we see it as a result of President Reagan's announcement on October 2. Afterwards my colleagues and I would be pleased to accommodate any of your technical or policy concerns.

It was last February that my predecessor testified to this committee. At that time the Navy did not have an approved Trident II program. Rather, we had an advanced development program for an improved sea-based ballistic missile system.

We would have had a selection sometime in fiscal year 1983. The funding was provided for a missile with an IOC of 1990. Since my predecessor testified to this committee, the Secretary of Defense has directed the Navy to proceed with development and initial deployment of the Trident II missile. The IOC is to be in 1989.

Now it may be possible that the IOC can be advanced somewhat. That is a matter that Rear Adm. Clark to my left is looking into at the present time.

Also, since the last testimony to this group the first Trident submarine, the Ohio, has been to sea and she has enjoyed highly successful sea trials. In fact, she has exceeded performance goals in many critical

areas.

Within recent months the backfit of the Trident I (C-4) missile into seven Poseidon submarines has been completed. Incidentally, I might comment that that Trident I missile has performed significantly better than its own design goals.

The last five Poseidon submarines scheduled for backfit are undergoing that process at the present time and the entire 12-ship program should finish in September of next year.

Later in this decade, as a result of the President's decision, the Trident II (D-5) missile will add an entirely new dimension to our seabased capability. It will also enhance considerably some of our current capabilities.

Most conspicuously will be the fact that for the first time the United States will have a sea-based missile system that is effective across the entire target spectrum from hard silos, including command and control facilities, to the softer military and war supporting industrial targets. This very characteristic is essential to our current strategy.

Of tremendous importance is the fact that the missile will be in a truly nontargetable and fully survivable basing mode. Thus the Navy will have, and the Nation will have, no pressures upon it to use or lose the system and this of itself will be a powerfully stabilizing influence in a crisis situation.

Furthermore, our SLBM survivability will not be coupled to any Soviet proliferation or qualitative improvement of their strategic forces. Therefore, the Nation and the Navy can determine the size of its Trident force with military capability and requirements as the principal entering argument. There will be no need to proliferate systems to compensate for the lack of survivability.

There is another important attribute of the Trident II missile, and that is that it will provide an increment of invulnerable, hard target kill capability with each submarine that goes to sea. Thus, there will be an inducement to the Soviets to move their strategic forces into a more survivable basing mode as each increment of incentive is applied in a measured and deliberate fashion.

This U.S. move to incorporate greater capability into nontargetable systems should provide the leverage and incentives for the Soviets to deemphasize their large throw weight but potentially vulnerable, ICBM force. This could then set the stage for meaningful arms reductions without impacting on either side's legitimate military needs.

Senator WARNER. I am glad you mentioned that. We possibly have in attendance this morning some who take an unusual interest in that side of the ocean. I hope you emphasize that in your testimony, as the other witnesses have, that this buildup directed by President Reagan is with the hope in mind that someday we can reach meaningful and balanced arms control limitation agreements and that there is no lack of determination on the part of our President and the Congress to go forward with this program until such time as those arms control agreements come into being.

Admiral WILLIAMS. In talking about those notions I have in fact stressed the survivability of the submarine-launched ballistic missile system.

In order to reaffirm that idea let me just comment that during the recent years and recent months a broad range of analyses have been accomplished by a range of people, the CIA, the DIA, the Navy itself and Rand Corp., as commissioned by the Air Force. Their findings are unanimous that the submarine launched ballistic missile force is essentially invulnerable today and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

The Navy sees no complications resulting from President Reagan's D-5 Trident II decision. In fact, we see that the D-5 for a total given expenditure will provide much greater capability than our present C-4 missile.

The new missile will have about 75 percent more payload than the current C-4. It will have major improvements in accuracy over the C-4, it will have a full payload range comparable to that of the C-4, and like the C-4, should we so choose, it can have a greater range by removing some of its warheads. It will have flexibility in that the front end will be designed to receive warheads tailored to the target assignment itself.

The Navy has developed an acquisition plan designed to optimize the performance of the missile. We intend to continue to use the same management philosophy and plan that has proved so successful in the past. In essence, the Strategic Systems Project Office under Admiral Clark, again to my left, will function as a prime contractor and integrator of the numerous subcontractors responsible for the various aspects of the weapons system. Specifically we will utilize to the extent possible those subcontractors who have performed successfully in previous missile development and production.

