Admiral BURKHALTER. Mr. Hoffmann, can you give us an answer on that which we could use in this unclassified hearing?

Mr. HOFFMANN. It will have to be limited but in essence I think the technology in air defense is probably roughly better or equal to U.S. technology, and I think we are now entering essentially a numbers game. The Soviets will have to add a lot of brand new technology which they have developed and it is a question of how long it is going to take them to deploy that much over the entire Soviet Union, because the defense essentially has to defend the whole country. It is going to take them quite a while to deploy these newer systems in very, very large numbers.

So it is a numbers game and catchup as to how long it is going to take the Soviets. We estimate probably in the nineties some time they will start having a completely adequate system against low-altitude bombers.

Senator WARNER. Let me see if I can summarize. The present air defense system that is described in this paper was designed to meet the forces in existence today, basically the B-52 and the FB-111 and any other threat we might have. Is that correct?

Mr. HOFFMANN. No; we don't think it is very adequate against any low-altitude threat as it stands right now.

Senator WARNER. Primarily it is a high-altitude system?

Mr. HOFFMANN. Yes.

Senator WARNER. With very low capability for low-altitude penetration?

Mr. HOFFMANN. Yes.

Senator WARNER. So if the B-1 were in existence today and would be put against this air defense system, would the B-1 clearly survive? Mr. HOFFMANN. Yes.

Senator WARNER. Now, the B-1 is to come into our inventory, if authorized by the Congress, in the late eighties. At that time is it your judgment that the Soviets will have begun an intensive program to modernize their air defense systems, specifically directed toward lowlevel penetration by a bomber of the B-1 class?

Mr. HOFFMANN. Yes; they certainly will have begun. It is a question of numbers, very large numbers that they are going to require.

Admiral BURKHALTER. If I might clarify also: I believe Mr. Hoffmann is saying that it will take large numbers of improved Soviet systems to be able to counter the B-1. We feel the B-1 would be an effective system certainly for a period of time. The Soviets will clearly try to develop systems to counter the B-1. Follow-on U.S. systems would be in order to further counter those systems.

I personally think the B-1 system would be a very good system against what the Soviets have or would contemplate in the intermediate future.

Senator WARNER. Let's be more specific with those dates. First, as I understand your point, on the qualitative and quantitative program: Qualitatively they probably have the technical capability to develop an air defense system that could interdict the B-1 as we now have it on the drawing boards, that is the modernized upgraded B-1. Quantitatively it is going to put them to an enormous expense to provide for the Soviet Union sufficient units of this air defense system to be a deterrent against the B-1. Is that correct?

Admiral BURKHALTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. HOFFMANN. We would also have to discuss the ECM game, and I don't think we should go into that now.

Admiral BURKHALTER. We can provide some more details during the closed hearings, sir.

Senator WARNER. Were you tasked as an agency to comment on this strategic program of the President?

Admiral BURKHALTER. No, sir, not to my knowledge. Any questions we get from the Joint Chiefs we provide the answers on, of course, on a daily basis. We could have had some questions from the staff in regard to various alternative programs but as far as a formal request for a formal program review from DIA, I am not aware of that.

Mr. HOFFMANN. I was chairman of the threat group for the intelligence support to the B-1 study that was done last year, and then it was held in abeyance for decision.

Senator WARNER. You did the current analysis for DIA on the B-1 bomber and you chaired the overall intergovernmental group?

Mr. HOFFMANN. It was an intergovernmental threat group.

Admiral BURKHALTER. We participated in many different threat studies, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. I appreciate that.

If I might return to you, in connection with your duties as chairman and in the preparation of the reports could you be more specific with respect to the timeframe within which the B-1 as now envisioned and before the Congress would be an effective system in relation to the Soviet air defense? What is the timeframe?

Mr. HOFFMANN. I would say it would be an effective system up through the midnineties.

Senator WARNER. That is the midnineties?

Mr. HOFFMANN. Yes.

Senator WARNER. In which event the Soviets will qualitatively and quantitatively have developed an air system which would make it no longer an operationally effective thing?

Mr. HOFFMANN. In addition, as I mentioned before, you have to evaluate the effects of ECM.

