act; or as it is more simply expressed by the abettors of the last mentioned theory, no creature can act but as it is acted on. But we deny that this is a self-evident truth; and we are sure it never can be demonstrated. It is freely admitted that every creature is continually sustained in existence, and in the possession of its faculties by the power of God; but if that creature be in its very essence active, it is evident from the premises, that nothing more is necessary to cause it to act, than to continue its existence. According to our theory, therefore, the efficient cause of free actions is to be looked for no where else but in the free agents themselves; except in special cases where God may choose, for wise and good ends, supernaturally to operate on their minds. And if there be no necessity of introducing other causes of free and voluntary actions, why should we encumber the subject more deeply with the doctrine of divine efficiency or concourse in the performance of sinful acts. No distinctions, however nice, will ever be sufficient to guard that system from the shocking consequence of making God the author of sin.

But it is feared, that the theory which we defend will make the creature independent of the Creator; there is no reason for apprehension, as we not only admit that the power of God is, every moment, necessary for the sustenance of the creature, but we maintain that every action of the creature will be accordant with his eternal purpose. To obtain a distinct view of this subject, it is requisite to recall to mind a few undeniable principles. The first is, that in the production of creatures, God acts wisely, or as a being of intelligence; like finite beings, God has no need to deliberate, compare, and reason, but he perceives instinctively all possible things with all their possible relations. In wisdom he made all things that are made. Every minute part of every animal and of every vegetable was wisely ordained to occupy its appropriate place, and suited to answer its appropriate end. The whole system, in the various relations of one part to another, was arranged and adjusted in infinite wisdom. This supposes that the whole existed in idea before the infinite mind when his purpose was formed to give it existence. In this plan free agents formed a part; these, with all their actions, also were contemplated previously (in the order of nature) to the decree which determined their future existence to be certain.

Again, in selecting his plan, the great Creator acted with perfect freedom. He was under no necessity to create any

thing. He is independent of all creatures, and stands in need of nothing. Not only was he at perfect liberty to create or not, but he was free to adopt any system which pleased him. If there had been any thing in the existing plan which did not please him, or would not answer his purpose perfectly, he was at liberty to reject the whole, and would have done so. When he purposed to create the progenitor of the human family, he had it in his power to have given existence to another of the same species: he might, for example, have made the last man first; or have formed a person distinct from any who ever shall actually exist. Now this being the case, the inquiry arises, could not God have placed at the head of the human family, on whom the destiny of the rest should depend, one who would not have sinned? If he could not; if every creature that could have been created of the human species would certainly have sinned as well as Adam, then it follows eventually that sin could not be avoided if man existed; and the conclusion is, that a determination to create man, involved in it the purpose to permit the existence of sin. But if the alternative be taken, and it be said, that God could have created, in the place of Adam, one who would not have sinned, still the same conclusion forces itself upon us; for if, when he might have formed a creature who would not have transgressed, he chose to form one whom he knew would, it is as evident as any thing can be, that by this selection he did determine to permit the existence of sin.

Let us now, for a moment, examine the theory which supposes, that the plan of the Almighty, as it originally existed in the eternal mind, is not the one which is actually in existence; but that while it was his purpose that evil should have no place in the universe, contrary to his will and plan, it has come in through the transgression of free agents; and that in consequence of this a new plan has been adopted, accommodated to the exigence of the case. If we understand the Arminian theory, this is the point by which it stands distinguished from the theory which we believe. The mere statement of this opinion seems to us to carry with it a confutation. For, when the original plan was formed and adopted, according to the premises, it was certainly known that it would utterly fail; and was it ever heard of among creatures, that any intelligent being seriously formed a purpose which he knew at the time could not and would not be accomplished? To suppose, then, that God with a perfect prescience of all future events, resolved upon a plan

of the universe entirely different from what he knew would come to pass, is a scheme so unreasonable, that we know not how any one, after distinctly considering it, can adopt it: and we seem to ourselves now to perceive the reason why some speculative Arminians have been driven to the theory mentioned above, that God did not choose to know what would really take place.

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But passing by the inconsistency of this theory on account of these reasons, let us see to what consequences it will lead us. The hypothesis is, that the present state of the world does not accord with the original plan of the Almighty; but that by the introduction of sin against his will, the whole state of the moral world is changed, and of course the government of the world by providence must be entirely different from what it would have been if man had not sinned. One undeniable consequence is, that the end which God had in view in the creation is lost, unless we suppose that his glory can be moted as well by a state of things which prostrates his own plan, as by its execution. But if the ruler of the universe was frustrated in his purpose by the first sin, so he must be by every subsequent transgression; and, therefore, the existence of creatures, instead of answering his original purpose, whether that was to make them happy or to promote his own glory, has entirely failed of its complete accomplishment. And if this has occurred by the actual course of events in time past, what security is there, that the same will not be the fact in time to come? yea, what security is there that things will not continue to grow worse and worse, until all nature shall rush to some dreadful catastrophe, in which every thing good in the creation shall be utterly lost in everlasting darkness and confusion?