This coupled with avoiding revolutionary, high risk development efforts will shorten the development period. It will contain the total costs and will minimize risks.

Now the concept of the Trident II missile was actually looked at and examined from fiscal year 1978 to fiscal year 1980. This effort explored the full spectrum of accuracy improvements, range, footprints and payload. From the investigations the Trident II program has developed.

Advanced development commenced in 1981. The specific objectives

of that advanced development program include developing selected components and subsystems to reduce acquisition lead time and to define optimum missile configurations, developing to prototype of a new guidance system and pursuing major missile and propulsion improvements throughout ground testing.

Moreover, since fiscal year 1975 the Navy has been conducting the improved accuracy program. That program directly supports the development of Trident II. The program's purpose is to develop the ability to predict with confidence the costs and schedules associated with achieving accuracy improvements in future missiles.

Although that program will not be completed until the end of fiscal year 1982, the developments to date provide very high confidence that the required accuracies will be achieved.

Thus, three major elements of the acquisition program, continuity in project manager, a sound development program and the improved accuracy program gives the Navy great assurance that the Trident II program will optimize the missile performance.

SUBMARINE RETIREMENTS

Turning to the submarines. As you know, we plan to retire the 31 Poseidon hulls after each reaches its nominal life of 30 years. The first hull will retire in fiscal year 1993 and the last in 1999.

We expect the Trident submarine building rate to proceed at one per year. The initial D-5 missiles

Senator WARNER. Excuse me, Admiral. I might just interject that the retirement program was planned in accordance with the terms and conditions of the SALT I agreement, isn't that correct?

Admiral WILLIAMS. No. My comment does not specifically accommodate any past or postulated SALT agreement. That comment just assumes a 30-year life and the first submarine will retire in 1993 and the last submarine will retire in 1999.

Senator WARNER. Well, I think it is tied in.

Admiral WILLIAMS. Excuse me, sir?

Senator WARNER. I think it is tied in with the SALT I agreement, some of those retirements of the hulls.

Admiral WILLIAMS. In closed session I can show you a profile of what the introduction of retirement of submarine hulls would look like and give you a feel for-

Senator WARNER. I am quite aware of that. I just wanted to make that observation.

Admiral WILLIAMS. Now, the Trident building rate. We expect to proceed at one per year as indicated by the President. The initial D-5 missile will be installed in early Trident submarines which will undergo a conversion from a Trident I capability to a Trident II capability. That first submarine is expected to deploy in 1989.

Under our current plans the first new Trident submarine that will be initially configured for the Trident II missile will be the 13th ship scheduled for delivery in fiscal year 1991. This program, as I have described, will result in an all Trident II/D-5 force by the end of the century.

Now because of our decommissioning of Poseidon submarines, our launch tube inventory will decrease from a potential maximum of about 832 tubes in the year 1992 to 480 tubes in the year 2000.

Despite that decline in launch tubes, the capability of the submarine force will continue to increase throughout this and the next decade. This is due almost entirely to the introduction of the more capable D-5 missile. It is also due somewhat to the ability of the Trident submarine to remain at sea for longer durations and a larger percentage of its time than the present Poseidon submarine.

The Navy has not yet determined or recommended an ultimate force size for the SLBM force. There are a number of factors that affect that decision. The overall mix between our ICBM's, cruise missiles, the submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers is a large factor. Of course, U.S. strategy and objectives, the threat, the character of the enemy target system and arms control considerations are also relevant.

All of the foregoing are factors that are being constantly evaluated by our Secretary of Defense and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In order to be a bit more specific, I can give you a feel for the capabilities of several purely illustrative SLBM forces. Because of the greater effectiveness and reliability of the missile, the greater number of tubes and the higher at-sea time, a Trident submarine/C-4 missile combination of about 17 ships will provide the same military capability as the entire force of 31 Poseidon submarines. Fewer Trident SSBN's, when equipped with the Trident II/D-5 missile, will provide a similar capability as to that which we have today.

