fectly disengaged from the force of the above reasons, and at lib. erty to leave his fortune to his friends, to charitable or public purposes, or to whom he will: the same blood, proximity of blood, and the like, are merely modes of speech, implying nothing real, nor any obligation of themselves.

There is always, however, a reason for providing for our poor relations, in preference to others who may be equally necessitous, which is, that if we do not, no one else will; mankind, by an established consent, leaving the reduced branches of good families to the bounty of their wealthy alliances.

The not making a will, is a very culpable omission, where it is attended with the following effects: where it leaves daughters, or younger children, at the mercy of the eldest son; where it distributes a personal fortune equally amongst the children, although there be no equality in their exigence or situations; where it leaves an opening for litigation; or, lastly, and principally, where it defrauds creditors: for, by a defect in our laws, which has been long and strangely overlooked, real estates are not subject to the payment of debts by simple contract, unless made so by will; although credit is, in fact, generally given to the possession of such estates: he, therefore, who neglects to make the necessary appointments for the payment of his debts, as far as his effects extend, sins, as it has been justly said, in his grave: and if he omits this on purpose to defeat the demands of his creditors, he dies with a deliberate fraud in his heart.

Anciently, when any one died without a will, the bishop of the diocese took possession of his personal fortune, in order to dispose of it for the benefit of his soul, that is, to pious or charitable uses. It became necessary, therefore, that the bishop should be satisfied of the authenticity of the will, when there was any, before he resigned the right he had to take possession of the dead man's fortune in case of intestacy. In this way, wills, and controversies relating to wills, came within the cognizance of ecclesiastical courts; under the jurisdiction of which, wills of personals (the only wills that were made formerly) still continue, though in truth, no more nowa-days connected with religion, than any other instruments of conveyance. This is a peculiarity in the English law.

Succession to intestates must be regulated by positive rules of law, there being no principle of natural justice whereby to ascertain the proportion of the different claimants: not to mention that the claim itself, especially of collateral kindred, seems to have foundation in the law of nature.

These regulations should be guided by the duty and presumed

inclination of the deceased, so far as these considerations can be consulted by general rules. The statutes of Charles the Second commonly called the Statutes of Distribution, which adopt the rule of the Roman law in the distribution of personals, are sufficiently epuitable. They assign one-third to the widow, and two-thirds to the children; in case of no children, one-half to the widow, and the other half to the next of kin; where neither widow nor lineal descendants survive, the whole to the next of kin, and to be equally divided amongst kindred of equal degrees, without distinction of whole blood and half blood, or of consanguinity by the father's or mother's side.

The descent of real estates, that is, of houses, and land, having been settled in more remote and in ruder times, is less reasonable. There never can be much to complain of in a rule which every person may avoid, by so easy a provision as that of making his will; otherwise, our law in this respect is chargeable with some flagrant absurdities; such as, that an estate shall in nowise go to the brother or sister of the half blood, though it came to the deceased from the common parent; that it shall go to the remotest relation the intestate has in the world, rather than to his own father or mother; or even be forfeited for want of an heir, though both parents survive ; that the most distant paternal relation shall be prefered to an uncle, or own cousin, by the mother's side, notwithstanding the estate was purchased and acquired by the intestate himself.

Land not being so divisible as money, may be a reason for making a difference in the course of inheritance; but there ought to be no difference but what is founded upon that reason. The Roman law made none,

BOOK III.

PART II.

OF RELATIVE DUTIES WHICH ARE

INDETERMINATE.

CHAPTER I.

CHARITY.

I use the term Charity neither in the common sense of bounty to the poor, nor in St. Paul's sense of benevolence to all mankind; but I apply it at present, in a sense more commodious to my purpose, to signify the promoting the happiness of our inferiors.

Charity in this sense, I take to be the principal province of virtue and religion; for, whilst worldly prudence will direct our behaviour towards our superiors, and politeness towards our equals, there is little beside the consideration of duty, or an habitual humanity which comes into the place of consideration to produce a proper conduct towards those who are beneath us, and dependent upon us.

