initial missile strikes. The manned bombers provide the Soviets a degree of flexibility and diversity in their strategic attack forces not available with ballistic missiles.

The Tupolev Backfire is the latest addition to the LRA forces. The Backfire is a twin-engine, swing-wing, turbofan-powered bomber capable of carrying free-fall bombs or air-to-surface missiles. Placed in service in the midseventies over 70 are deployed with long-range aviation with a like number assigned to Soviet naval aviation. This aircraft is still in production at the rate of about 21⁄2 aircraft per month, or 30 a year.

The Backfire is a versatile, multipurpose aircraft capable of performing nuclear strike, conventional attack, antiship, and reconnaissance missions. Its range and payload capabilities are comparable to those of the Bison-more than 12,000 pounds payload and a range in excess of 8,900 kilometers with a bomb load. Its versatility makes it an excellent strike aircraft for peripheral and possibly for intercontinental missions. The Backfire can be equipped with probes to permit inflight refueling which could increase its range and flexibility.

The 600 intermediate range TU-16/Badger and TU-22/Blinder aircraft represent a significant capability for use in theater strike operations. The TU-16/Badger is by far the most numerous aircraft in the force. Ten variants of this twin-jet, subsonic aircraft have been produced. These variants have expanded the mission of the Badger beyond standard bombing to include electronic countermeasures, air-to-surface missile delivery, reconnaissance, and refueling.

The sweptwing, supersonic TU-22/Blinder is powered by two afterburning turbojet engines. The missile-carrier variant can deliver an AS-4 to a range of about 4,090 kilometers. The Blinder has also been produced in free-fall bomber, reconnaissance, and trainer versions.

The Soviets have an air-to-air refueling capability for long-range aviation. While they have not yet developed an aircraft specifically for refueling, some 30 modified Bison aircraft serve as tankers. The Soviets evidently are developing a tanker version of the IL-76/Candid transport aircraft. If so, the system is not yet deployed in sizable numbers.

STRATEGIC DEFENSES

Turning to defensive forces, the Soviets maintain the world's largest strategic defenses. Their efforts encompass each of the primary areas of defense concern: Air defense, ballistic missile defense, antisatellite defense, and civil defense. When combined with the strong counterforce orientation of Soviet strategic offensive forces, these defense efforts point to a strategic concept of layered, indepth defense of the homeland.

This concept starts with preemptive attacks, if possible, against Western nuclear offensive forces and their command and control. It then proceeds to active defense against weapons en route to targets and to the preparation of passive defenses to protect the Soviet governmental infrastructure and society against the effects of weapons. penetrating the defenses.

The technical problems associated with defense against air and missile attack are immense. Although Soviet defenses characteristically have fallen short of being able to handle fully the tasks they face, the

U.S.S.R. has persevered and is today entering a period of weapons system deployment aimed at measurably improving capabilities, primarily in air defense.

Soviet air defenses combine the interceptor aircraft with early warning networks and surface-to-air missiles. There are more than 5,000 early warning and height-finding air defense radars throughout the U.S.S.R. During the past decade, the U.S.S.R. has continued to modernize its air defense forces which currently consist of some 2,500 aircraft, including the MIG-23/Flogger, MIG-25/Foxbat, SU-9/ Fishpot, SU-15/Flagon, TU-128/Fiddler, and YAK-28/Firebar.

The Flagon and the Flogger swing-wing interceptor aircraft are the workhorses of today's air defense interceptor force, comprising twothirds of the total inventory. The Flagon, first deployed in the late sixties has been improved during the seventies through additional armament and modernized avionics. The Flogger is the most widely deployed interceptor.

The MACH-3 Foxbat, designed to counter a high-altitude threat, can operate at 25,000 meters. A cutback in its production in 1977-78 suggests that Soviet policy shifted to meet requirements for a lowrather than a high-altitude threat.

A number of new interceptor aircraft types could enter the air defense force over the next decade. Soviet research and development most likely will emphasize the development of look-down/shoot-down systems designed to be able to operate above their intended targets, identify and track them against the cluttered background of the Earth, and fire missiles capable of functioning in the same environment.

