Nor Virtue, male or female, can we name, But what will grow on Pride, or grow on Shame. Thus Nature gives us (let it check our pride) The virtue nearest to our vice ally'd: Reason the byas turns to good from ill, And Nero reigns a Titus, if he will. VARIATIONS. After 194. in the MS. How oft, with Paffion, Virtue points her Charms! COMMENTARY. 196 VER. 197. Reafon the byafs, &c] But left it should be objected that this account favours the doctrine of Neceffity, and would infinuate that Men are only acted upon, in the production of Good out of Evil; the poet teacheth (from y 196 to 203) that Man is a free agent, and hath it in his own power to turn the natural paffions into Virtues or into Vices, properly fo called: The fiery foul abhor'd in Catiline, In Decius charms, in Curtius is divine i 200 This light and darkness in our chaos join'd, What shall divide? The God within the mind. COMMENTARY. Reafon the byafs turns to good from ill, Secondly, if it should be objected, that though he doth indeed tell us fome actions are beneficial and fome hurtful, yet he could not call thofe virtuous nor thefe vicious, because, as he hath described things, the motive appears to be only the gratification of some paffion; give me leave to answer for him, that this would be mistaking the argument, which (to 249 of this epiftle) confiders the paffions only with regard to Society, that is, with regard to their effects rather than their motives. That however, 'tis his defign to teach that actions are properly virtuous and vicious; and though it be difficult to diftinguish genuine Virtue from fpurious, they having both the fame appearance, and both the fame public effects, yet they may be difembarrassed. If it be asked, by what means? He replies (from y 202 to 205) By Confcience; which is to the purpofe; for it is folely a Man's own concern to know whether his Virtue be pure and folid; for NOTES. VER. 204. The God within the mind.] A Platonic phrase for Confcience; and here employed with great judgment and propriety. For Confcience either fignifies, fpeculatively, the judgment we pass of things upon whatever principles we chance to have; and then it is only Opinion, a very unable judge and divider. Or else it fignifies, practically, the application of the eternal rule of right (received by us as the law of God) to the regulation of our actions; and then it is properly Confcience, the God (or the law of God) within the mind, of power to divide the light from the darknefs in this chaos of the paffions. VOL. III. G Extremes in Nature equal ends produce, In Man they join to fome myfterious ufe; 205 Tho' each by turns the other's bound invade, Where ends the Virtue, or begins the Vice. 210 COMMENTARY. what is it to others, whether this Virtue, while, as to them, the effects of it is the fame, be real or unfubstantial? VER. 205. Extremes in Nature equal ends produce,] But still it will be faid, why all this difficulty to distinguish true Virtue from falfe? The poet fhews why (from 204 to 211) That though indeed Vice and Virtue fo invade each other's bounds, that fometimes we can scarce tell where one ends and the other begins, yet great purposes are ferved thereby, no less than the perfecting the conftitution of the whole, as lights and fhades, which run into one another in a well-wrought picture, make the harmony and spirit of the compofition. But on this account to fay there is neither Vice nor Virtue,the poet fhews (from 219 to 217) would be just as wife as to fay there is neither black nor white; because the shade of that and the light of this often run into one another: Afk your own heart, and nothing is fo plain; 'Tis to miftake them, cofts the time and pain. This is an error of fpeculation, which leads Men fo foolishly to conclude, that there is neither Vice nor Virtue. 220 Vice is a monster of fo frightful mien, As, to be hated, needs but to be feen; Yet feen too oft, familiar with her face, We first endure, then pity, then embrace. But where th' Extreme of Vice, was ne'er agreed: Afk where's the North? at York, 'tis on the Tweed; In Scotland, at the Orcades; and there, At Greenland, Zembla, or the Lord knows where. No creature owns it in the first degree, 225 But thinks his neighbour further gone than he; After VARIATION S. 220. in the ift. Edition, followed thefe, A Cheat! a Whore! who ftarts not at the name, After 226. in the MS. The Col'nel fwears the Agent is a dog, The Scriv❜ner vows th' Attorney is a rogue. COMMENTARY. VER. 217. Vice is a monfter, &c.] There is another Error of practice, which hath more common and fatal effects; and is next confidered (from 216 to 221.) It is this, that though, at the first afpect, Vice be fo horrible as to affright all beholders, yet, when by habit we are once grown familiar with her, we firft fuffer, and in time begin to lofe the memory of her nature; which neceffarily implies an equal ignorance in the nature of Virtue. Hence Men conclude, that there is neither one nor the other. VER. 221. But where th' Extreme of Vice, &c.] But it is not Ev'n those who dwell beneath its very zone, Virtuous and vicious ev'ry Man must be, For, Vice or Virtue, Self directs it still; COMMENTARY. 230 235 only that extreme of Vice next to Virtue, which betrays us into these mistakes. We are deceived too, as he fhews us (from 220 to 231) by our obfervations about the other extreme: For from the extreme of Vice being unsettled, Men conclude that Vice itself is only nominal. VER. 231. Virtuous and vicious ev'ry Man must be,] There is yet a third cause of this error, of no Vice, no Virtue, compofed of the other two, i. e. partly fpeculative, and partly practical.. And this also the poet here confiders (from 230 to 239) fhewing it arifeth from the imperfection of the beft characters, and the inequality of all; whence it happens that no Man is extremely virtuous or vicious, nor extremely conftant in the purfuit of either. Why it fo happens, the Poet, with admirable fagacity, affigns the caufe, in this line: For, Vice or Virtue, SELF directs it ftill. An adherence or regard to what is, in the fense of the world, a Man's own Intereft, making an extreme in either impoffible. Its effect in keeping a good Man from the extreme of Virtue, needs no explanation; and in an ill Man, Self-interest shewing him the neceffity of fome kind of reputation, the procuring, and preferving that, will neceffarily keep him from the extreme of Vice. |