initial missile strikes. The manned bombers provide the Soviets a degree of flexibility and diversity in their strategic attack forces not available with ballistic missiles.

The Tupolev Backfire is the latest addition to the LRA forces. The Backfire is a twin-engine, swing-wing, turbofan-powered bomber capable of carrying free-fall bombs or air-to-surface missiles. Placed in service in the midseventies over 70 are deployed with long-range aviation with a like number assigned to Soviet naval aviation. This aircraft is still in production at the rate of about 21⁄41⁄2 aircraft per month, or 30 a year.

The Backfire is a versatile, multipurpose aircraft capable of performing nuclear strike, conventional attack, antiship, and reconnaissance missions. Its range and payload capabilities are comparable to those of the Bison-more than 12,000 pounds payload and a range in excess of 8,900 kilometers with a bomb load. Its versatility makes it an excellent strike aircraft for peripheral and possibly for intercontinental missions. The Backfire can be equipped with probes to permit inflight refueling which could increase its range and flexibility.

The 600 intermediate range TU-16/Badger and TU-22/Blinder aircraft represent a significant capability for use in theater strike operations. The TU-16/Badger is by far the most numerous aircraft in the force. Ten variants of this twin-jet, subsonic aircraft have been produced. These variants have expanded the mission of the Badger beyond standard bombing to include electronic countermeasures, air-to-surface missile delivery, reconnaissance, and refueling.

The sweptwing, supersonic TU-22/Blinder is powered by two afterburning turbojet engines. The missile-carrier variant can deliver an AS-4 to a range of about 4,090 kilometers. The Blinder has also been produced in free-fall bomber, reconnaissance, and trainer versions.

The Soviets have an air-to-air refueling capability for long-range aviation. While they have not yet developed an aircraft specifically for refueling, some 30 modified Bison aircraft serve as tankers. The Soviets evidently are developing a tanker version of the IL-76/Candid transport aircraft. If so, the system is not yet deployed in sizable numbers.

STRATEGIC DEFENSES

Turning to defensive forces, the Soviets maintain the world's largest strategic defenses. Their efforts encompass each of the primary areas of defense concern: Air defense, ballistic missile defense, antisatellite defense, and civil defense. When combined with the strong counterforce orientation of Soviet strategic offensive forces, these defense efforts point to a strategic concept of layered, indepth defense of the homeland.

This concept starts with preemptive attacks, if possible, against Western nuclear offensive forces and their command and control. It then proceeds to active defense against weapons en route to targets and to the preparation of passive defenses to protect the Soviet governmental infrastructure and society against the effects of weapons penetrating the defenses.

The technical problems associated with defense against air and missile attack are immense. Although Soviet defenses characteristically have fallen short of being able to handle fully the tasks they face, the

U.S.S.R. has persevered and is today entering a period of weapons system deployment aimed at measurably improving capabilities, primarily in air defense.

Soviet air defenses combine the interceptor aircraft with early warning networks and surface-to-air missiles. There are more than 5,000 early warning and height-finding air defense radars throughout the U.S.S.R. During the past decade, the U.S.S.R. has continued to modernize its air defense forces which currently consist of some 2,500 aircraft, including the MIG-23/Flogger, MIG-25/Foxbat, SU-9/ Fishpot, SU-15/Flagon, TU-128/Fiddler, and YAK-28/Firebar.

The Flagon and the Flogger swing-wing interceptor aircraft are the workhorses of today's air defense interceptor force, comprising twothirds of the total inventory. The Flagon, first deployed in the late sixties has been improved during the seventies through additional armament and modernized avionics. The Flogger is the most widely deployed interceptor.

The MACH-3 Foxbat, designed to counter a high-altitude threat, can operate at 25,000 meters. A cutback in its production in 1977-78 suggests that Soviet policy shifted to meet requirements for a lowrather than a high-altitude threat.

A number of new interceptor aircraft types could enter the air defense force over the next decade. Soviet research and development most likely will emphasize the development of look-down/shoot-down systems designed to be able to operate above their intended targets, identify and track them against the cluttered background of the Earth, and fire missiles capable of functioning in the same environment.

