mesas the hardening of MX silos to survive all but a direct hit, and placement of silos in a manner designed to protect them against existing Soviet targeting.

We expect to choose one, or, more likely, several, of these options by 1984.

The final aspect of our ICBM modernization efforts involves the orderly phasing out of the Titan missile force.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE

The final element of the Reagan administration's program involves our plans for significantly upgrading our long neglected strategic defense system. These forces and sensors have been virtually ignored for over a decade. As a result, we have large gaps in the North American air defense network, obsolete air defense interceptors and antisatellite and ballistic-missile defense R. & D. programs that have truly fallen behind the Soviets.

Our program is multifaceted. It will improve air surveillance in coordination with Canada by deploying a combination of our overthe-horizon backscatter, OTH-B, radars and improved versions of existing radars; and development efforts toward more enduring sensors will be started.

We will replace five squadrons of aging F-106 interceptors with new F-15's and buy at least six AWACS aircraft for peacetime and wartime surveillance and interceptor control.

We will continue to pursue an operational antisatellite system. Finally, an expanded but cost-effective civil defense program will be developed in coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

BUDGET AND COSTS

I consider the elimination of the growing window of vulnerability of such high priority that it would be worth almost any amount of money. There can be no pricetag on national survival. But we need not face such stark choices, for our strategic modernization program is affordable, even within the reduced spending levels mandated by the President's economic recovery program.

As the President noted in announcing his strategic decision, the entire cost of maintaining and rebuilding our strategic forces over the next 5 years will consume less than 15 percent of our defense expenditure, considerably below the 20 percent spent on strategic arms in the 1960's during the last comparable modernization of our deterrent forces. Thus the program is clearly affordable.

In summary, this comprehensive program modernizes all elements of our strategic posture, commences the redressal of the existing imbalance with Soviet forces and signals both our resolve and our capability to counter further growth in Soviet power.

We believe we have used the unique opportunity presented to us in order to mold a strategic force that will meet the objectives of our national strategy and serve as an effective deterrent in the years to come. This concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much.

I understand that Secretary Borsting will soon be joining the Secretary of Defense in another hearing before an Appropriations Subcommittee. We will pose these questions and ask if the panel will answer them in a manner that you all decide among yourselves.

First, the B-1 cost, because of the reductions which have been made in the President's defense programs, it is even more important now that we understand the true cost implications of the B-1 bomber in the two-bomber program.

What programs are funded in the President's request other than the B-1 and related to the long range combat aircraft program and not publicly identified with it?

Dr. WADE. The breakdown addresses the bomber program in totality. If you would like me to break it down in detail, I can provide it for the record.

Senator WARNER. I would suggest you do that. [The information follows:]

B-1B COST INFORMATION

The core B-1B program for RDT&E and procurement of 100 aircraft with spares and baselevel support equipment is estimated at $19.7B. An additional $379M is budgeted in the proper other accounts for manufacturing facilities, manufacturing technology and component improvements. Flight simulators, which are normally budgeted in another account are under discussion but estimates will not be firm for a few years due to basing decisions; that is number of bases and whether all will be central operating or some will be dispersal with training at a main base.

The inclusion of the potential additions and items budgeted in other accounts but singularly caused by the B-1B will bring the program total to the order of $20.5B plus $400M budgeted in other accounts.

Senator WARNER. We have an estimate of perhaps $1.5 to $3 billion for testing, certification, improvements, production technology, and facility improvement. Would you care to comment on our evaluation? Dr. BORSTING. Will you restate the question?

Senator WARNER. We have a staff estimate of $1.5 to $3 billion for testing, certification, improvements, production technology, and facility improvement.

Dr. BORSTING. This is for the B-1B?

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Dr. BORSTING. This would be the staff estimate for costs in addition to the basic estimate?

Senator WARNER. That would be correct.

Dr. BORSTING. Let me just answer a general question about the estimated B-1B program costs.

The figure that we used in presenting strategic options to the President was an order-of-magnitude estimate. This was a figure that the program manager initially came up with. We have worked with it and we have scrubbed certain things. For example, on multiyear contracting we feel that we can achieve some savings, and that was taken off the figure submitted by the project manager.