Senator WARNER. That is a variant in here which, being classified, we can't get into, but that might prolong the effectiveness beyond the midnineties the capability of the B-1 bomber?

Mr. HOFFMANN. That is right.

Admiral BURKHALTER. Of course, again, with the technological development we have today and some additional countermeasures on our side to help keep that system further effective over into the latter part of the nineties.

CIVIL DEFENSE

Senator WARNER. I am going to close with a few more questions and then I will yield to my colleague, Senator Levin.

Now on civil defense: Historically, the Soviets have put a far greater emphasis on civil defense than the United States.

Would you trace the reasoning for that?

Admiral BURKHALTER. Sir, we believe that the Soviet emphasis on civil defense is a part of their overall philosophy of how to fight a war. They believe that it is necessary to take the steps to protect their military and their civil leaders. It is just a logical thing for them to

do and they have devoted considerable effort to that over a number of years.

As we indicated earlier, they have over 100,000 people deployed full time in their civil defense effort. We have seen many efforts by them to provide hardened facilities in order to relocate not only their military, but also their civilian leadership and we think there are probably some efforts to try to harden many of their crucial facilities, their industries, and protect further many of their key workers in these key industries. But it has been a part of the Soviet philosophy that we have observed now for at least the last 10 or 15 years, and it is just part of their way of thinking and their way of life, sir.

VERIFICATION OF SS-20 DEPLOYMENT

Senator WARNER. I have one last question: Back to the SS-20's again, there are discussions now as to how the Western World can come to grips with the growth of the SS-20's short of the physically dismantling of these systems. How can we verify any type of arms limitation agreement with respect to the 20's, say the deployment pattern?

Admiral BURKHALTER. I think to give you a proper answer sir, we really should defer that to the next classified session.

Senator WARNER. Could you say it is a complex question? Admiral BURKHALTER. Yes, sir, it is a very complex question. Senator WARNER. Perhaps the most complex in the strategic systems, wouldn't it be?

Admiral BURKHALTER. If it isn't the most, it is among the most, we would agree with you there.

Senator WARNER. Would the threat to Western Europe be at all diminished appreciably if they were just moved out of Eastern Europe? Admiral BURKHALTER. You mean away from the range of NATO? Senator WARNER. Yes.

Admiral BURKHALTER. Well, sir, yes, that would, but then of course they can also retarget their ICBM's. The SS-20 is not the only system they can use to hit Western Europe.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Levin?

DEFENSE AGAINST ATB AND B-1

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hoffmann testified-I think it was Mr. Hoffmann-that it is a tough job to defend against the B-1, an expensive job, too, and I am wondering if it is equally tough or tougher to defend against an ATB. Mr. HOFFMANN. The Stealth, you mean?

Senator LEVIN. You are familiar with the term ATB?
Mr. HOFFMANN. It is the term of the Stealth.

Senator LEVIN. Is that a classified term?

Mr. HOFFMANN. The Soviets don't have an ATB?

It is much more difficult to defend against the Stealth bomber. The radar equation shows that if you have a small cross section, the range is a function of the fourth root of the cross section.

Senator LEVIN. What you say about the expense of defending against a B-1 is even more expensive against the Stealth bomber?

Admiral BURKHALTER. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. I think, Admiral, you gave us the assessment of the midnineties or was that Mr. Hoffmann?

Admiral BURKHALTER. Yes, sir, and I added to that of course that there could well be technological developments on our side, countermeasures that could give us even further protection on into the decade. Senator LEVIN. Doesn't the assumption or assessment of the midnineties assume some new advanced countermeasures?

Admiral BURKHALTER. I am not sure it does, sir, but we can give you much more detail during the classified session. Of course a lot of that depends upon the effort of the Soviets. It will take an enormous effort on their part to be able to counter the B-1.

Senator LEVIN. Are you saying the answer to that question is a classified answer?

Admiral BURKHALTER. No; I didn't mean to imply that.

Senator LEVIN. Will you answer my question again and see if we can get an unclassified answer to it? The question is whether or not the assessment that the B-1's will be good as penetrators to the midnineties, whether that is based on an assessment of a new advanced ECM?

