« PrécédentContinuer »
as well as connectivity to the forces. If the CO system does not function satisfactorily on an end-to-end basis then the capability to use the strategic forces, when we need them and in accordance with our employment plans, will be seriously degraded.
I would, therefore, portray the elements of the President's package as follows. First, we will correct those deficiencies that pertain to reliability and survivability of the most essential strategic C' functions, on an end-to-end basis. Several of the initiatives we are taking in this regard will also contribute to endurance. For example, completion of the deployment of the E-4B airborne command posts to serve the National Command Authority will significantly improve the survivability and provide some endurance for the most critical decisionmaking function. Similarly, the mobile ground terminal program will provide survivability, and help us achieve greater endurability for receiving, processing, and disseminating missile attack warning data.
We have also identified those strategic C: functions which are specifically needed to support an enduring force posture. For example, the new [deleted] satellite communications system will provide greatly improved two-way communications with our strategic submarines and with surviving bomber forces. Also, the Integrated Operational NUDETS Detection System, or IONDS, sensors to be deployed on NAVSTAR Global Positioning System spacecraft will significantly benefit our capabilities [deleted]. Our current plans call for several of these initiatives to be completed by 1990.
SOVIET C CAPABILITIES
Senator WARNER. Mr. Jones, Mr. Latham: I understand that Soviet c' capabilities are currently regarded within the Department of Defense as being virtually indestructible. That is, that no matter what we do, how we target or attack the C system, the best we can hope to do is to interrupt temporarily their command, control and communications operations—we cannot permanently knock them out. Am I correct in understanding that this is the assessment of the job? What specific features or characteristics of their system give it this robustness? Do you see any solutions to the problem of building greater survivability and endurancy into the United States Of network in reviewing Soviet CS architectures ?
Mr. LATHAM. The Soviet C* system is indeed highly diverse and redundant and includes mobile elements as well as large numbers of hardened facilities. Their defensive systems also enhance the survivability of their strategic C8 capabilities. (Deleted.]
We can and do use mobility, diversity and redundancy to enhance survivability, but there are key differences in force structure, strategy, and resources which argue against trying to replicate the Soviet C architectures. We need to give greater attention to active defense, in part because such systems may make a significant contribution to the survivability and endurance of our strategic CS capabilities.
Senator WARNER. Dr. Wade, Mr. Latham: Specifically, what is new about the Oʻ initiatives the President is recommending? Are we really seeing a dramatic commitment to major new programs and technologies to address present vulnerabilities in this area or are we merely getting new rhetoric and slightly higher budgetary priority being given to previously identified CS modernization programs?
Mr. LATHAM. We are presenting a cohesive program to correct strategic con. nectivity deficiencies during the transition phases of war which is significantly different than the past programs presented to Congress where efforts were heavily oriented towards correcting peacetime deficiencies and those of the initial transition phase. Our new efforts when implemented will more closely match the survivability of the strategic forces they support and will correct many of the transition phase deficiencies. (Deleted.]
As evidenced by the increase in fiscal year 1932–87 costs of 65 percent over that of the Carter program, we are doing much more than rhetoric and minor funding changes. The peacetime and transition problems have been of long standing but specific efforts to corrert all of them had not been identified or neressa rily supported. In addition to the adequate funding of C modernization efforts identified in prior years there are numerous new efforts. Specific examples of new programs include: a new advanced warning system, a CONUS Air Defense rehabilitation, a proliferated ground wave radio network and alerting systems in the Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment area ; EMP hardening of airborne and fixed
command posts, a new ground mobile command center program, satellite survivability enhancements and improved facilities in the decisionmaking area; and improved interoperability of emergency action message equipments between the Services, VLF/LF receivers for the bomber fleets, a survivable satellite control capability and a new satellite program in the Communications System Connectivity Area.
Senator WARNER. Is there a “planning wedge” in the out-year budget program associated with some as yet unidentified Carchitecture which it is hoped will ultimately solve our present problem with C endurancy but which has yet to be conceptualized ?
