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STRATEGIC COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

NOVEMBER 3, 1981
Wade, Dr. James P., Jr., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense

(Research and Engineering); accompanied by T. K. Jones, Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces);
Donald C. Latham, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Communications,
Command, Control and Intelligence); Lt. Gen. Hillman Dickinson,
Director, Communications, Command, and Control Systems, Office of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; Vice Adm. Gordon Nagler, Director, Command
and Control, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; and Brig. Gen.
Bernard P. Randolph, Director, Space Systems and Command, Control
and Communications Directorate, Deputy Chief of Staff, Research, De-

velopment and Acquisition, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force -----------Latham, Donald C. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence)......

IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGIC DECISION

209

232

NOVEMBER 4, 1981
Davis, Gen. B. L., USAF, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command;

Director, Strategic Target Planning; Director, Strategic Connectivity,
Joint Chiefs of Staff.------

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258

PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC DECISIONS

302

NOVEMBER 10, 1981
DeLauer, Hon. Richard D., Under Secretary of Defense for Research and

Engineering, and Lt. Gen. Kelly H. Burke, Deputy Chief of Staff,
Research, Development, and Acquisition, Headquarters, U.S. Air
Force....

STRATEGIC FORCE DECISIONS.

NOVEMBER 12, 1981
Ellis, Gen. Richard H., USAF (Retired), former Commander in Chief,
Strategic Air Command, SAC.--.

STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAM

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NOVEMBER 13, 1981
La Rocque, Rear Adm. Gene R., U.S. Navy (Ret), Director, Center for

Defense Information.----
Carpenter, Lee----------

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

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NOVEMBER 13, 1981
Tate, Maj. Gen. Grayson D., USA, program manager, Ballistic Missile
Defense Program, U.S. Army---

STRATEGIC FORCES PLANS AND PROGRAMS

NOVEMBER 13, 1981
Perry, Dr. William J., former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and

Engineering...

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STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS

MONDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1981

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC AND

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D.C.

SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES

The subcommittee met in open session pursuant to notice at 9:02 a.m., in room 212, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John W. Warner, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Warner and Levin.

Staff present: Rhett B. Dawson, staff director and chief counsel; James F. McGovern, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel ; Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Frank J. Gaffney, Ronald F. Lehman, José E. Martinez, E. George Riedel, professional staff members; and Karen A. Love, staff assistant.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Buzz Hefti, assistant to Senator Warner; Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Bill Furniss, assistant to Senator Quayle; Robert Nichols, assistant to Senator Jackson; Frank Krebs, assistant to Senator Cannon; Gray Armistead, assistant to Senator Byrd; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; and Peter Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER,

CHAIRMAN

Senator WARNER. The subcommittee will be in order.

Today we will begin what will perhaps be one of the most extensive series of subcommittee hearings in the recent history of the Armed Services Committee. The purpose of these hearings is to lay a foundation for legislative decisions in connection with the strategic program.

From a personal viewpoint, it is my belief that these hearings work toward reducing the probability of a nuclear war ever occurring.

On October 2, the President announced the outlines of a five-part program designed to strengthen our land-based intercontinental ballistic-missile force, modernize our strategic-bomber force, bring hardtarget kill capability to our sea-based deterrent, enhance the air defenses of the United States, and to improve the command, control and communications system which permits us to control our forces in time of peace and war.

The timing of the President's decision, coming as it did after the beginning of the new fiscal year, has placed a great burden upon the Congress to consider this program expeditiously.

I have before me a very lengthy set of hearings. We will not be able to release them now or until such time as we can coordinate this hearing schedule with the final phases of conference between the two Armed Services Committees going on simultaneously. But it was Chairman Tower's decision, at my urging, that we begin to undertake these hearings at the subcommittee level contemporaneously with the final decision taking place in conference.

While many of the President's recommended initiatives do not require additional funding until fiscal year 1983 or later, there are, however, several items in the fiscal year 1982 defense authorization bill now being considered by the Senate and House Conference which are affected by the President's decision. Some of these programs, such as the decision to proceed with the B-1 bomber and to deploy the MX missile on an interim basis in silos, were options considered prior to the President's announcement.

