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INDICES OF SURVIVING U.S. CAPABILITIES AFTER A SOVIET FIRST STRIKE*
(U.S. FORCES FULLY GENERATED). EQUIVALENT MEGATONS
HARD TARGIT KILL POTENTIAL
*Includes prelaunch survivability, reliabiiity, and the ability to penetrate defenses.
B-52D RETIREMENT: WEAPONS AND MEGATONS Senator NUNN. Dr. Ikle, what percentage of the total number of weapons and available megatonnage will retirement of the B-52s represent?
What are the same measurements for the Titan missile force ?
What is the total percentage of the number of weapons and megatonnage represented in the B-52D and Titan retirement as planned in the Reagan program?
When will these decreases be replaced ? Does it make sense to replace or offset these decreases either before they are taken or at least at the same time?
ANSWER. In terms of our 1987 capabilities, when all B-52Ds and Titans would be retired from the Strategic inventory, the 75 B-52Ds would represent [deleted] percent of our warheads [deleted] percent of our equivalent megatonnage available under generated alert conditions before a Soviet first strike. 52 Titan IIS would represent less than [deleted] percent of our warheads and about [deleted] percent of our equivalent megatonnage in terms of preattack measures in the same year. Retaining these two older systems would add less than [deleted] percent more warheads [deleted] percent more equivalent megatonnage to the planned 1987 arsenal.
Current plans would add more than [deleted] times as many on-line warheads to the arsenal in fiscal year 1983 as are planned for retirement in that year. By 1987, [deleted] times as many warheads will have been added as are planned for retirement. Equivalent megatonnage will be added to the force somewhat more slowly, although by 1987, when the B-52D and Titan II retirements are complete, more than [deleted] times as much equivalent megatonnage will have been added to the force as is planned for retirement.
The decision to retire these aging and costly systems on the schedule proposed, especially in view of the planned force modernization, makes good sense. Moreover, we do not feel obligated to maintain such costly forces merely to maintain the appearance of force capabilities more effective than we actually possess.
CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM Senator NUNN. Dr. Ikle, can you provide the committee with a complete picture of the Reagan cruise missile program as compared to that envisioned in the Carter fiscal year 1982 and 5-year program to include respective time frames?
How many advanced technology cruise missiles were in the Carter program? How many are included in the new Reagan program?
Dr. IKLE. The cruise missile efforts in lioth the Carter and Reagan programs included the Air Launched, Ground and Sea Launched cruise missiles as well as advanced cruise missile technology efforts.
The fiscal year 1982 Carter program would procure a total of [deleted] ALCMS wheres the current program is recommending a procurement of [deleted] PAA ALCMs or a total buy of over [deleted].
Both the Reagan and Carter programs support the December 1979 NATO Ministers' decision which procures [deleted] PAA GLCMs or a total buy of [deleted] missiles.
Both the Reagan and Carter programs supported procurement of the conventionally armed land attack and antiship Tomahawk sea launched cruise missiles. While the Carter program supported continued development of the sea launched nuclear land attack variant, no procurement was budgeted in the near term. However, the Reagan program supports procurement of [deleted] nuclear land attack SLCMs starting in 1984 which will have both strategic reserve and worldwide Theater Nuclear Force roles.
Senator NUNN. Dr. Ikle, have you addressed yourself to the possible arms control implications of deploying long-range sea-launched cruise missiles equipped with nuclear warheads for strategic missions aboard attack submarines? Have you considered any adverse impact which may result as a consequence of these tactical warfare assets being diverted from their primary mission to perform SIOP roles and due to their tactical warfare weapons load-out being degraded ?
ANSWER. With regard to arms control, I would note that the deployment of nuclear-armed SLCM's will occur well after the SALT II Protocol would have expired, had that Treaty come into force. Hence the deployment would have been consistent with the terms of that Treaty. With regard to future arms control efforts, and the concern heard in some quarters that deployment of nuclear SLCMS will complicate verification of a future agreement, I would note the following. First, the Soviets have already deployed large numbers of cruise missiles on their submarines and surface ships. To the extent that a problem exists, or will exist, it is already there and not of U.S. making. Second, there is implicit in this concern the assumption that if we do not deploy certain weapons systems, then the Soviets won't deploy them either. There is no basis for such an assumption. On the contrary, the Soviets give every evidence of deploying the systems they regard as serving their interests, regardless of U.S. actions, and despite our forbearance. With regard to your second point, our deployment of nuclear SLOMs will be done in such a manner as not to affect adversely the tactical warfare capabilities of the launch platforms.
ENDURING NUCLEAR WAR Senator Nunx. Dr. Ikle, recent press accounts have suggested that a major policy element in President Reagan's strategic modernization program is the emphasis on being able to conduct an "enduring nuclear war," a war that lasts days, weeks, and months. "Endurance” according to this concept would be more than the ability of weapons systems and C to ride out an initial attack, it would involve the ability of the United States to reconstitute its forces again and again over long periods punctuated by nuclear attack.