It will not be satisfactory to answer, that God has wisdom and power sufficient to prevent such a catastrophe; for his wisdom and power, according to the hypothesis, are not adequate to the prevention of sin and its consequences; and if these may arise and spread and increase, how can the consequence supposed be prevented? If the plan of the Almighty Ruler of the universe may be thwarted in one instance, it may in all. No security for the final well-being of the universe can be found any where. Now is it reasonable to think that, on these principles, a God of infinite wisdom would ever have made creatures capable of frustrating all his plans, and disappointing all his most benevolent purposes?

But it may be alleged, that God foreseeing the evil which would arise from the abuse of free will, determined to provide

against it, and accordingly, has done so, by sending his Son into the world to repair the ruins which sin has made; and thus, although God will not be glorified according to his original design, he will, nevertheless, be honoured by the new remedial scheme. The ground of the objection, however, still remains. If God's first plan was entirely frustrated by the sin of his creatures, what security is there, that the same will not happen in relation to this new plan? As the will of man is still free, and as the success of the mediatorial scheme depends on the choice of man, why may it not happen, that the end aimed at in the second will also be frustrated? Indeed, according to this theory, the fact has already occurred; for the design of God in sending his Son was to save all men, but it is acknowledged, that only a small part of the human race has been brought to salvation hitherto. And there is no better hope for the future, for men are not better now than formerly, and judging from the past, we may conjecture, that the greater number will continue to neglect this great salvation. Hence it appears, that the great God has been disconcerted and disappointed in all his designs: not only was his original plan of a universe without sin, frustrated, but his remedial plan, which was to save all men from sin, has also failed. These are consequences which inevitably flow from the hypothesis, that the cause of events in the world is not in accordance with the original plan of the Creator. But it is impossible, after an impartial view of the divine attributes, to believe in these conclusions. They are repugnant to reason. They are dishonourable to the divine perfections.

It may be, however, that the sober Arminian will be disposed to take different ground, and to maintain, that God did, with the prescience of all his sins, determine to create man; and that the existing state of things he did resolve to permit; but that he decreed nothing respecting these actions, but left them free; so that when the creature sins, he is not under any necessity of doing wrong from any divine purpose. Now, here it is evident, again, that there is an idea attached to the doctrine of decrees which does not belong to it, and which we have heretofore laboured to separate from it. It is, that if their sinful actions are decreed, they cannot be free, and must come to pass by an unavoidable necessity. To remove all difficulty, however, on this account, we will agree to meet the Arminian on the ground last selected. And we do aver, that in this theory he comes substantially into the very doctrine which we

maintain. For if God formed man with the full certainty of all his sins, then the purpose to create such a being with a foresight of such acts, is virtually decreeing the future existence of such acts. If, when the purpose was formed to create Adam, his fall was distinctly foreseen, then the determination to give Adam existence, involved the purpose that such an act as his transgression should also exist. Not that God intended or needed to do any thing to cause man to sin; this we reject, as much as the Arminian: but he resolved to permit this event. And here is the true ground of distinction between effective and permissive decrees; in the execution of the first, God acts himself; but in the execution of the last, other agents act, and act freely, and without constraint.

It does appear, therefore, that there is a ground on which the sober Arminian and moderate Calvinist can meet; and on which, even their views of the divine decrees can be made to harmonize.

ART. II.-WORKS OF JOHN HOWE.

The Works of the Reverend and learned John Howe, M. A. sometime fellow of Magdalen College, Oxon. London.

A STRIKING evidence of the prevalence of evangelical piety in England, is found in the great currency which is given, at the present time, to the works of the old Non-conformists. The massy volumes which were prized in the seventeenth century had become repulsive to modern readers, and the great productions of these excellent men needed a garb more consonant with the pampered taste of the age. The enterprise, therefore, is highly laudable which has presented us with the labours of Owen and Baxter and Bates and Flavel and Charnock and Howe, in an elegant and convenient form, and divested of that uncouth and peculiar orthography which characterizes the ancient folios.

The writings of the last mentioned theologian have been less perused by the majority of Christian readers than many other contemporary works; not so much from any want of interest in the subjects which he treats, still less from any defect in his matter or style, as from the more subtle and philosophical nature of his reasoning. The principal performances of Howe must ever continue to be most prized by men accustomed to VOL. III. No. II.-Z