Ferdinand would do as much, when he should be in a situation to assert his claims with success."

It was altogether improbable, whatever might be the good faith of the parties, that an arrangement could long subsist which so rudely rent asunder the members of this ancient monarchy; or that a thousand points of collision should not arise between rival hosts, lying as it were on their arms within bowshot of each other and in view of the rich spoil which each regarded as its own. Such grounds for rupture did occur, sooner probably than either party had foreseen, and certainly before the king of Aragon was prepared to meet it.

The immediate cause was the extremely loose language of the partition treaty, which assumed such a geographical division of the kingdom into four provinces as did not correspond with any ancient division, and still less with the modern, by which the number was multiplied to twelve.3 The central portion, comprehending the Capitanate, the Basilicate, and the

2

Martyr, after noticing the grounds of the partition treaty, comments with his usual shrewdness on the politic views of the Spanish Sovereigns: "Facilius namque se sperant, eam partem, quam sibi Galli sortiti sunt, habituros aliquando, quam si universum regnum occuparint." Opus Epist., epist. 218.

3 The Italian historians, who have investigated the subject with some parade of erudition, treat it so vaguely as to leave it, after all, nearly as perplexed as they found it. Giovio includes the Capitanate in Apulia, according to the ancient division; Guicciardini, according to he modern; and the Spanish historian Mariana, according to both. The last writer, it may be observed, discusses the matter with equal learning and candor, and more perspicuity than either of the preceding. He admits reasonable grounds for doubt to which moiety of the kingdom the Basilicate and Principalities should be assigned. Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. p. 670.-Guicciardini, Istoria, tom. i. lib. 5, pp. 274, 275.-Giovio, Vita Magni Gonsalvi, lib. 1, pp. 234, 235

Principality, became debatable ground between the parties, each of whom insisted on these as forming an integral part of its own moiety. The French had no ground whatever for contesting the possession of the Capitanate, the first of these provinces, and by far the most important, on account of the tolls paid by the numerous flocks which descended every winter into its sheltered valleys from the snow-covered mountains of Abruzzo. There was more uncertainty to which of the parties the two other provinces were meant to be assigned. It is scarcely possible that language so loose, in a matter requiring mathematical precision, should have been unintentional.

Before Gonsalvo de Cordova had completed the conquest of the southern moiety of the kingdom, and while lying before Tarento, he received intelligence of the occupation by the French of several places, both in the Capitanate and Basilicate. He detached a body of troops for the protection of these countries, and, after the surrender of Tarento, marched towards the north to cover them with his whole army. As he was not in a condition for immediate hostilities, however, he entered into negotiations, which, if attended with no other advantage, would at least gain him time.5

4 The provision of the partition treaty, that the Spaniards should collect the tolls paid by the flocks on their descent from the French district of Abruzzo into the Capitanate, is conclusive evidence of the intention of the contracting parties to assign the latter to Spain. See the treaty apud Dumont, Corps diplomatique, tom. iii. pp. 445, 446. 5 Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 52.—Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 12.-Ulloa, Vita di Carlo V.. fol. 10.-Gonsalvo, in his account of these transactions to the sovereigns, notices "the intemperate language and bearing" both of the

The pretensions of the two parties, as might have been expected, were too irreconcilable to admit of compromise; and a personal conference between the respective commanders-in-chief (April 1st, 1502) led to no better arrangement than that each should retain his present acquisitions till explicit instructions could be received from their respective courts.

But neither of the two monarchs had further instructions to give; and the Catholic king contented himself with admonishing his general to postpone an open rupture as long as possible, that the government might have time to provide more effectually for his support and strengthen itself by alliance with other European powers. But, however pacific may have been the disposition of the generals, they had no power to control the passions of their soldiers, who, thus brought into immediate contact, glared on each other with the ferocity of bloodhounds ready to slip the leash which held them in temporary check. Hostilities soon broke out along the lines of the two armies, the blame of which each nation charged on its opponent. There seems good ground, however, for imputing it to the French; since they were altogether better prepared for war than the Spaniards, and entered into it so heartily as not only to assail places in the debatable ground, but in Apulia, which had been unequivocally assigned to their rivals."

viceroy and Alègre. This part cf the letter is in cipher. Carta de Tarento, 10 de Marzo, 152, MS.

