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the borders of his Sicilian dominions, was not to be thought of for a moment. The latter, which pledged him a second time to the support of pretensions hostile to his own, was scarcely more palatable. A third expedient suggested itself; the partition of the kingdom, as hinted in the negotiations with Charles the Eighth, by which means the Spanish government, if it could not rescue the whole prize from the grasp of Louis, would at least divide it with him."

Instructions were accordingly given to Gralla, the minister at the court of Paris, to sound the government on this head, bringing it forward as his own private suggestion. Care was taken at the same time to secure a party in the French councils to the interests of Ferdinand." The suggestions of the Spanish envoy received additional weight from the report of a con

12 See Part II., chapter 3, of this History.-Ferdinand, it seems, entertained the thought of visiting Italy in person. This appears from a letter, or rather an elaborate memorial, of Garcilasso de la Vega, urging various considerations to dissuade his master from this step. In the course of it he lays open the policy and relative strength of the Italian states, half of whom, at least, he regards as in the interests of France. At the same time he advises the king to carry the war across his own borders into the French territory, and thus, by compelling Louis to withdraw his forces, in part, from Italy, cripple his operations in that country. The letter is full of the suggestions of a shrewd policy, but shows that the writer knew much more of Italian politics than of what was then passing in the cabinets of Paris and Madrid. Carta de Garcilasso de la Vega, Toledo, 25 de Agosto, 1500, MS.

13 According to Zurita, Ferdinand secured the services of Guillaume de Poictiers, lord of Clérieux and governor of Paris, by the promise of the city of Cotron, mortgaged to him in Italy. (Hist. del Rey Hernando, lib. 3, cap. 40.) Comines calls the same nobleman a good sort of a man, "qui aisément croit, et pour espécial tels personnages,' meaning King Ferdinand. Comines, Mémoires, liv. 8, chap. 23.

siderable armament then equipping in the port of Malaga. Its ostensible purpose was to co-operate with the Venetians in the defence of their possessions in the Levant. Its main object, however, was to cover the coasts of Sicily in any event from the French, and to afford means for prompt action on any point where circumstances might require it. The fleet consisted of about sixty sail, large and small, and carried forces amounting to six hundred horse and four thousand foot, picked men, many of them drawn from the hardy regions of the north, which had been taxed least severely in the Moorish wars."4

The command of the whole was intrusted to the Great Captain, Gonsalvo de Cordova, who since his return home had fully sustained the high reputation which his brilliant military talents had acquired for him abroad. Numerous volunteers, comprehending the noblest of the young chivalry of Spain, pressed forward to serve under the banner of this accomplished and popular chieftain. Among them may be particularly noticed Diego de Mendoza, son of the grand cardinal, Pedro de la Paz," Gonzalo Pizarro, father

14 Bembo, Istoria Viniziana, tom. iii. lib. 5, p. 324.—Ulloa, Vita et Fatti dell' invitissimo Imperatore Carlo V. (Venetia, 1606), fol. 2.— Mariana, Hist. de España, tom. ii. lib. 27, cap. 7.-Giovio, Vitæ Illust. Virorum, tom. i. p. 226.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 4, cap. 11.-Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 10, sec. 13.

15 This cavalier, one of the most valiant captains in the army, was so diminutive in size that, when mounted, he seemed almost lost in the high demipeak war-saddle then in vogue; which led a wag, according to Brantôme, when asked if he had seen Don Pedro de Paz pass that way, to answer that "he had seen his horse and saddle, but no rider." Euvres, tom. i. disc. 9.

of the celebrated adventurer of Peru, and Diego de Paredes, whose personal prowess and feats of extravagant daring furnished many an incredible legend for chronicle and romance. With this gallant armament the Great Captain weighed anchor in the port of Malaga, in May, 1500, designing to touch at Sicily before proceeding against the Turks."

Meanwhile, the negotiations between France and Spain, respecting Naples, were brought to a close, by a treaty for the equal partition of that kingdom between the two powers, ratified at Granada, November 11th, 1500. This extraordinary document, after enlarging on the unmixed evils flowing from war, and the obligation on all Christians to preserve inviolate the blessed peace bequeathed them by the Saviour, proceeds to state that no other prince, save the kings of France and Aragon, can pretend to a title to the throne of Naples; and as King Frederick, its present occupant, has seen fit to endanger the safety of all Christendom by bringing on it its bitterest enemy, the Turks, the contracting parties, in order to rescue it from this imminent peril and preserve inviolate the bond of peace, agree to take possession of his kingdom and divide it between them. It is then provided that the northern portion, comprehending the Terra di Lavoro and Abruzzo, be assigned to France, with the title of King of Naples and Jerusalem, and the southern, consisting of Apulia and Calabria, with the title of Duke of those provinces, to Spain. The dogana, an impor

Ferreras, Hist. d'Espagne, tom. viii. p. 217.-Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 161. Garibay, Compendio, tom. ii. lib. 19, сар. 9.

tant duty levied on the flocks of the Capitanate, was to be collected by the officers of the Spanish government, and divided equally with France. Lastly, any inequality between the respective territories was to be so adjusted that the revenues accruing to each of the parties should be precisely equal. The treaty was to be kept profoundly secret until preparations were completed for the simultaneous occupation of the devoted territory by the combined powers."

Such were the terms of this celebrated compact, by which two European potentates coolly carved out and divided between them the entire dominions of a third, who had given no cause for umbrage, and with whom they were both at that time in perfect peace and amity, Similar instances of political robbery (to call it by the coarse name it merits) have occurred in later times; but never one founded on more flimsy pretexts, or veiled under a more detestable mask of hypocrisy. The principal odium of the transaction has attached to Ferdinand, as the kinsman of the unfortunate king of Naples. His conduct, however, admits of some palliatory considerations that cannot be claimed for Louis.

The Aragonese nation always regarded the bequest of Ferdinand's uncle Alfonso the Fifth in favor of his natural offspring as an unwarrantable and illegal act. The kingdom of Naples had been won by their own good swords, and, as such, was the rightful inheritance of their own princes. Nothing but the domestic troubles of his dominions had prevented John the

See the original treaty, apud Dumont, Corps diplomatique, tom. iii. pp. 445, 446.

Second of Aragon, on the decease of his brother, from asserting his claim by arms. His son, Ferdinand the Catholic, had hitherto acquiesced in the usurpation of the bastard branch of his house only from similar causes. On the accession of the present monarch, he had made some demonstrations of vindicating his pretensions to Naples, which, however, the intelligence he received from that kingdom induced him to defer to a more convenient season." But it was deferring, not relinquishing, his purpose. In the mean time, he carefully avoided entering into such engagements as should compel him to a different policy by connecting his own interests with those of Frederick; and with this view, no doubt, rejected the alliance, strongly solicited by the latter, of the duke of Calabria, heir apparent to the Neapolitan crown, with his third daughter, the infanta Maria. Indeed, this disposition of Ferdinand, so far from being dissembled, was well understood by the court of Naples, as is acknowledged by its own historians."9

It may be thought that the undisturbed succession to the throne of Naples of four princes, each of whom had received the solemn recognition of the people, might have healed any defects in their original title, however glaring. But it may be remarked, in extenuation of both the French and Spanish claims, that the principles of monarchical succession were but imperfectly settled in that day; that oaths of allegiance were tendered too lightly by the Neapolitans, to carry

18 See Part II. chapter 3, of this History.

19 Giannone, Istoria di Napoli, lib. 29, cap. 3.—Zurita, Hist. del Rey Hernando, tom. i. lib. 3, cap. 32.

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