To increase the effectiveness of their force, the Soviets are developing an increasingly effective airborne warning and control system to detect low-altitude penetrators. An earlier attempt, the TU-126/Moss, carrying a large rotodome radar on its back, does not appear to have met the need.

The Soviet strategic surface-to-air missile force is composed of some 10,000 launchers deployed at over 1,000 fixed sites within the borders of the U.S.S.R. These launchers can actually accommodate over 12,000 missiles because many of the launchers have multiple launch rails. In addition, other Warsaw Pact countries have over 1,000 launchers deployed in Eastern Europe.

The SA-2, initially operational in 1959, has been the backbone of Soviet SAM defenses. It is deployed throughout the Soviet Union and is used by non-Soviet Warsaw Pact and other communist and Third World nations as well. The SA-3 is now deployed throughout the U.S.S.R. and Warsaw Pact at over 400 sites. It provides low-altitude coverage and point defense to selected strategic areas.

The SA-5 was first deployed in 1963, and deployment continues today with over 100 complexes operational throughout the Soviet Union. The SA-5 is a long-range interceptor designed to counter the threat of high-performance aircraft.

The SA-10 system is the latest Soviet strategic SAM system and is designed for increased low-altitude capability. With radars which are more advanced than previous systems, the SA-10 was designed to counter low-altitude manned aircraft, although it may have some capability against cruise missiles.

In all, the Soviets maintain a vast network of SAM sites, which act in concert with the large numbers of interceptor aircraft. This network is enhanced by a virtual 100-percent high-altitude coverage of early warning radars, and presents a formidable barrier to any wouldbe attackers from the air.

ABM DEFENSE

The Soviets maintain the world's only deployed antiballistic missile defense. The system includes peripherally-located Hen House ballistic missile, early warning radars, and four operational ABM launch complexes near Moscow. The Moscow defenses currently include the ABM-1b/Galosh interceptor missiles, battle management radars, and missile engagement radars.

The Soviets have continued to improve their ballistic missile early warning capability by constructing large phased-array radars to supplement the old Hen House network and to close existing gaps in

coverage.

They also continue to engage in an active and costly ABM research and development effort, which they are permitted to do under the ABM Treaty of 1972. Their main concentration appears to be on improving the performance of their large phased-array detection and tracking radars, and developing a rapidly deployable ABM system. When development of this system is completed, its main elements could be deployed in the Moscow area to replace or supplement the existing systems. Such deployment would further upgrade Moscow's defenses, and could provide operational experience for broader deployment. Improving the Moscow defenses is also allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty as long as the 100 interceptor launcher limit is not exceeded. Deployment in additional locations is prohibited by the treaty.

ANTISATELLITE DEFENSE

The Soviets' defensive posture extends into space as well with the only antisatellite system known to be operational. The demonstrated Soviet nonnuclear low-altitude orbital ASAT interceptor poses a known, if presently limited, threat to some U.S. satellites. It is anticipated the Soviets will continue work in this area with a goal of negating satellites in high orbit, as well as developing more effective kill mechanisms, perhaps using a laser or some other type of directed energy weapon.

CIVIL DEFENSE

Complementing their active defensive program is a nationwide civil defense structure under military control. Full-time civil defense staffs exist at each echelon of the Soviet administration structure. In peacetime more than 115,000 people work full time in the program. In wartime, the number could be upwards of 16 million. The program costs more than the equivalent of $2 billion annually.

Protection of their leadership has been a primary objective of the Soviets. Given a war-crisis warning of only a few hours, the survival and effective functioning of the 110,000 government and other officials necessary to lead the Soviet Union may, therefore, be possible. This

The timing of the President's decision, coming as it did after the beginning of the new fiscal year, has placed a great burden upon the Congress to consider this program expeditiously.

I have before me a very lengthy set of hearings. We will not be able to release them now or until such time as we can coordinate this hearing schedule with the final phases of conference between the two Armed Services Committees going on simultaneously. But it was Chairman Tower's decision, at my urging, that we begin to undertake these hearings at the subcommittee level contemporaneously with the final decision taking place in conference.