We have also said we did not think we would have as many engineering change orders as the Air Force estimate allowed for, and we reduced the program figure accordingly.

There have been about $1.7 billion of cost reductions factored into the current, still tenative estimates.

Our cost-analysis group and the Air Force are reviewing very carefully whether those savings can really be achieved.

Senator WARNER. Are the weapons to be carried by the B-1 funded in the B-1 account?

Dr. BORSTING. No, they would be funded separately. The cruise missiles, for example, would be funded in the cruise missile account. Senator WARNER. Then how much have you added to compensate for these weapons?

Dr. BORSTING. To the B-1B cost, you mean?

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Dr. BORSTING. Well, for example, for additions to the B-1B for external and internal carriage, for the cruise missile we have added $800 million. That is the total cost for those modifications. It is not for the missiles themselves, but for the modifications so that the bombers can carry the cruise missiles.

Senator WARNER. Well now, that would be incorporated in the B-1 figure itself?

Dr. BORSTING. Yes.

Senator WARNER. You are telling me and we will go into design of the B-1 with another panel, although any of you who wish to comment may do so-what you are telling me is that you put $800 million to $1 billion in the B-1 account to make arrangements so it can be a cruise missile carrier; is that correct?

Dr. BORSTING. Originally, some of the base-cost figures that have been given did not include that $800 million, and I am saying that any figures we would have now would include the $800 million.

Senator WARNER. So that is pylons and electronics and release mechanisms and all of the other things?

Dr. BORSTING. Yes.

Senator WARNER. My question was, what about the weapon load that this system will carry, namely, the cruise missiles and perhaps iron bombs and all of the rest, where is that figure?

Dr. BORSTING. Well, it would carry 22 cruise missiles, I believe 8 internally and 14 externally.

Jim, do you want to add to this?

Dr. WADE. As to specific loadouts, I would suggest we wait for closed hearings.

Senator WARNER. Well, in terms of the types of weapons, but what about the dollar figure associated with the weapon load that would make this an effective system?

Dr. BORSTING. By dollar figure you mean the total cost of the weapons themselves, all of the different weapons?

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Dr. BORSTING. I can give that to you and I don't have it with me. [The information follows:]

B-1B WEAPONS

The B-1B will have the capability to carry varying weapon loads. Those range from 22 ALCMs, 24 SRAMS, 24 nuclear gravity weapons, such as B-83 and B-61. Conventional weapons' capability for carrying large numbers of MK-82/84 will also be in place at the IOC.

The nuclear weapons loading will vary depending upon the specific scenario for an individual bomber and the timing within the Single Integrated Operations

Plan (SIOP). Most likely the weapons loading will be mixed consisting of ALCM, SRAM and gravity bombs. Typical weapons loadings would be as follows:

Standoff Mission-8 ALCM internal and 14 ALCM external.

Penetration Mission-16 gravity weapons and 8 SRAM.

Shoot and Penetrate Mission-8 ALCM, 4 gravity weapons and 4 SRAM. In general, the B-1B will be capable of carrying an average load of 22-24 nuclear weapons on a single mission. The costs for the weapons should not be attributed to the B-1B program because in general weapons will be transferred from the B-52 aircraft which will be phased out as B-1Bs enter the inventory. If in the future additional weapons are required to uniquely support the B-1B, the associated costs will be submitted to the committee, although it should be again reiterated that we, at this time, do not foresee this condition.

Senator WARNER. You don't have a ballpark idea?

Dr. BORSTING. I do not have any total figure with me.

Senator WARNER. Is your cost estimate for the B-1 a multiyear procurement?

Dr. BORSTING. Yes; it does presently assume, as I mentioned earlier, a savings for multiyear procurement in the outyears once we are sure of the configuration of the B-1B.

Dr. WADE. In addition, the B-1 production contract will be of a firm, fixed-price nature, which gives us a more firm handle on outyear cost control.

