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assessment was made by Dr. Perry last April, so presumably there is information since last April.
ANSWER. While the background leading to the statement made by Dr. Perry is not available to us, we would disagree with the statement as presented. Although the Soviets are developing advanced technological systems with considerable one-on-one capabilities, full Soviet defense against combined attacks of U.S. aerodynamic forces remains unlikely in this decade.
Senator LEVIN. That assessment was made by Dr. Perry last April, so presumably there is information since last April. That is what you are saying, Mr. Hoffmann? That is April 1980.
Mr. HOFFMANN. I am not aware of where Dr. Perry came up with a number relative to this. How do you define that as being the deployment?
Admiral BURKHALTER. If we might, I would like to take that question and give you a better answer for the record.
Senator LEVIN. OK.
Admiral BURKHALTER. I would like to take it for the record and provide you with a record answer to make sure that we give you the best information we have.
Senator LEVIN. If I have a couple of more minutes. I don't want to monopolize your time. I am not on the subcommittee.
Senator WARNER. We welcome you and we will give you what additional time is necessary. I would like to adjourn in about 6 or 8 minutes to resume the classified hearings in another room.
Senator LEVIN. Is is generally true that our ECM has lagged behind Soviet air defense by a couple of years?
Admiral BURKHALTER. I would like again to turn to one of our experts because that is an area in which I do not have a good expertise.
Mr. HOFFMANN. I cannot talk about that within this session.
SOVIET VERSUS U.S. MODERNIZATION Senator LEVIN. You have indicated, Admiral, the modernization of the Soviet strategic forces this morning, and I would like to ask you a question about the modernization of our strategic forces during the last decade. Would you agree that during this period of time, we have modernized our forces in the following way: One, with the Trident I missile ?
Admiral BURKHALTER. Yes.
Admiral BURKHALTER. The Trident sub which is yet to deploy. The first one is commissioned this coming Saturday.
Senator LEVIN. If I ask you this question next Monday, your answer would be “yes” to that?
Admiral BURKHALTER. We still have the deployment.
Senator LEVIN. How about air launch? We are close to the deployment of those, aren't we?
Admiral BURKHALTER. Yes; I am not as current on some of those systems as the Soviet systems but that system I believe will be in operation in the next year or two.
Senator LEVIN. How about improvements to the B-52's?
Admiral BURKHALTER. Again, sir, you are getting beyond my area of expertise I think there have been some improvements but this is a pretty old airplane.
Senator LEVIN. How about avionics for the B-52?
Admiral BURKHALTER. They have been improved, and whether improved in the last decade or not, I am not at liberty to say because I am not
Senator LEVIN. How about the Mark 12A ?
Admiral BURKHALTER. That has been incorporated in the Minuteman, and again I can't give you the precise dates on that system.
Senator LEVIN. Well, you don't know whether they have been deployed within the last decade or not?
Admiral BURKHALTER. Yes, sir, I have, but to give you the precise dates—but if I might give you, do you have any other question ?
Senator LEVIN. You asked the chairman for time to answer some other questions. How about command and control in the Minuteman? Do you know whether that has been improved ?
Admiral BURKHALTER. The command and control has not been improved, not much during the past decade. There are plans to do that, but if I could just give you one statement which is somewhat germane, you compare those improvements to what the Soviets have done and the Soviets have deployed significantly more systems than we feel
Senator LEVIN. I don't doubt that but I want a comparison. I agree with you, if you look at both sides of the story, they made greater advances than we have, and I want to make sure we are looking at both sides of it. It is just not one-sided, a 99-page assessment of their strength without looking at our strength.
Admiral BURKHALTER. Yes, sir.
SOVIET DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
Senator LEVIN. The other question is you indicated this morning, I guess after some prodding by our chairman, that you believed they have spent $300 billion more in strategic weaponry than we have over the last decade, and I am wondering if you could tell us what they spent and what we have spent which resulted in that figure, that bottom line figure.
Have they spent $900 billion and we spent $600 billion, and that nets out at $300 billion, or how did you arrive at that figure?
Admiral BURKHALTER. Sir, we don't have detailed numbers here. Our statement was about the difference in total military investment. Should the number we gave you be off, I will correct the record.
Senator LEVIN. That will be fine, and I thank you and I thank the chairman for allowing me to participate.
Mr. Hoffmann, if you would also, or Admiral, could give us for the record what has taken place since April of last year which would change the assessment of Dr. Perry ? Again, is his assessment of April 30 of last year, was that the Soviet strategic air defense, the new generation will be reaching its full deployment in 1987. If you could provide for the record what has happened since then, or indicate that maybe nothing has happened and you don't agree with the assessment that would be most helpful.
Admiral BURKHALTER. Yes, sir; we will be more than happy to do that, Senator."
Senator WARNER. I want to clarify that $300 billion figure. You have indicated that that was a development in the strategic area. Are you quite sure ?
Admiral BURKHALTER. I believe that is overall military investment.
Senator WARNER. It is my understanding it is an overall Defense figure.
Admiral BURKHALTER. We will be glad to give you that. [The information follows:]
NATO AND WARSAW PACT DEFENSE EXPENDITURES Senator LEVIN. “How much has been spent in the past decade by the US/NATO and Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact on defense-all systems, not just strategic?”