To increase the effectiveness of their force, the Soviets are developing an increasingly effective airborne warning and control system to detect low-altitude penetrators. An earlier attempt, the TU-126/Moss, carrying a large rotodome radar on its back, does not appear to have met the need.

The Soviet strategic surface-to-air missile force is composed of some 10,000 launchers deployed at over 1,000 fixed sites within the borders of the U.S.S.R. These launchers can actually accommodate over 12,000 missiles because many of the launchers have multiple launch rails. In addition, other Warsaw Pact countries have over 1,000 launchers deployed in Eastern Europe.

The SA-2, initially operational in 1959, has been the backbone of Soviet SAM defenses. It is deployed throughout the Soviet Union and is used by non-Soviet Warsaw Pact and other communist and Third World nations as well. The SA-3 is now deployed throughout the U.S.S.R. and Warsaw Pact at over 400 sites. It provides low-altitude coverage and point defense to selected strategic areas.

The SA-5 was first deployed in 1963, and deployment continues today with over 100 complexes operational throughout the Soviet Union. The SA-5 is a long-range interceptor designed to counter the threat of high-performance aircraft.

The SA-10 system is the latest Soviet strategic SAM system and is designed for increased low-altitude capability. With radars which are more advanced than previous systems, the SA-10 was designed to counter low-altitude manned aircraft, although it may have some capability against cruise missiles.

In all, the Soviets maintain a vast network of SAM sites, which act in concert with the large numbers of interceptor aircraft. This network is enhanced by a virtual 100-percent high-altitude coverage of early warning radars, and presents a formidable barrier to any wouldbe attackers from the air.

ABM DEFENSE

The Soviets maintain the world's only deployed antiballistic missile defense. The system includes peripherally-located Hen House ballistic missile, early warning radars, and four operational ABM launch complexes near Moscow. The Moscow defenses currently include the ABM-1b/Galosh interceptor missiles, battle management radars, and missile engagement radars.

The Soviets have continued to improve their ballistic missile early warning capability by constructing large phased-array radars to supplement the old Hen House network and to close existing gaps in coverage.

They also continue to engage in an active and costly ABM research and development effort, which they are permitted to do under the ABM Treaty of 1972. Their main concentration appears to be on improving the performance of their large phased-array detection and tracking radars, and developing a rapidly deployable ABM system. When development of this system is completed, its main elements could be deployed in the Moscow area to replace or supplement the existing systems. Such deployment would further upgrade Moscow's defenses, and could provide operational experience for broader deployment. Improving the Moscow defenses is also allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty as long as the 100 interceptor launcher limit is not exceeded. Deployment in additional locations is prohibited by the treaty.

ANTISATELLITE DEFENSE

The Soviets' defensive posture extends into space as well with the only antisatellite system known to be operational. The demonstrated Soviet nonnuclear low-altitude orbital ASAT interceptor poses a known, if presently limited, threat to some U.S. satellites. It is anticipated the Soviets will continue work in this area with a goal of negating satellites in high orbit, as well as developing more effective kill mechanisms, perhaps using a laser or some other type of directed energy weapon.

CIVIL DEFENSE

Complementing their active defensive program is a nationwide civil defense structure under military control. Full-time civil defense staffs exist at each echelon of the Soviet administration structure. In peacetime more than 115,000 people work full time in the program. In wartime, the number could be upwards of 16 million. The program costs more than the equivalent of $2 billion annually.

Protection of their leadership has been a primary objective of the Soviets. Given a war-crisis warning of only a few hours, the survival and effective functioning of the 110,000 government and other officials necessary to lead the Soviet Union may, therefore, be possible. This

protection has been achieved through the construction of deep, hard urban shelters and countless relocation sites. Leadership protection, from the national to local level, is intended to assure the maintenance of control throughout the society.

Mr. Chairman, this broad review of Soviet strategic offensive nuclear forces and defenses has addressed their most significant aspects. I am sure that you and the members of the subcommittee recognize that both time and classification limitations have precluded addressing every detail.

