nificant problem, even if the others didn't. Would you comment? Were these among the reasons why the Air Force did not support the road mobile MX? General BURKE. Because of the many design safety features we would not regard the MX warhead as dangerous while in transit. However, the same opposition that has been expressed for movement of radioactive waste material is also likely to be aimed at mobile MX. Clearly, public willingness to accept movement of MX through and near communities and on public roads is a major reason why the road mobile basing mode has not been accepted. Additionally, the size of the MX missile, as it is currently designed, is simply too large to effectively travel on our current highway system. SHOOT AND PENETRATION MISSION FOR B-1 Senator WARNER. Generals Allen and Burke: Have you assessed the tanker requirements associated with a shoot and penetrate mission for the B-1? ANSWER. Yes, we have. Our assessment is that there will be less of a range penalty associated with cruise missile carriage on the B-1B than on the B-52. The B-1B will experience a drag increase—approximately eight percent—which is less than the 15 to 25 percent drag increase of a B-52 equipped with external missiles. This translates into a somewhat lower tanker requirement for a B-1B force than a B-52 force of comparable size and configuration. However, the fact remains that our tanker requirements for strategic bombers will still increase as cruise missiles enter the bomber force. KC-10, KC-35 REENGINING Senator WARNER. Generals Allen and Burke: How would the decision to kill the KC-10 and delay the KC-135 reengining programs affect our ability to meet these tanker requirements? ANSWER. The changes to which the question refers will simply delay the Air Force's plans to alleviate the projected refueling shortfall. Our objective is to meet the requirement with programs such as the KC-10 and KC-135R which would match increases in tanker capability to the corresponding increases in refueling demand. TANKER REQUIREMENTS Senator WARNER. General Burke: Would you provide the subcommittee for the record with your estimates of the range of tanker requirements associated with the Carter administration's bomber program and the Reagan administration's bomber program-both before the October budget changes related to KC-10 and KC-135 reengining lines, and after. ANSWER. With respect to the reductions in the KC-10 and KC-135 reengining as a result of the October budget changes, the requirement for refueling has remained the same. The reductions were based solely on fiscal constraints or priorities with no decrease in the requirement. The only change is the Air Force's ability to meet that requirement. With regard to changes in the bomber program, SIOP tanker forecasts for the Carter bomber program showed a need of [deleted] KC-135A equivalents in [deleted]. On the other hand, President Reagan's modernization decisions will alter that bomber force significantly. Under the Reagan proposal, the SIOP tanker requirement will be [deleted] KC-135A equivalents in [deleted]. To this must be added the [deleted] KC-135A equivalents required for contingency operations, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and other conventional missions. In the outyears. with a growing fleet of air refuelable aircraft (fighters, bombers, and airlifters), the requirement for tankers will continue to increase. STRATEGIC POLICY DOCUMENT, PD-59 Senator WARNER. General Burke, to your knowledge, has the Reagan administration decided to scrap or otherwise revise President Carter's strategic policy document, PD-59? ANSWER. I understand that the Reagan administration is reviewing all Presidential Decisions from the previous administration. I believe the Office of the Secretary of Defense would more appropriately be able to respond to your question. PRESENT STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM Senator WARNER. General Burke, in your personal, professional judgment, is the present Strategic force modernization program as consistent with and supportive of PD-59 as was the program endorsed by President Carter? ANSWER. Most definitely. The present Strategic force modernization program is consistent with and supportive of national strategic policy. In fact, the current program better supports such policy by emphasizing the development of more survivable, more enduring, and more effective weapon systems. AF PRIORITIES C3 Senator WARNER. What are the Air Force's own priorities for Strategic C3 modernization? ANSWER. The Air Force position in regard to C3 modernization seeks to achieve a systems approach to the development and acquisition process. The goal is to achieve the proper balance between the validated force structure and the C3 network which supports it. In the existing climate of fiscal constraint and evolving policy guidance, this goal is not easily achieved. Highly legitimate but divergent positions are held concerning the proper balance; however, there is no question that C3 systems must be as survivable and enduring as the component systems of the force structure which they support. Accordingly, the Air Force has developed a prioritized, system-oriented list of strategic C3 modernization programs which will be pursued aggressively. A summary statement of those programs is as follows: [Deleted.] ATTAINING THE OBJECTIVES Senator WARNER. What relative importance do you attach to attaining the objectives of high confidence pre-strike connectivity, improved attack assessment and extended durability? ANSWER. In listing our priorites for achieving those objectives, we would rank our first requirement as [deleted]. If we assume the [deleted] our existing systems support this priority. Planned upgrades to the commercial terrestrial and satellite systems will [deleted]. Our ability to characterize an attack in support