While many of the President's recommended initiatives do not require additional funding until fiscal year 1983 or later, there are, however, several items in the fiscal year 1982 defense authorization bill now being considered by the Senate and House Conference which are affected by the President's decision. Some of these programs, such as the decision to proceed with the B-1 bomber and to deploy the MX missile on an interim basis in silos, were options considered prior to the President's announcement.

As you will recall, the Senate in the fiscal year 1982 authorization bill fenced money for these programs subject to a two-House veto. Other decisions, such as the retirement of some B-52D bombers in this fiscal year, were not anticipated in congressional action to date and the merits of these elements of the program remain to be addressed by the conference.

Thus, while the hearings which we are about to conduct on the President's strategic modernization program are relevant to our upcoming decisions on the fiscal year 1982 authorization bill, they will lay the groundwork for congressional review of future budget requests in fiscal year 1983 and beyond.

Today we will be hearing from both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. I think we need to understand the Soviet threat before we can properly analyze the President's recommended response, particularly because of what is taking place in Europe today, that we spread before the American public and others as much as possible with regard to this threat and how the strategic program, in my judgment, works toward a reduction of the likelihood of any nuclear confrontation.

Because of the sensitive nature of intelligence sources and methods, the subcommittee will conduct much of its hearing on Soviet strategic forces in closed session with staff attendance restricted. But, in view of the fact that the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces buildup is of great interest to the general public, we have arranged to have this first portion of our intelligence hearing to be conducted in open session.

I trust that my colleagues and the witnesses will join with me in taking precautions so that no national security information is inadvertently compromised.

Subsequently, we will reconvene in room S-407, to go into classified details.

I have circulated to the members of the panel a list of additional hearings which we will be conducting over the next few weeks. Initially, we will be hearing from administration witnesses and from the military services on our strategic policy, programs and budget. It is

my intent also to call witnesses from various governmental agencies and other experts.

As we proceed, I look forward to close bipartisan cooperation with my colleagues on the scheduling of hearings and the calling of witnesses. Our goal is to seek out the facts that we need to make decisions. It is my intention to make these hearings my highest priority in the weeks ahead. The schedule will be intense and the workload heavy, but I urge my colleagues, whether members of the subcommittee or not, to attend as many hearings as possible and to follow the testimony closely.

I pledge that I and my staff will help in every way possible to make sure that we develop a comprehensive and thorough record.

I would like to welcome as our first witness this morning Adm. E. A. Burkhalter, Jr., Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. E. A. BURKHALTER, JR., USN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY DENNIS CLIFT, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER; ROGER DENK, SENIOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYST; HENRY HOFFMANN, JR., STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSES; JOHN SELLERS, ABM AND LASERS; JIM MILLER, STRATEGIC FORCES; JEROME BEATTY, STRATEGIC AIR; ART NEVINS, C3, COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS; DON WOOD, CIVIL DEFENSE; JOE ARDINGER, STRATEGIC ESTIMATES; JIM MCCRERY, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR STRATEGIC PROGRAMS; DAVID PHILLIPS, INTELLIGENCE ANALYST; CHARLES MUNSON, INTELLIGENCE ANALYST; AND FRANCIS DUNLAP, INTELLIGENCE ANALYST

Admiral BURKHALTER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today and present before your subcommittee discussion on Soviet strategic forces.

I am personally pleased to be DIA's principal witness and to have with me a number of experts on various aspects of Soviet strategic power, both in the open session and in the following closed one.

Senator WARNER. Why don't you introduce those witnesses? Admiral BURKHALTER. Yes, sir, I will ask them to stand and introduce themselves. Starting with Mr. Dennis Clift.

Mr. CLIFT. Dennis Clift, Senator Warner.

Mr. DENK. Roger Denk, sir.

Senator WARNER. Would you gentlemen care to come up and join the admiral?

Admiral BURK HALTER. I will ask these two gentlemen to join us, and Mr. McCrery, who is our Defense Intelligence Officer on this subject. I would like the others here to introduce themselves as soon as these gentlemen are settled.

Mr. MILLER. I am James Miller.

Mr. ARDINGER. Joe Ardinger.

Mr. HOFFMANN. I am Henry Hoffmann, Jr.

Mr. SELLERS. I am John Sellers.

Mr. DUNLAP. I am Francis Dunlap.