There are three principal methods of promoting the happiness of our inferiors:

1. By the treatment of our domestics and dependants. 2. By professional assistance.

3. By pecuniary bounty.

CHAPTER II.

CHARITY.

THE TREATMENT OF OUR DOMESTICS AND DEPENDANTS.

A PARTY of friends setting out together upon a journey, soon. find it to be the best for all sides, that while they are upon the road, one of the company should wait upon the rest; another ride for

ward to seek out lodging and entertainment; a third carry the portmanteau; a fourth take charge of the horses; a fifth bear the purse, conduct and direct the route; not forgetting, however, that as they were equal and independent when they set out, so they are all to return to a level again at their journey's end. The same regard and respect; the same forbearance, lenity, and tenderness in using their service; the same mildness in delivering commands; the same study to make their journey comfortable and agreeable to them, which he whose lot it was to direct the rest, would in common decency think himself bound to observe towards them, ought we to show to those who, in the casting of the parts of human society, happen to be placed within our power, or to depend upon us.

Another reflection of a like tendency with the former is, that our obligation to them is much greater than theirs to us. It is a mistake to suppose that the rich man maintains his servants, tradesmen, tenants, and labourers; the truth is, they maintain him. It is their industry that supplies his table, furnishes his wardrobe, builds his houses, adorns his equipage, provides his amusements. It is not his estate, but the labour employed upon it, that pays his rent. All that he does, is to distribute what others produce; which is the least part of the business.

Nor do I perceive any foundation for an opinion, which is often handed round in genteel company, that good usage is thrown away upon low and ordinary minds; that they are insensible of kindness, and incapable of gratitude. If by "low and ordinary minds" are meant the minds of men in low and ordinary stations, they seem to be affected by benefits in the same way that all others are, and to be no less ready to requite them; and it would be a very unaccountable law of nature if it were otherwise.

Whatever uneasiness we occasion to our domestics, which neither promotes our service, nor answers the just ends of punishment, is manifestly wrong; were it only upon the general principle of diminishing the sum of human happiness.

By which rule we are forbidden,

1. To enjoin unnecessary labour or confinement, from the mere love and wantonness of domination.

2. To insult them by harsh, scornful, or opprobious language. 3. To refuse them any harmless pleasures.

And, by the same principle, are also forbidden causeless or immoderate anger, habitual peevishness, and groundless suspicion.

CHAPTER III.

SLAVERY.

THE prohibitions of the last chapter extend to the treatment of slaves, being founded upon a principle independent of the contract between masters and servants.

I define slavery to be "an obligation to labour for the benefit of "the master, without the contract or consent of the servant."

This obligation may arise, consistently with the law of nature, from three causes :

1. From crimes.

2. From captivity.

3. From debt.

In the first case, the continuance of the slavery, as of any other punishment, ought to be proportioned to the crime; in the second and third cases, it ought to cease, as soon as the demand of the injured nation, or private creditor, is satisfied.

The slave-trade upon the coast of Africa is not excused by these principles. When slaves are in that country brought to market, no questions, I believe, are asked about the origin or justice of the vender's title. It may be presumed, therefore, that this title is not always, if it be ever, founded in any of the causes above assigned.

But defect of right in the first purchase is the least crime with which this traffic is chargeable. The natives are excited to war and mutual depredation, for the sake of supplying their contracts, or furnishing the market with slaves. With this the wickedness begins. The slaves, torn away from parents, wives, children, from their friends and companions, their fields and flocks, their home and country, are transported to the European settlements in America, with no other accommodation on shipboard than what is provided for brutes. This the second stage of cruelty; from which the miserable exiles are delivered, only to be placed, and that for life, in subjection to a dominion and system of laws, the most merciless and tyrannical that ever were tolerated upon the face of the earth; and from all that can be learned by the accounts of people upon the spot, the inordinate authority which the plantation laws confer upon the slaveholder, is exercised by the English slaveholder, especially, with rigour and brutality.

But necessity is pretended, the name under which all enormities are attempted to be excused. And, after all, what is the necessity? It has never been proved that the land could not be cultivated