of the function of the NCA, to enhance the survivability of the weapon systems and thus their ability to respond accordingly and our ability to endure until the termination of hostilities, all require differing levels of information which could be defined as [deleted]. Prior to upgrading the level of detail in our information transfer and warning capabilities, our priority for resource allocation is toward programs necessary to enhance a more [deleted]. In this context then, we will strive to improve the [deleted]. [Whereupon, at 10:58 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.] STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS FRIDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1981 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, Washington, D.C. NAVY STRATEGIC PROGRAMS The subcommittee met in open session pursuant to notice, at 8:44 a.m., in room 212, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John W. Warner, chairman, presiding. Present: Senator Warner and Senator Nunn. Staff present: Rhett B. Dawson, staff director and chief counsel; James F. McGovern, general counsel; Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Frank J. Gaffney, Ronald F. Lehman, José M. Martinez, David S. Lyles, E. George Riedel, James C. Smith, professional staff members; Mark B. Robinson, research assistant. Also present: Buzz Hefti, assistant to Senator Warner; Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Bill Furniss, assistant to Senator Quayle; Frank Krebs, assistant to Senator Cannon; Robert Nichols, assistant to Senator Jackson; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; Peter Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin. OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER, CHAIRMAN Senator WARNER. In recent years, as the Soviet Union has begun to deploy the improved ICBM's and air defense systems which have been made possible by large and sustained investments in strategic systems, the sea-based leg of the U.S. nuclear deterrent has taken on significantly increased importance. Fortunately, at the same time as a greater and greater responsibility for maintaining the peace and deterring nuclear war has fallen to the Navy, its ability to perform this role has been substantially enhanced. The latest component of this enhancement, the Ohio-class Trident submarine, will be shortly entering the fleet. Let me correct that. Didn't I see where it entered yesterday? Admiral WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, the ship has been delivered to the Navy. It has not yet been commissioned. Senator WARNER. That is correct, but it was delivered 3 days early, wasn't it? Admiral WILLIAMS. Yes, sir. Senator WARNER. What was the date? Admiral WILLIAMS. The date was the 28th. Senator WARNER. As one who has been involved in the inception of the Trident submarine program, I fully appreciate the enormous contribution the U.S.S. Ohio and her sister ship will make to the Navy's ability to carry out its critical strategic missions into the 21st century. Today, in this the fifth of our hearings on the strategic force modernization program announced by the President earlier this month, we will focus on the Trident submarine program and other components of the President's plan as they relate to the Navy. Specifically the committee will be considering the Trident II/D-5 missile system, now given a go-ahead for development, a go-ahead subject to the Congress. We were still working on it as late as 8:35 last night in the conference. I am pleased to report to you this morning that the conference approved the last item at 8:35 p.m. last night. We will discuss the decision to deploy land-attack, nuclear armed cruise missiles aboard attack submarines and we will review the status of planning for basing the Ohio-class submarines. While we have a subsequent hearing dealing exclusively with command, control and communications aspects of the President's program, we will be considering the Navy's C3 requirements as seen from the operational side of the service. It is a pleasure, a great pleasure, if I may say, to welcome the distinguished and able officers who will address these questions as our witnesses this morning: Rear Adm. William A. Williams III, director, Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division, Office of the CNO; Rear Adm. Frank Kelso, Director of Strategic Submarine Division and Trident Program Coordinator; Rear Adm. Walter Locke, Director of the Joint Cruise Missile Project Office; and Rear Adm. Glenwood Clark, Strategic Missile Projects Office. Admiral Williams, you may proceed. STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. WILLIAM A. WILLIAMS III, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR WARFARE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CNO, ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADM. FRANK B. KELSO II, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SUBMARINE DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE CNO; REAR ADM. WALTER M. LOCKE, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, JOINT CRUISE MISSILE PROJECT OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL MATERIAL; AND REAR ADM. GLENWOOD CLARK, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC MISSILE PROJECTS OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL MATERIAL Admiral WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. My function as the Director of the Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division in the CNO's Office is to serve as a focal point for Navy nuclear matters, and it is there that we undertake a translation of the national policy and the Navy requirements and assess how well we are meeting those objectives. With your permission, I would like to speak unclassified for the record and give you an overview of the Navy's strategic program as |