D'Auton, Hist. de Louys XII., part. 2, chap. 3-7.-Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 60, 62, 64, 65.—Giovio, Vitæ Hust. Virorum, tɔm. i. p. 236.-Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 4. Bernaldez states that the Great Captain, finding his confer

In the mean while, the Spanish court fruitlessly endeavored to interest the other powers of Europe in its cause. The emperor Maximilian, although dissatisfied with the occupation of Milan by the French, appeared wholly engrossed with the frivolous ambition of a Roman coronation. The pontiff and his son, Cæsar Borgia, were closely bound to King Louis by the assistance which he had rendered them in their marauding enterprises against the neighboring chiefs of Romagna. The other Italian princes, although deeply incensed and disgusted by this infamous alliance, stood too much in awe of the colossal power which had planted its foot so firmly on their territory to offer any resistance. Venice alone, surveying from her distant watchtower, to borrow the words of Peter Martyr, the whole extent of the political horizon, appeared to hesitate. The French ambassadors loudly called on her to fulfil the terms of her late treaty with their master, and support him in his approaching quarrel; but the wily republic saw with distrust the encroaching ambition of her powerful neighbor, and secretly wished that a counterpoise might be found in the success of Aragon. Martyr, who stopped at Venice on his return from Egypt, appeared before the senate (October, 1501) and employed all his eloquence in supporting his master's cause in opposition to the French envoys; but his ence with the French general ineffectual, proposed to the latter to decide the quarrel between their respective nations by single combat. (Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 167.) We should require some other authority, however, than that of the good Curate to vouch for this romantic flight, so entirely out of keeping with the Spanish general's character, in which pruder ce was probably the most conspicuous attribute.

pressing entreaties to the Spanish sovereigns to send thither some competent person, as a resident minister, show his own conviction of the critical position in which their affairs stood."

The letters of the same intelligent individual during his journey through the Milanese are filled with the most gloomy forebodings of the termination of a contest for which the Spaniards were so indifferently provided; while the whole north of Italy was alive with the bustling preparations of the French, who loudly vaunted their intention of driving their enemy not merely out of Naples, but Sicily itself."

7 Daru, Hist. de Venise, tom. iii. p. 345.—Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, tom. i. lib. 6.-Peter Martyr, Opus Epist., epist. 238, 240, 252.-This may appear strange, considering that Lorenzo Suarez de la Vega was there, a person of whom Gonzalo de Oviedo writes, "Fué gentil caballero, é sabio, é de gran prudencia; * * * * * muy entendido é de mucho reposo é honesto é afable é de linda conversacion;" and again, more explicitly, "Embaxador á Venecia, en el qual oficio sirvio muy bien, é como prudente varon." (Quincuagenas, MS., bat. 1, quinc. 3, dial. 44.) Martyr admits his prudence, but objects his ignorance of Latin, a deficiency, however heinous in the worthy tutor's eyes, probably of no rare occurrence among the elder Castilian nobles.

* Many of Martyr's letters were addressed to both Ferdinand and Isabella. The former, however, was ignorant of the Latin language, in which they were written. Martyr playfully alludes to this in one of his epistles, reminding the queen of her promise to interpret them faithfully to her husband. The unconstrained and familiar tone of his correspondence affords a pleasing example of the personal intimacy to which the sovereigns, in defiance of the usual stiffness of Spanish etiquette, admitted men of learning and probity at their court, without distinction of rank. Opus Epist., epist. 230.

9 "Galli," says Martyr, in a letter more remarkable for strength of expression than elegance of Latinity, "furunt, sæviunt, internecionem nostris minantur, putantque id sibi fore facillimum. Regem eorum esse in itinere, inquiunt, ut ipse cum duplicato exercitu Alpes trajiciat