As you will recall, the Senate in the fiscal year 1982 authorization bill fenced money for these programs subject to a two-House veto. Other decisions, such as the retirement of some B-52D bombers in this fiscal year, were not anticipated in congressional action to date and the merits of these elements of the program remain to be addressed by the conference.

Thus, while the hearings which we are about to conduct on the President's strategic modernization program are relevant to our upcoming decisions on the fiscal year 1982 authorization bill, they will lay the groundwork for congressional review of future budget requests in fiscal year 1983 and beyond.

Today we will be hearing from both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. I think we need to understand the Soviet threat before we can properly analyze the President's recommended response, particularly because of what is taking place in Europe today, that we spread before the American public and others as much as possible with regard to this threat and how the strategic program, in my judgment, works toward a reduction of the likelihood of any nuclear confrontation.

Because of the sensitive nature of intelligence sources and methods, the subcommittee will conduct much of its hearing on Soviet strategic forces in closed session with staff attendance restricted. But, in view of the fact that the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces buildup is of great interest to the general public, we have arranged to have this first portion of our intelligence hearing to be conducted in open session.

I trust that my colleagues and the witnesses will join with me in taking precautions so that no national security information is inadvertently compromised.

Subsequently, we will reconvene in room S-407, to go into classified details.

I have circulated to the members of the panel a list of additional hearings which we will be conducting over the next few weeks. Initially, we will be hearing from administration witnesses and from the military services on our strategic policy, programs and budget. It is

my intent also to call witnesses from various governmental agencies and other experts.

As we proceed, I look forward to close bipartisan cooperation with my colleagues on the scheduling of hearings and the calling of witnesses. Our goal is to seek out the facts that we need to make decisions. It is my intention to make these hearings my highest priority in the weeks ahead. The schedule will be intense and the workload heavy, but I urge my colleagues, whether members of the subcommittee or not, to attend as many hearings as possible and to follow the testimony closely.

I pledge that I and my staff will help in every way possible to make sure that we develop a comprehensive and thorough record.

I would like to welcome as our first witness this morning Adm. E. A. Burkhalter, Jr., Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. E. A. BURKHALTER, JR., USN, DEPUTY

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY DENNIS CLIFT, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER; ROGER DENK, SENIOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYST; HENRY HOFFMANN, JR., STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSES; JOHN SELLERS, ABM AND LASERS; JIM MILLER, STRATEGIC FORCES; JEROME BEATTY, STRATEGIC AIR; ART NEVINS, C3, COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS; DON WOOD, CIVIL DEFENSE; JOE ARDINGER, STRATEGIC ESTIMATES; JIM MCCRERY, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR STRATEGIC PROGRAMS; DAVID PHILLIPS, INTELLIGENCE ANALYST; CHARLES MUNSON, INTELLIGENCE ANALYST; AND FRANCIS DUNLAP, INTELLIGENCE ANALYST

Admiral BURKHALTER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today and present before your subcommittee discussion on Soviet strategic forces.

I am personally pleased to be DIA's principal witness and to have with me a number of experts on various aspects of Soviet strategic power, both in the open session and in the following closed one.

Senator WARNER. Why don't you introduce those witnesses?

Admiral BURKHALTER. Yes, sir, I will ask them to stand and introduce themselves. Starting with Mr. Dennis Clift.

Mr. Clift. Dennis Clift, Senator Warner.
Mr. DENK. Roger Denk, sir.

Senator WARNER. Would you gentlemen care to come up and join the admiral?

Admiral BURKHALTER. I will ask these two gentlemen to join us, and Mr. McCrery, who is our Defense Intelligence Officer on this subject.

I would like the others here to introduce themselves as soon as these gentlemen are settled.

Mr. MILLER. I am James Miller.
Mr. ARDINGER. Joe Ardinger.
Mr. HOFFMANN. I am Henry Hoffmann, Jr.
Mr. SELLERS. I am John Sellers.
Mr. DUNLAP. I am Francis Dunlap.

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