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not whether the punishment be of long or of short duration; whether in this world, or in the next. If the justice and goodness of God require that punishment should not be inflicted when repentance has taken place, it must be a violation of these attributes to permit any punishment whatever, the most slight, or the most transient. Nor will it avail to say that the evils of this life, attendant upon vice, are the effects of an established constitution, and follow in the way of natural consequence. Is not that established connexion itself the effect of the Divine decree? Are not its several operations as much the appointment of its Almighty Framer, as if they had individually flowed from his immediate direction? But, besides, what reason have we to suppose that God's treatment of us in a future state, will not be of the same nature as we find it in this-according to established rules, and in the way of natural consequence? Many circumstances might be urged, on the contrary, to evince the likelihood that it will. This, however, is not necessary to our present purpose. It is sufficient that the Deist cannot prove that it will not. Our experience of the present state of things evinces that indemnity is not the consequence of repentance here: can he adduce a counter experience that it will be hereafter?” (Pp. 5, 6.)

Fourthly, The repentance of man is necessarily imperfect; it is, on this account, in addition to others, impossible to conceive that it should place the transgressor in the same situation as before the offence. Why should our opponents have represented repentance as necessary to forgiveness, if they had not felt that some reparation is due to God, and his law, for the injury which sin inflicts upon both? To make this reparation mere obedience is obviously incompetent; for, since perfect obedience is at all times our duty, present obedience can exhaust present obligations only. It cannot furnish a surplus of merit to set off against past demerit. The opponents of the doctrine of atonement have been consequently constrained to throw the penitence of the reformed transgressor into the scale with his obedience, to give it the greater weight; that, while his future obedience may exhaust his future obligations, his penitence may obliterate the former unfulfilled demands of the

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law. Now the present state of the argument does not require me to dwell upon the inefficacy of perfect penitence, I merely remind the reader that the penitence of man is necessarily imperfect; so that the very element which is recommended by our opponents, for the cleansing away of sin, being itself filthy, must, instead of purifying, leave a fresh stain upon the conscience, when an effort is made to wash with it the former stain away.

Fifthly, It is impossible to conceive that repentance should place an individual in the situation in which he stood before transgression, because, even though it were perfect, it has no power to remove the obstacles arising out of the character and government of God against the bestowment of pardon upon the guilty. To illustrate and confirm this assertion, it will be necessary to state precisely the nature of these obstacles, that the essential incompetency of repentance to their removal, and the consequent necessity of the atonement, may more distinctly appear.

It is impossible to have it too powerfully impressed upon our minds, that the obstacles to pardon, to which we have now referred, arose entirely out of the rectoral character of the Deity. They may all be resolved into the necessity under which he was placed, as a moral Governor, to preserve to the law all the efficiency which, as an instrument of moral government, it is possible for it to possess-which efficiency cannot be sustained, unless the conduct of the moral Governor be such as to evince the high sense he entertains of the excellence of the law, and the confidence with which its subjects may rely on the performance of its promises, and the execution of its threatenings.

Let us examine this matter a little more attentively. "Sustaining, as we do, various relations to God and to each other, there arise out of them, by necessary consequence, various obligations and duties. God is our Creator, our Preserver, our Benefactor, our Governor. He is the Framer of our bodies, and the Father of our spirits? He sustains us "by the word of his power;" for, as we are necessarily dependent beings, our continued existence is a kind of prolonged creation. We owe all that we possess to him; and our future blessings must

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flow from his kindness. Now, there are obviously certain affections and actions which harmonize or correspond with these relations. To love and obey God manifestly befit our relation to him as that great Being from whom our existence, as well as all our comforts flow."

"We sustain various relations to each other. God has formed of one blood all the families of the earth. Mutual love, and brotherly kindness, the fruit of love, are required by this relation-they harmonize or correspond with it. We are children; we are loved, and guarded, and supported, and tended with unwearied assiduity by our parents. Filial affection and filial obedience are demanded by this relation; no other state of mind, no other conduct, will harmonize with it. We are, perhaps, on the other hand, parents. Instrumentally, at least, we have imparted existence to our children; they depend on us for protection, support, &c. ; and to render that support, is required by the relation we bear to them.”—(Elements of Mental and Moral Science, by the Author, p. 512.)