As I mentioned in my introductory remarks, I have with me some experts in the various fields covered by this testimony and the recent paper on Soviet military power. I would be pleased to address personally or to have the most knowledgeable person present address any questions you may have, recognizing that security considerations may require that some answers be provided in a classified session.

I thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important topic, and await your questions.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Admiral.

I expect you and I have been working in this area for better than a decade now.

Admiral BURKHALTER. Yes, sir, we have.

SOVIET VERSUS U.S. BUILDUP

Senator WARNER. It appears to me that there is a disparity in the momentum between the Soviet buildup and the U.S. buildup. Would you care to give your evaluation in general terms of the momentum of the two nations?

Admiral BURKHALTER. Sir, I can give you one example that I have used many times in the past, which I think is a very classic one, in the SSBN system. The United States deployed the 41st of their Polaris and SSBN's in 1968 when the Soviets were putting their first Yankee SSBN to sea. Since then they have built and deployed over 62 of the Yankee and Delta class SSBN's and they now have this new Typhoon class SSBN that we discussed earlier in the testimony. We will commission our first follow-on SSBN, the U.S.S. Ohio, this next Saturday in Connecticut.

Senator WARNER. Let's use as a threshold date the spring of 1972 when SALT I was signed. Between 1972 and today, how many new nuclear launcher programs has the United States undertaken?

Admiral BURKHALTER. Sir, if my memory is correct, our Minuteman force was completely deploved then and it has been modernized but we have deployed no new nuclear force since that time.

Senator WARNER. Considering that the Trident has been built since. Admiral BURKHALTER. The Trident weapons system, which of course will be the complementary system to go with the Ohio class. Senator WARNER. Correspondingly, since SALT I, how many new launch designs have the Soviets had?

Admiral BURKHALTER. I mentioned the SS-17 and and SS-18 and SS-19, along with the SS-N-8 and SS-N-18 weapons systems, and now the follow-on system, the SS-NX-20 that we discussed during the briefing.

Senator WARNER. Wouldn't you consider the Typhoon a new launch system?

Admiral BURKHALTER. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. What about the Backfire?

Admiral BURKHALTER. The Backfire is of course a theater weapon which we believe has a capability as an intercontinental weapon as well.

Senator WARNER. So the Soviets in this same period of a decade have initiated new programs on land, sea, and air. That is right? Admiral BURKHALTER. That is correct.

Senator WARNER. In what areas of strategic capability do the Soviets lead the United States, and in what areas does the United States lead the Soviets?

Admiral BURKHALTER. Sir, I think to give you a precise answer here would be difficult, we would really prefer to answer that for you in a classified session.

Senator WARNER. I would appreciate that, and a number of my questions will undoubtedly result in that response. But again, bearing in mind the need, and I was among those who urged the administration to come forward with this booklet, the need to get more facts before the public, because this particular series of strategic programs is probably the biggest dollar figure in the budget, certainly on the military side. Let's see what we can do to help the American public better understand the problem that confronts the United States. I will repeat the question:

In what areas do you feel the Soviets lead the United States, and in what areas do we lead the Soviets?

Admiral BURKHALTER. Sir, I would like to answer that by referring to our testimony and to this booklet.

Serator WARNER. If you think it is covered there we won't be repetitious.

Admiral BURKHALTER. I would like to repeat, if I might, that they have developed the SS-18 and -19 systems which we consider to be as accurate as any weapons system that we have today. The vast array of systems that they have developed over the past 8 to 10 years very clearly has given them a much larger numerical superiority. They have superiority in many of those numbers. As I mentioned, they have accuracies that are approaching those of the best weapons systems in the world today.

They have developed a MIRV capability, independently targetable reentry missiles, during the past decade, as you mentioned the Backfire long-range bomber, also they have continued to improve their other bomber systems, and they have continued to improve the silo basing of their missile systems by continuing to harden them.

To give you precise details on those superiorities I think we would like to defer to the classified session.

SOVIET EXPENDITURES ON STRATEGIC FORCES

Senator WARNER. How much does the Soviet Union spend on strategic forces, say, in this current fiscal year and in the projected 5-year program.