Now the Navy studies have consistently shown that roughly two squadrons of about 10 SSBN's each would provide a formidable capability. Due to geographic factors, the location of the target base, the relationship between missile range, payload, and accuracy and the desire to maximize the total oneration area available to the submarines, it is almost self-evident that it is appropriate to operate Trident submarines from both the east and the west coasts.

Given that we will have and deploy the Trident II/D-5 missile with its greater capability, the Navy feels the continuation of one submarine per year is a satisfactory building rate.

Unless there are overriding considerations of national importance with regard to force levels and capabilities, the prudent course of action is to plan to continue the one-per-year Trident construction rate.

NUCLEAR LAND ATTACK CRUISE MISSILE

Allow me to shift subjects and talk for a moment about the nuclear land attack cruise missile which the President's program also called for.

Because of the multi-mission aspects of our SSBN's as well as our surface forces, the Navy does not feel that it can afford to dedicate general purpose ships to the strategic role on a continuing basis. However, the general purpose submarines and surface ships that will carry the nuclear land attack Tomahawk cruise missile will represent a formidable capability to supplement the theater nuclear support role. Most importantly, it will provide additional survivable nuclear forces for the Strategic Reserve Force. The latter role could be pivotal in the postwar balance and struggle for recovery.

Regardless of how used these weapons are, they must be considered in the Soviet's calculations of the U.S. capability.

As you mentioned, sir, the President's program places improvements on command and control for all strategic forces and places them at a high priority. The SLBM force must in fact be responsive to the needs of the national command authority. Therefore, the communications systems must facilitate and not degrade the high survivability and endurance enjoyed by the SLBM force. The President's program is a long step in getting our C3 house in order.

Vice Admiral Nagler, the Director of the Navy's Command and Control function for the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, will appear before this committee next week and will discuss these matters in greater detail.

In closing, allow me to express that the Navy believes that President Reagan's program is a wise balance between the needs of strategic forces and the needs of our general purpose forces.

Moreover, the Navy is particularly confident that the D-5 missile can be produced on time and will achieve the desired performance. When matched with the capable Trident submarine and improvements in command and control, the sea-based leg will contribute significantly to deterrence and hopefully will provide the leverage and the incentives for arms reduction.

[The prepared statement of Rear Adm. William A. Williams III follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. WILLIAM A. WILLIAMS III, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR WARFARE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I am Rear Adm. Bill Williams. the Director of the Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. This division is the Navy focal point for translating national nuclear policy into Navy requirements and for assessing how well our current and future systems, plans, and policies support national objectives. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this important subcommittee.

Before proceeding, allow me to introduce key people in the Navy's nuclear missile program: Rear Adm. Glenwood Clark, USN, the Director of the Strategic Systems Project Office; Rear Adm. Frank Kelso, USN, the Director of the Strategic Submarine Division and Trident Program Coordinator and Rear Adm. Walter Locke, the Director of Cruise Missile Projects. I will call on them to respond to technical questions the committee might have.

I will lead off the discussion today with an overview of the Navy's strategic program as directed by President Reagan's announcement of October 2. I will address force capability and effectiveness, timing of new construction and retirements, program costs, and how the Trident II, the D-5 missile, will enhance the Nation's overall deterrent posture.

When my predecessor, Rear Adm. Powell Carter, testified before this subcommittee last February, Navy did not have an approved D-5 program. Rather, we had an advanced development program for an improved sea launched ballistic missile which would have led to a selection of the follow-on missile in fiscal year 1983. The funding profile supported a 1990 IOC. Since then, SECDEF has directed Navy to plan to proceed with development and initial deployment of the D-5 in 1989. It may be possible to advance the IOC by a modest amount; Admiral Clark's office is examining this alternative in greater detail. Since February, Ohio, the first Trident submarine, has enjoyed highly successful sea trials; the ship has exceeded performance goals in many critical areas. Additionally, a total of seven Poseidon submarines have been backfitted with the longer range C-4 missile, which has performed significantly better than its own design goals. The last five Poseidon submarines to be backfitted with the C-4 missile are being converted now incident to regular overhaul. This program will be completed in September of next year.

Later in this decade, the D-5 missile will add an entirely new dimension to our sea based capability. It will also enhance considerably some of our current capa