Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power
Cambridge University Press, 19 juin 2000 - 292 pages
With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining is a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.
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Divided Government and Interbranch Bargaining
A Natural History of Veto Bargaining 19451992
Rational Choice and the Presidency
Models of Veto Bargaining
Explaining the Patterns
Testing the Models
Autres éditions - Tout afficher
80th Congress 93rd Congress accept actors administration analysis bill’s breakdown rates Bush Chapter Clinton Committee configuration Congress passed congressional coordination model CQ Almanac cut point deadline effect decision theory Democrats divided government Eisenhower empirical enactments equilibrium example face of power failed override Figure Ford game theory gress House important legislation incomplete information interbranch bargaining landmark legislative significance logit Logit analysis minor legislation model of veto model predicts overridden override attempt override model patterns pocket veto policy concessions policy reputation political president and Congress president vetoes president's probability rational choice theory Reagan repassage rates repassed Republicans round second face second offer Senate sequential veto bargaining signed solution concept split party Congress statistical status quo strategy successor bill SVB model Table tion Truman unified and divided unified government utility functions variable veto chains veto override player veto rate veto threats vetoed bills vetoed the bill