Mr. LATHAM. As indicated in the response to the proceeding question we have [deleted]. Our programmatic action for correcting transition-phase deficiencies will provide a solid foundation for subsequent implementation of more survivable and enduring strategic Cosystems. The magnitude of additional resources required just to fix the peacetime and transition-phase problems alone were such that we did not believe it prudent to reflect the planning wedges [deleted] given the DOD need for funding of other well-defined programs. To assure that realistic endurance goals are established and that all components of the strategic cu program are developed in coordination with the strategic weapons programs, the DOD will be continuing our Strategic Connectivity Review process and high level management involvement in program guidance and surveillance of interrelated efforts.
Senator WARNER. What is the magnitude of such a funding wedge? Mr. LATHAM. There is no funding wedge. At such time as additional programs to enhance our [deleted] capability are identified, we will identify the additional resources required and justify them through our program and budget review process. This may require substantial increases in the out-years above that required for the foundation capability reflected in the testimony today.
Senator WARNER. Dr. Wade, Mr. Latham: I was personally delighted to learn of the President's decision to proceed with a small scale version of the Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) Communications System. How do you rank this system in importance vis-a-vis other C initiatives which will be forthcoming in the fiscal year 1983 request.
Mr. LATHAM. Due to the close interrelationship of programs within the three major strategic CS functions of tactical warning, decisionmaking and communications, a rank order of prioritization would be inappropriate as there are salient differences between the communications needs and times of message delivery to each of the three elements of the Triad. The aircraft escape time window and danger to our land-based missile forces from Soviet ICBM attack necessitate that we place a higher near-term priority on improving their communications capability than that of the submarines. The Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarine force (SSBNs) is the most survivable leg of the strategic Triad today [deleted]. Therefore, the ELF program ranks high in our set of improvements to strengthen this leg of the Triad. It is very important because it improves the submarine forces' ability to maintain covertness, avoid detection [deleted).
Senator WARNER. Do you believe that—even at its presently greatly-reduced scale-the recommended ELF system will contribute significantly to the critically important connectivity with our submarine force and to the enhancement of the survivability of that force.
Mr. LATHAM. Yes. The system will provide a continuous, very low canacity link to the submarines, which can operate with far greater operational flexibility than when they are directly connected to the links available for disseminating strike orders. (Deleted.]
ATTACK SUBS AND STRATEGIC SLCM'S
Senator WARNER. Have analyses been performed which assess the impact of the decision to deploy SIOP-dedicated sea-launched cruise missiles aboard U.S. Navy attack submarines will have on the ability of these highly important and scarce assets to execute the tactical missions for which they have been designed and acquired ?
Dr. WADE. (Deleted.]
Senator WARNER. What will be the specific numbers of SLCMs deployed on each attack submarine? How many of these will be SIOP-dedicated? What tac- .. tical weapons normally carried on attack subs will have to be given up in order to provide space in the hold for nuclear SLCMS?
Dr. WADE. (Deleted.]
Senator WARNER. What percentage of the sub fleet will have to be reassigned from current operating areas in order to be within range of SLCM targets in Europe?
Dr. WADE. (Deleted.]
SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS AVAILABILITY
Senator WARNER. To what degree has special nuclear materials availability been factored into the decision-making process on the strategic force modernization package?
ANSWER. Special nuclear materials availability is one of the factors which was considered, not only with respect to strategic modernization but also our total stockpile requirements. We simply cannot deploy nuclear weapons unless we have the necessary material. We continue to believe, however, that special nuclear materials availability should not be the overriding factor in such decisions [deleted]. Accordingly, we should ensure that DOE funding is both adequate and timely to meet this DOD-projected demand.
Senator WARNER. Where, for instance, will the nuclear materials for the additional thousands of cruise missiles now sought, come from?
ANSWER. [Deleted.] With specific respect to cruise missile projections, our planning for the past several years has considered the need to deploy cruise missiles in large numbers.
Senator WARNER. Will it be necessary to mine the Titan warheads for their special nuclear materials in order to meet the demand, and if Congress should decline to authorize the dismantling of the Titans, would you expect to have significant SNM shortfall? Could there be a shortfall in any event?