In the attention we pay to these duties, growing thus necessarily out of relations, the honour of God and the general good are deeply involved: and, therefore, they are enforced by legislative enactment. God has commanded us to love him with all our mind, and soul, and strength, and our neighbour as ourselves. This enforcement of duty is not an arbitrary act on the part of God. On the contrary, it is of the very essence of moral government; the welfare of the universe imperatively demands it.

Further, it is equally necessary that these legal enactments should be accompanied with penal sanctions to enforce obedience to them. Unless this were the case, what has been called the authority of the law-or its efficiency as an instrument of moral government-its power to regulate the conduct of men, could not be sustained. It is, in fact, the sanctions of the Divine law, as is the case with every other law, in connexion with its promises, which impart to it all the influence which it possesses. A mere statement of certain actions to be performed, and of others to be avoided, though it proceeded from the lips of one who had a right to assume the reins of govern

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ment, unless there were presented along with it the prospect of some good to be obtained by obedience, and some evil to be endured as the result of disobedience, would be utterly devoid of efficiency. It could not, in fact, be an instrument of moral government; for moral government is the government of motives; and nothing can constitute a motive to action, except the prospect of some good to be enjoyed, or some evil to be avoided; which is, indeed, the same thing.

It may also be further observed, on this part of the subject, that penal sanctions are necessary to give the character of law to such an enumeration of actions as we have just referred to. "Law," says Jonathan Edwards, "must be enforced with threatenings of punishment, otherwise it fails of having the nature of a law, and is only of the nature of counsel or advice, or rather of a request. For one being to express his inclination or will to another concerning any thing he would receive from him, without any threatening annexed, but leaving it to the person applied to whether he will grant it or not, supposing that his refusal would be with impunity, is properly of the nature of a request. It does not amount to counsel or advice. No doubt, it falls far short of the nature of law-giving. For such an expression of one's will as this, is an expression of will without any expression of authority. It holds forth no authority for us merely to manifest our wills or inclinations to another; nor, indeed, does it manifest any authority over a person applied to, to promise him rewards. So persons may, and often do, promise rewards to others for doing those things that they have no power to oblige them to. So may persons do to their equals; so may a king do to others who are not his subjects. This is rather bargaining with others than giving them laws. That expression of will only is a law, which is exhibited in such a manner as to express the lawgiver's power over the person to whom it is manifested-his power of disposal of him according as he complies or refusesthat which shows power over him so as to oblige him to comply; or to make it to be his cost if he refuses." (Vol. viii., page 506.)

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rather to be regarded as consisting in their tendency, in consequence of their manifestation of the righteousness of the law, and the danger consequent upon transgression, to preserve unimpaired the moral power of the law, even while pardon is extended to those who have violated it.

Thirdly, we now proceed to show the ground on which pardon flows to those who repent and believe the gospel on account of this sacrifice;-or the connexion which exists between it, and the forgiveness of sin.

The observations which would seem to be required on this particular, have been so completely anticipated, that we might proceed at once to the following section, were it not proper to examine the statement of those writers who maintain that the atonement is, in fact, the channel through which forgiveness flows to the penitent, but avow at the same time, that there is no discoverable connexion between the one and the other ;or, that it is impossible for us to explain the manner in which the sacrifice of our Lord operated to procure the pardon of sin.

In this class of writers, we are constrained to place one individual, to whom all who attach paramount importance to the doctrine of atonement, are ready to confess the deepest obligations. I allude to the very learned and talented Dr. M'Gee. I cannot but regard the language of this powerful writer, in reference to this point, as the greatest blemish in his valuable work. "The sacrifice of Christ was never deemed by any who did not wish to calumniate the doctrine of atonement, to have made God placable, but merely viewed, as the means appointed by the Divine wisdom, by which to bestow forgiveness." (Vol. i., p. 22.) Having advanced this general statement, which is true in one sense, and false in another, he proceeds," But still it is demanded, in what way can the death of Christ, considered as a sacrifice of expiation, be conceived to operate to the remission of sins, unless by appeasing a being who otherwise would not have forgiven us?" To this, he adds, "The answer of the Christian is, I know not, nor does it concern me to know, in what manner the sacrifice of Christ is connected with the forgiveness of sins; it is enough that it is declared by God that this is the medium through