Dr. BROWN. Thank you. As you pointed out, the Department of Defense has the operational responsibility for the aerostat program. I certainly will go back and ask the Secretary of Defense to provide an explanation to the videotape that you showed us here today and get back to you. Also

Mr. ENGLISH. Could I interrupt you, Mr. Brown? Let me just say that, of course, Mr. Aspin was not Secretary of Defense at the time

Dr. BROWN. Certainly.

Mr. ENGLISH [continuing]. That this took place. I don't think that Secretary Cheney had any knowledge of this, and as I understand it, this is part of the problem. I don't think the Secretary of Air Force had knowledge of this at the time. I think what you have, you have got Commanders, you have got people within the force who, quite frankly, don't want this responsibility. And they certainly do not want to have to make any kind of investment-this would have been $200,000 that would have come from the Air Force and out of the Department of Defense budget; so rather than make that investment, they-in turn, they made the decision that they would destroy the aerostat, destroy the entire system down there. Then they wouldn't have to carry out the responsibilities of detection.

And that is what I think the problem comes down to; it is the money that is involved. And quite frankly, they simply don't want to spend it; and it is a problem that the Secretary is going to have, you are going to have. And, you know, all of us in Congress have been trying to make sure that the policies and programs that are laid out are carried out as intended.

Dr. BROWN. I will ask Secretary Aspin on our behalf to take a look at this issue, and report back to you on what we find.

I might also point out that prior to my being appointed to the position, the President directed a Presidential review of our interdiction efforts. He also asked that it be held up until I was confirmed. We are close to concluding that review right now and, Mr. Chairman, I will be delighted, once we have completed it and the President has signed off, to come back and brief you on what direction we take under this administration as far as interdiction is concerned.

Mr. CONYERS. The gentleman from Arizona, Jon Kyl.

Mr. KYL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Brown, just to comment a little bit more on what Mr. English has been talking about, the issue of aerostats is a little more complicated, I think, than the question of the Air Force not wanting to deploy and operate the system. There is a real question about just how effective aerostats are, even when they are up and operating, but leaving that question aside-unless as a part of the answer to this question, you could provide more information to us, which would be helpful, of course-let me pursue a bit more the issue of interdiction.

In your testimony on page 13, you developed a better understanding our interdiction resources and wh contribution. I would hope that w

other review to get your views on this. This implies you have a pretty good idea right now.

Rather than having me give a speech about my views, I would like to hear your views on how much we are putting, or you do plan to put into interdiction, and what relative role you think that should play in the overall drug strategy.

Dr. BROWN. First, I intend to go to the Bahamas this week to see firsthand what is going on with our interdiction efforts there as part of my overall review of the overall drug control initiative.

Second, as we put together our strategy, we have to follow certain principles, and one of the principles that I think is very important is that we have to be comprehensive in how we address the drug control issue. I tend to now look at drug control in really two areas, one is domestic efforts where we have our enforcement, we have our treatment, education, prevention, and also our interdiction. I use the term to describe what takes place to keep the drugs from coming across our border.

The second area would be our international efforts, going into the source countries or the transit countries. As I pointed out earlier, we are now in the process of taking a thorough review to the Presidential review process about our interdiction efforts; the document that is being circulated for administrative review, and it is classified as secret at this point.

But I would request once we get the approval to come back and give you a more thorough briefing about what the policies will be on interdiction. There is some limit to what I can address now, except to say that we are very much concerned about whether or not we get the bang for the buck as we look at the issue of drug control and specifically, interdiction, because we have put a lot of money over a period of years into interdiction.

So with the chairman's permission, at some point I would like to come back and give you a much more thorough briefing on what we are doing as a result of the Presidential review of the interdiction efforts.

Mr. KYL. Without at all being critical of you, Mr. Brown, that implies that for the last 9 months, and we are now into October 1993, that we have had no strategy, that we have been on some kind of auto pilot.

Dr. BROWN. We have been, since I have taken office in July, developing an interim strategy. The other strategy was not produced in February, and my promise to the Congress and to the President which was to produce the interim strategy which we intend to release to the public within the next few days.

In that strategy, what we would outline would be the broad principles that we will follow in addressing the drug control issue. At the same time, we are still developing our full-blown strategy, which will be submitted to the Congress in February of next year. During this same process, we have been going through the effort of certifying the budgets, going through the reorganization as a result of the downsizing of the organization. So we will produce for you very shortly an interim strategy, which would touch very briefly on the principles that deal with all aspects of drug control in this country.

Mr. KYL. I have one final question, but let me just preface it with this comment, and again, without being at all personally critical of you, if my constituents criticize our government for not demonstrating adequately a commitment to eradicate this problem identified by the chairman in his opening remarks, I think what you have just said perfectly illustrates that they are correct in that. This suggests that the issue has been given the importance, the priority, that I think most of us up here feel the drug problem should be given.

Let me just ask this final question. I support the North American Free Trade Agreement. One of the criticisms that has been levied against the agreement is that with freer trade, inevitably, it will be more difficult to interdict drugs coming across the border. I know the Attorney General has tried to respond to that indicating that her efforts would be unstinting to continue to interdict drugs. But can you be any more specific about the kinds of actions that would be necessary and that you would contemplate or recommend to ensure that the passage of NAFTA doesn't increase the prospect of more drugs coming into the country illegally?

Dr. BROWN. In reference to your statement preceding the question, let me say that there is a very serious and sincere commitment to address the drug issue in America; that the administration views it in my estimation, speaking on behalf of the administration, as one of the most serious domestic problems confronting this country at this time, and there is a commitment and a will to address the problem and those programs are ongoing.

We are looking at better ways of addressing it, and thus, the time it has taken to develop the interim strategy and then the fullblown strategy will outline those better ways. We have to do better; we must do better, we must make a difference. People are suffering, losing their lives, and the quality of life in America has diminished as a result of the drug problem.

Violence is rampant in many of our cities as a result of the drug problem, not just in our inner cities, but in our suburbs and increasingly in rural areas as well. So it is something that we should do; it is a national imperative that we do make a difference. So we are committed to doing that.

In reference to NAFTA, we are making an effort to take a close look at that. There is nothing that we would see that would suggest that the drug trafficking would increase as a result of NAFTA. We are putting and will be putting more resources on the borders.

So as the cargo transportation increases, we will continue to do the searches. As you know, NAFTA means free tariff, not stopping the searches that we do of the cargo that comes across. So the resources will be put there to ensure that that treaty, that agreement, will not have a negative impact on drug trafficking.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Chairman, if I could just followup on that question. I appreciate that commitment.

I think it will take an increased commitment, because there will of necessity simply be more traffic. There would be a lot more trucks crossing the border, and you are right, it deals with tariffs, but that means that there will be more traffic.

And so I see two things: One, there will have to be changes at the border crossings so that we don't just have absolute chaos there