Is there a Reagan Administration policy which gives greater priority than in the past to scenarios in which nuclear exchanges continue on for days, weeks, or even months?
What is the basis for assuming that nuclear wars are likely to be of long endurance?
What is the concept of employment of the different components of American nuclear forces during a nuclear war of long duration?
Is the administration's interest in deep underground basing for ICBMs related to a need for long enduring retaliatory weapons ?
ANSWER. The qualities of endurance and survivability have long been recognized as being an essential part of a credible deterrent strategy. The Reagan Administration is, however, placing greater emphasis on obtaining enduring systems and supporting 001 to ensure that we are capable of retaliating with overwhelming strength under all circumstances.
We put a great deal of stress on this and we think this is a very important part of our broader and balanced deterrence posture.
The reasoning is that we want to deny Soviet planners who may design an attack, either for a peak crisis or for an attack out of the blue, every possible avenue of thinking whereby they could expect to obtain an advantage by initiating nuclear war.
One great concern by a number of thoughtful analysts who have followed Soviet programs is that they might plan on a massive, quick, initial surprise attack which would to a large extent disarm us of some of our more vulnerable systems, and then leave the United States with such a disorganized capability of residual offensive arms and a largely disabled command and control and communications system that there could be no more response that would serve a purpose, or that further response could be deterred by the remaining Soviet weaponry.
It has been feared that this kind of planning might be combined with the utilization of the rather advanced Soviet civil defense system, permitting the evacuation of most of their urban populations so that they could either deter, or if they can't really deter and disarm the retaliatory strike, survive part of it, and then return as the only nucelar power on Earth and dominate the outcome of such a horrible war.
It is in order to foreclose that thinking, however important it may be in Soviet plans—and there are indications it has gained some importance over the last 10 or 20 years—that we want enduring survival, that is to say, we want to close the last door to any half-way rational Soviet plan for initiating war.
Senator NUNN. Can you discuss the degree to which concerns about environmentally-related opposition and possible litigation influenced the decision not to proceed with an MX/MPS basing in the Great Basin Region ? Were such concerns totally absent from the policy-making deliberations? Do you intend to take steps to streamline the environmental impact review process as it may relate to alternative MX basing schemes such as reconstructed Minuteman silos or deep underground basing?
ANSWER. The serious environmental impact of MPS basing and the concerns of the affected citizens were of course in our minds. However, at all times we believed that if President Reagan told the people in the deployment areas that he was absolutely convinced MPS basing was necessary and that his defense experts were convinced it was much better than any other system, opposition would have melted away. Therefore, the environmentally-related opposition and threats of litigation did not loom large in our thinking. The fact is that the President and his advisors did not conclude that MPS was in the best interests of the national security.
We are a long way from making any decision about whether it will be necessary to streamline the environmental impact review process for any future basing decision.
ALTERNATIVES WITHIN THE STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PLAN
Senator Nunn. Dr. Ikle, Dr. Wade, you have described how different strategic programs should work together, but could you explain why we could not do as well with the Advanced Technology Bomber rather than the B-1 and do much better with some form of MX/MPS rather than doing only the uncertain R. & D. initiatives such as Deep Underground Basing and the Long Endurance Aircraft. This last point would seem to be very important in light of the recent Defense Science Board conclusion that Ballistic Missile Defense could be greatly enhanced by deceptive basing such as MPS.
ANSWER. The B-1 is needed because it is here and now. It will provide us predictable and very useful performance at a predictable time and at predictable cost. The ATB is a great hope for the nation's defense in the future, but at this point we cannot write down its characteristics, schedule, or costs. On MX basing, there is no question that in principle deceptive basing makes the job of ballistic missile defense easier. In the future we will consider various types of deceptive basing for IOBM's and/or for their defending interceptors. However, these will be system concepts optimized from the beginning for integration of ICBM's and active defenses.
Senator QUAYLE. The meeting will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m. the committee was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]
STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1981
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES,
STRATEGIC PROGRAMING AND BUDGETING
The subcommittee met in open session pursuant to notice at 9 a.m., in room 212, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John W. Warner,
Present : Senators Warner, Jackson, and Levin.
Staff present: Frank J. Gaffney, professional staff members; Francis J. Sullivan, minority staff director; Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Ronald F. Lehman, José E. Martinez, E. George Riedel, professional staff members; and Mary A. Shields, staff assistant.
Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Buzz Hefti, assistant to Senator Warner; Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Robert Nichols, assistant to Senator Jackson; Frank Krebs, assistant to Senator Cannon; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; and Peter Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER,
Senator WARNER. I tender my apologies to one and all. Last night I was selected to do an early segment on the Today show, from the viewpoint of the President's position on AWACS, and then go to an
interest of the administration had to be met, and I apologize.
We begin our third hearing this morning on the Reagan strategic modernization program. On Monday we received testimony on the strategic nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union.
Yesterday, the subcommittee received testimony on the strategic doctrines and defense policies which provide the framework within which the strategic modernization package will operate. Now we must
The Reagan administration proposes a two-bomber program—both the B-1 and an advanced-technology bomber.
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