Senator WARNER. Can we assume that Congress, which has not yet decided the multiyear procurement issue for large procurement programs, will be approving multiyear contracts for the B-1 procurement lot or decisions will have to be made before testing is complete?

Dr. BORSTING. In any multiyear procurement we inform the Congress of our intention to go on a multiyear contract. For example, in 1982 we have four systems that we have told the Congress that we would go multiyear for.

Senator WARNER. Do you have a breakout of detail to give you the proper authority to do that, as to the differential between a multiyear contract with the B-1 vice the standard program?

Dr. BORSTING. Yes.

Senator WARNER. What is that?
Dr. BORSTING. It is $800 million.

Senator WARNER. Program costs for the B-1?

Dr. BORSTING. Yes, Senator.

Senator WARNER. That is an incentive. Can you assure me that the reductions in the cost estimate of the B-1 are proper with respect to estimates and gains from an improved learning curve? That is the $600 million in the budget which would fund largely engineering change orders; is that true?

Dr. BORSTING. We are continually scrubbing these estimates. At this time we think that they are accurate, but we are having hearings and having the OSD staff work more with the contractors and other people to make sure that these are accurate estimates.

Senator WARNER. Are there any other comments on that?

Dr. WADE. No, sir, it is important to note that this rescrubbing of the detailed cost estimates with the OSD staff is still going on. We are getting to the point where we are close to having a firm foundation on the out year total program cost.

Senator WARNER. Could you investigate and assure the Senate that funding for the engine components, engineering development, has not been transferred to a component improvement program in violation of the Defense Department regulations?

Dr. WADE. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. What improvements to the B-1 bomber were considered by the Defense Department or the Air Force and rejected? Dr. BORSTING. Mr. Jones will talk about that.

Mr. JONES. As you know, the original version of the B-1 bomber was supersonic. We have deleted that because it does not really buy us any improvement in the ability to penetrate.

As far as I know, there were no major improvements in terms of things that would help the airplane to penetrate that were rejected. Senator WARNER. Well, from the standpoint of fiscal management then, the Air Force will not come in, in all likelihood, and state that the fiscal managers denied us this variant or that variant or that system, and we got pretty much what the Air Force wanted in terms of the design for the B-1?

Mr. JONES. Yes; that is correct, Senator. They have in there what they wanted and, moreover, OSD in conjunction with the Air Force have added the cruise missile carriage provision which will give the bomber more flexibility and roughly triple the effectiveness over what we had before.

Senator WARNER. Perhaps. Are you capable of putting in the record a description of this B-1 as it now is envisioned? By that I mean, we have the old one, and I remember when I was on the R. & D. Subcommittee I took an active role in preserving some of the dollars so the testing could continue.

Could you describe to me what we hope to achieve at the end of the production line, in this request vice what is on the testbed out there now?

Mr. JONES. We could furnish that for the record.

Senator WARNER. You couldn't give a brief description?

Mr. JONES. I would rather furnish it for the record, if you don't mind.

Senator WARNER. All right.

[The information follows:]

CHANGES FROM B-1 TO B-1B

The major differences between the B-1 (which we have been testing) and the B-1B are as follows:

Cruise missile carry capability.

A relocatable forward weapons bay bulkhead is added to accommodate longer weapons such as current cruise missile.

Provisions for incorporating the capability to carry external stores on the fuselage is added.

Engine nacelles are modified to better match the reduced supersonic requirements and to further reduce observables.

Takeoff gross weight limit is raised from 395,000 to 477,000 pounds for improved range and payload capability.

Provisions for incorporating the capability to carry external droppable fuel tanks is added.

Aircraft radar cross-section is reduced tenfold.

Variable geometry inlet is replaced by fixed inlets with some features for reducing radar cross-section added.

Improved avionics suite drawing from the B-52 Offensive Avionics System modifications to take advantage of commonality with new B-52 equipment and radar equipment and on the F-15 and F-16.

Additional use of composites for weight and cost reduction is added.

Wing sweep retained, but reduced from 67.5° sweep to 60° to simplify the wing fuselage fairing.

Higher frequency jamming and new jamming techniques to contend with most recent threat predictions.