favorable position for his camp. The sloping sides of the hill were covered with vineyards, and its base was protected by a ditch of considerable depth. Gonsalvo saw at once the advantages of the ground. His men

D

were jaded by the march; but there was no time to lose, as the French, who, on his departure from Barleta, had been drawn up under the walls of Canosa, were now rapidly advancing. All hands were put in requisition, therefore, for widening the trench, in which they planted sharp-pointed stakes; while the earth which they excavated enabled them to throw up a parapet of considerable height on the side next the town. On this rampart he mounted his little train of artillery, consisting of thirteen guns, and behind it drew up his forces in order of battle. 18

Before these movements were completed in the Spanish camp, the bright arms and banners of the French were seen glistening in the distance amid the tall fennel and cane-brakes with which the country was thickly covered. As soon as they had come in view of the Spanish encampment, they were brought to a halt, while a council of war was called, to determine the expediency of giving battle that evening. The duke of Nemours would have deferred it till the following morning, as the day was already far spent and allowed no time for reconnoitring the position of his enemy. But Ives d'Alègre, Chandieu, the commander of the

18 Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, fol. 253-255.-Guicciardini, Istoria, lib. 5, p. 303.-Chrónica del Gran Capitan, cap. 75, 76.- Zurita, Anales, tom. v. lib. 5, cap. 27.-Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 256. -Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V., fol. 16, 17.-Giovio says that he had heard Fabrizio Colonna remark more than once, in allusion to the intrenchments at the base of the hill, "that the victory was owing, not to the skill of the commander nor the valor of the troops, but to a mound and a ditch." This ancient mode of securing a position, which had fallen into disuse, was revived after this, according to the same author, and came into general practice among the best captains of the age, Ubi supra.

Swiss, and some other officers, were for immediate action, representing the importance of not balking the impatience of the soldiers, who were all hot for the assault. In the course of the debate, Alègre was so much heated as to throw out some rash taunts on the courage of the viceroy, which the latter would have avenged on the spot, had not his arm been arrested by Louis d'Ars. He had the weakness, however, to suffer them to change his cooler purpose, exclaiming, "We will fight to-night, then; and perhaps those who vaunt the loudest will be found to trust more to their spurs than their swords;" a prediction bitterly justified by the event."9

While this dispute was going on, Gonsalvo gained time for making the necessary disposition of his troops. In the centre he placed his German auxiliaries, armed with their long pikes, and on each wing the Spanish infantry under the command of Pedro Navarro, Diego de Paredes, Pizarro, and other illustrious captains. The defence of the artillery was committed to the left wing. A considerable body of men-at-arms, including those recently equipped from the spoils of Ruvo, was drawn up within the intrenchments, in a quarter affording a convenient opening for a sally, and placed under the orders of Mendoza and Fabrizio Colonna, whose brother Prospero and Pedro de la Paz took charge of the light cavalry, which was posted without the lines to annoy the advance of the enemy, and act on any point, as occasion might require. Having completed

19 Brantôme, ŒŒuvres, tom. ii. disc. 8.-Garnier, Histoire de France (Paris, 1783–8), tom. v. pp. 395, 396.-Gaillard, Rivalité, tom. iv. p. 244.-St. Gelais, Hist. de Louys XII., p. 171.