ANSWER. We would not expect the Congress to oppose the retirement of the Titan system. When warheads are retired, the special nuclear materials are recovered to support new weapon production. We would do this with the Titan warheads when they are retired. (Deleted.]
TRIDENT II/D5 Senator WARNER. To what degree does the President's announced Strategic Force modernization package change the D-5 program? Is it being accelerated ? Is an earlier initial operating capability then 1989 being sought? Are additional funds to achieve either of these goals necessary and are they going to be requested ?
Dr. WADE. Prior to the President's Strategic Force modernization package our SLBM modernization program contained three follow-on SLBM options: an improved accuracy Trident I C4 (C4U); a longer range improved accuracy C4 (C4L); and the larger, heavier payload and more accurate Trident II (D5). The Trident II (D5) was selected because it moves the U.S. closer to parity per dollar spent than any of the other SLBM modernization options that were under consideration. Our SLBM modernization program, which was initiated in fiscal year 1981, was geared for a specific missile option by the end of fiscal year 1933 to support a 1989 IOC. We do not plan to accelerate this IOC. To do so could increase the risk of attaining maximum achievable performance objectives. The Defense Department's fiscal year 1982 budget requested adequate RDT&E to support planned advanced development work. However, our fiscal year 1992 request was based on early Congressional approval of a fiscal year 1981 $32.9 million RDT&E reprograming request. This request, which was submitted to the Congress in March 1981, has not been approved and we have already been required to delete and dilute some technology efforts that would contribute to the D-5's desired performance parameters.
Senator WARNER. What is the Denartment's current projection of the probable accuracy capability of the Trident II D-5 missile?
Dr. WADE. (Deleted.]
Senator WARNER. How high a priority is attached to achieving a hard-target kill capability in our strategic submarine force ?
Dr. WADE. We attach significant importance to this capability. We must attain a capability to render ineffective the total Soviet military and political power structure, including control facilities and military forces. (Deleted.]
THE NAVSTAR GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) Senator WARNER. Dr. Wade, Mr. Latham: As you know, the NAVSTAR/Global Positioning Satellite System is now an important issue in our conference with
STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 1981
THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES,
AIR FORCE STRATEGIC PROGRAMS
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:38 a.m., in room 212, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John W. Warner, chairman, presiding.
Present: Senators Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Stennis, Cannon, and Levin.
Staff present: Frank Gaffney, professional staff member; Francis J. Sullivan, minority staff director; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Ronald F. Lehman, E. George Riedel, and James C. Smith, professional staff members, and Drew A. Harker, research assistant.
Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Buzz Hefti, assistant to Senator Warner; Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Bill Furniss, assistant to Senator Quayle; Robert Nichols, assistant to Senator Jackson; Frank Krebs, assistant to Senator Cannon; Arnold Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon, and Peter Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin. OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER,
Senator WARNER. Today, the subcommittee conducts its fourth hearing since the President made his October 2 announcement on the strategic modernization package.
I welcome my senior colleague, former chairman, Senator Stennis, this morning.
The two most controversial decisions made by the President involve the long-range combat aircraft and a basing mode for the MX missile. These are Air Force programs.
To give an Air Force perspective on these decisions this morning, we welcome Chief of Staff, Gen. Lew Allen ; Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition, Lt. Gen. Kelly Burke; and Brig. Gen. J. P. McCarthy, special assistant for the MX.
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).-We increased BMD R. & D. funding to support the long-term ground based option for MX. Strategic
We are requesting long-lead funding of 365 million in fiscal year 1982 for the planned procurement of three additional FLTSATCOM satellites; and $25 million to initiate development of an EHF satellite communications package for FLTSATX seven and eight. We are requesting $20 million to refurbish a C-135 aircraft to the EC-135 configuration to replace an airborne command post lost in an accident. Because we intend to redefine and restructure the reconstitutable and enduring satellite communications system (RESC) program, $38 million in fiscal year 1982 funding can be deleted.
(Whereupon, at 10:16 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]