Answer. A comparison of the overall levels of defense activities of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances is possible by valuing their military programs in US dollars. For the 1971-80 period, the estimated cumulative defense outlays for NATO nations amounted to the equivalent of 2,100–2,500 billion US dollars (1980 prices). In contrast, the estimated cumulative dollar costs of Warsaw Pact military programs amounted to $1,800–2,200 billion (1980 prices).
These dollar figures include the cost of military investment, operating, and research and development programs for all branches of the armed forces.
The range for the NATO costs reflects the uncertainty regarding the calculation of dollar equivalents for non-US NATO defense outlays. The range for the Warsaw Pact data is due to uncertainty about the estimated quantities and US prices used to develop the appropriate dollar costs.
Senator LEVIN. Well, I misunderstood your question, I wasn't here and my information was wrong. I am sorry.
Senator WARNER. I made a footnote here to correct that. I think maybe inadvertently in the direct testimony the figure was used exclusively for strategic as a delta and now that is verified as being accurate. But I think the reality is that the figure relates to the overall expenditures of Defense for all systems and not just strategic.
Admiral BURKHALTER. I would like to provide you with a clarifying number that we could give you, sir, both for the record for this session, and if there is any more detail for the closed session we can do that.
Senator LEVIN. In that case I would ask a different question. If you would also give us for the record the total expenditures of the Warsaw Pact and NATO during that time, and if you would give us the exchange rates that you are using when you compare those figures.
Senator WARNER. We will adjourn now and resume in S. 407. Only those persons cleared for executive session may appear.
[Whereupon, at 10:25 a.m. the committee was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]
STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1981
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES,
Washington, D.C. STRATEGIC POLICY AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
The subcommittee met in open session pursuant to notice at 8:36 a.m., room 212, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John W. Warner, chairman, presiding.
Present: Senators Warner, Thurmond, Quayle, Nunn, Exon, and Levin.
Staff present: Rhett B. Dawson, staff director and chief counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Louis W. Arny, Frank J. Gaffney, Ronald F. Lehman, José E. Martinez, and E. George Riedel, professional staff members.
Also present: Buzz Hefti, assistant to Senator Warner; Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Bill Furniss, assistant to Senator Quayle; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Greg Pallas, assisiant to Senator Exon; and Peter Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER,
posal is de la force of technology ban impro
Senator WARNER. We begin this morning the second in a series of hearings on the President's submission of his plan for the modernization of America's strategic nuclear forces. He described a five-part package which addressed each leg of the strategic Triad, civil and air defense, and the command, control, and communications systems, C3, which are the nerves of our strategic deterrent.
The President spoke first of revitalizing our bomber forces. His proposal is a two-bomber program which would have the U.S. Air Force procure a force of 100 modified B-1 bombers while development continues on an advanced technology bomber.
The two-bomber program provides an improved near-term capability and a hedge against difficulties with the so-called Stealth technology. As such, the President's two-bomber program represents a major commitment to enhancing the air-breathing leg of the nuclear Triad.
Nevertheless, the decision to go ahead with the B-1 bomber more than 4 years after that aircraft had been canceled by a previous President has encountered much opposition. Critics doubt the military effectiveness of the B-1 bomber and fear that the cost of the twobomber program will weaken other programs.
in the days and weeks ahead this subcommittee will devote much of its time to evaluating America's strategic bomber needs in light of defense budgets which will be less than had been anticipated last March.
The President's second initiative was the approval of the Trident II D-5 missile and the decision to deploy nuclear armed sea-launched crise missiles.
This subcommittee welcomes the decision on the D-5. Last year the Senate Armed Services Committee added funding to accelerate the Trident II missile and expressed strong support for the D-5 version. It has been the committee view that the Ohio class submarines should be equipped with the optimal missile in terms of accuracy, range, and payload, even at the sacrifice of an earlier initial operational capability, IOC.
The Reagan D-5 program continues, I believe, along these lines.
In light of the uncertain future basing options for the MX missile, the subcommittee will undoubtedly wish to pay special attention to the D-5 program to insure that the program is a success. We will also examine the administration's decisions to pursue a less vigorous Trident submarine program and its new emphasis on nuclear, sealaunched cruise missiles.
Perhaps no part of the President's strategic package is more controversial than his proposals for basing the new MX missile. The President has rejected, to the surprise of many, the multiple protective structure basing concept endorsed by the two previous administrations and by the Air Force. I should add that such deceptive basing of mobile missiles was also endorsed by the Congress and supported by the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.
The President rejected the so-called shell game because, in his words, “No matter how many shelters we might build, the Soviets can build more missiles, more quickly and just as cheaply."
The President proposes that we temporarily deploy the MX missile in superhardened, existing silos while we search for a more survivable, long-term basing mode.
The President has focused this search on deep underground basing, ballistic missile defense and a continuous patrol aircraft. The subcommittee will examine these proposals carefully because of the high cost of the MX program, its importance and the uncertainty which surrounds the selection of an ultimate basing mode.
The President's decision to give greater priority to command, control, and communications has found many supporters in this subcommittee, which, this very year, was responsible for the largest congressionally-mandated C3 initiative ever. In fact, the programs we have added this year are the very ones to be found at the heart of the President's C3 package.
Nevertheless, the President's proposal goes far beyond the level of funding which had thus far been supported for strategic communications. Because of the high cost associated with these systems, especially close congressional scrutiny will be necessary to insure that we are not over-reacting to what has been a serious problem.