Process and Implications of the Iceland Summit: Hearings Before the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-ninth Congress, Second Session, November 21, 24, 25; December 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10, 1986U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987 - 344 pages |
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM Treaty ADELMAN administration Admiral CROWE agree allies arms control arms control agreement believe bombers CARNESALE CHAIRMAN Chiefs of Staff committee Congress consulted conventional forces cruise missiles deal deploy deployment DEUTCH DICKS discussed Geneva George Shultz going Gorbachev hear ICBM ICBM's Iceland Iceland summit idea Iran issue Joint Chiefs kind LES ASPIN Let me ask look LRINF meeting ment military NATO NITZE nuclear forces nuclear weapons offensive forces Paul Nitze PERLE political position President President's problem question Reagan reductions Reykjavik Reykjavik summit Richard Perle ROGERS SALT SALT II SCHLESINGER SCHROEDER Scowcroft Secretary Shultz siles small mobile SONNENFELDT Soviet side Soviet Union SPRATT statement strategic defense STRATTON sublimits summit talking testing Thank things threat tion trying United verification warheads WARNKE Western Europe zero ballistic missiles zero/zero
Fréquemment cités
Page 4 - If US research efforts on defensive technologies prove successful, and are so perceived by the Soviet Union, such technologies could fundamentally alter the nature of the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Advanced ballistic missile defenses have the potential for reducing the military value of ballistic missiles and lessening the importance of their role in the strategic balance. In reducing the value of these weapons, defensive technologies could substantially...
Page 214 - First, both sides would agree to confine themselves through 1991 to research, development, and testing — which is permitted by the ABM treaty — to determine whether advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Second, a new treaty signed now would provide that if, after 1991, either side should decide to deploy such a system, that side would be obliged to offer a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense and for eliminating offensive ballistic missiles.
Page 147 - HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order. This is the fourth in a series of hearings...
Page 275 - The panel met, pursuant to call, at 10 am, in room 2118, Rayburn House Office building, Hon. Les Aspin (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Page 22 - ... our active investigation into strategic defenses. The prospect of effective defenses, and our determined force modernization program, have given the Soviet Union an important incentive to agree to cut back and eventually eliminate ballistic missiles. Within the SDI program, we judge defenses to be desirable only if they are survivable and cost-effective at the margin. Defenses that meet these criteria — those which cannot be easily destroyed or overwhelmed — are precisely the sort which would...
Page 7 - I am quite sure — that was the last offer submitted in writing by either side, in Reykjavik. That proposal read that the two sides would be prepared not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for a period of 10 years; that we would be prepared during that 10year period, to confine our research, development and testing, to that permitted by the ABM Treaty...
Page 149 - Strategic Forces As A Whole The development of the components of our strategic forces — the multiplicity of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and bombers — was in part the result of an historical evolution. This triad of forces, however, serves several important purposes. First, the existence of several strategic forces requires the Soviets to solve a number of different problems in their efforts to plan how they might try to overcome...
Page 214 - Both sides would agree to confine [themselves] to research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, for a period of five years, through 1991, during which time a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals would be achieved.
Page 26 - Our aircraft would now be supplemented by a host of new and sophisticated technologies as well as cruise missiles launched from the air and sea. It would be a much more diverse and capable force than in previous decades. In such circumstances, both the United States and the Soviet Union would lose the capacity provided by ballistic missiles to deliver large numbers of nuclear weapons on each others' homelands in less than thirty minutes tir.e.
Page 27 - America. Some fear that it would place the West at a grave disadvantage. I don't think so. In any competition ultimately depending upon economic and political dynamism and innovation, the United States, Japan and Western Europe have tremendous inherent advantages . Our three-to-one superiority in GNP over the Warsaw Pact, our far greater population, and the Western lead in modern technologies — these are only partial measures of our advantages . The West's true strength lies in the fact that we...