Mr. HOFFMANN. Partially. It is also as I mentioned-
Senator LEVIN. Partially what?

Mr. HOFFMANN. Partially dependent upon ECM.
Senator LEVIN. Is that advanced ECM?

Admiral BURKHALTER. I think the answer we would like to give

you

Senator LEVIN. It is very difficult. I don't know whether to look at you but I think Mr. Hoffmann gave us the first answer, or at least the one I heard, that the B-1 will be a good penetrator until the midnineties. My question is, does that assume advanced ECM for that answer?

Mr. HOFFMANN. Not completely, no.

Senator LEVIN. Does it partly assume advanced ECM?
Mr. HOFFMANN. Partially.

Senator LEVIN. What part?

Mr. HOFFMANN. I would rather not discuss that now.

Senator LEVIN. That is the part you can't testify to in open session. Would you agree, Admiral, with the answer of Mr. Hoffmann that the midnineties date partly assumes some advanced ECM?

Admiral BURKHALTER. Yes, sir, but if I might give you a further answer, Mr. Levin, an amplified answer. As I said earlier, there could well be additional ECM and other countermeasure improvements that could add to the capabilities of the penetrability of that system on into the latter part of the nineties. We can give you a more detailed answer on that in the closed session.

Senator LEVIN. I understand your testimony, but before we get to the latter part of the nineties, I want to get to the midnineties, because I believe that it assumes in part advanced ECM. Mr. Hoffmann apparently says that that is true and partly assumes advanced ECM. You want to talk about the late nineties, where we might be able to get to with further advanced ECM, but I want to go to the answer about the midnineties.

Admiral BURKHALTER. Could I ask Mr. McCrery, my colleague on the right, to comment on that?

Mr. MCCRERY. I think in a session like this, which is a rather general one, we have to be careful about the use of terms and the definition of terms such as advanced ECM. I think when Mr. Hoffmann commented he no doubt was thinking in terms of ECM that we would now call advanced ECM being used. However, if you mean in order to be operationally successful into the midnineties would the United States have to develop some far out advanced ECM not presently conceived or not presently planned, I think that our answer would be no.

Senator LEVIN. How about advanced ECM that is presently conceived?

Mr. MCCRERY. Well, while not wishing to speak for the Defense Department, but here representing only the intelligence portion of the Defense Department, I wouldn't want to comment about what they would include on their airplane, but I would assume that an aircraft as advanced as the B-1 would certainly include as part of its systems complement what we would now consider relatively advanced ECM and other countermeasure techniques.

Senator LEVIN. Which we have now conceived?

Mr. McCRERY. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. And you are saying that further advancements in that which we might be able to conceive of or now conceive it could take it even further?

Mr. MCCRERY. Yes, sir, I believe that is what the admiral was speaking of earlier on in his testimony when he said that it certainly is conceivable and probable that the effectiveness date could be pushed bevond the midnineties.

Senator LEVIN. Has there been a difference of opinion as to whether or not presently conceived provable ECM can carry us into the midnineties? Has there been a difference of opinion on that issue?

Mr. McCRERY. I don't think there has. It certainly is a very complex question and whenever you have a complex question, you have some variance in the different analysts' assessments. But I think if you are looking for a bottom line, I think the answer is that there is not a substantial difference.

Senator LEVIN. There is a consensus on that question?

Mr. McCRERY. Well, I am not sure we have been involved to a depth required to really answer that with a concrete statement.

Senator LEVIN. Just yesterday, I heard that the Soviet strategic air defense will be reaching its full deployment in 1987. Do you agree with that assessment?

Mr. HOFFMANN. What I am saying is what I originally said, that it was a numbers game and there are indications that the Soviets now are going to start to deploy new equipment. If they deploy the numbers of equivalent aircraft and SAM-type systems that they have now, we estimate it will be in the nineties to get to those kinds of numbers. So it is going to be a gradual deteriorating situation.

[Additional information follows:]

FULL DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET AIR DEFENSES

Senator LEVIN. Just yesterday I heard that the strategic air defense will be reaching its full deployment in 1987. Do you agree with that assessment? That