what nuclear force improvements do you believe would be required a pattlefield level—that is, in systems with ranges below 300 miles? Would you favor assigning a dedicated force of cruise missiles or surface ships to SACEUR to strengthen nuclear coupling in Europe? To what extent would the 1983 Montebello decision unilaterally re tical nuclear systems have to be reconsidered?

General GALVIN. The so-called double-zero option concerns a host political and military issues which involve not only fielded military equally important psychological and political perceptions.

There is a wide spectrum of expert opinion on the most recent zer and by definition, subjective judgment plays heavily in this subjec questions are whether or not our currently fielded capabilities are a cute alliance and U.S. national strategy with a reasonable assuranc whether the level of deterrence is adequate.

I support General Rogers' policies and believe that an intensifi prove NATO's conventional forces is vitally important. I also think intermediate-range missiles from Europe, which are also a deterrent tional war, should be balanced by the forces required to ensure th capability to implement the alliance's strategy of Flexible Response. sumptuous for me to give specific absolutes on these issues until I've tunity to assess the situation first hand. In this regard, I have est priorities during the first 6 months as follows:

Gain a fuller understanding of U.S. and Allied views of the dete fighting dimensions of the strategy of Flexible Responses:

With that understanding, assess the role of arms control, both as and in light of the most recent proposals, and its effect on my milit ities for executing that strategy in peacetime and in war;

Evaluate the total requirements-political, economic and military that strategy and the current shares of the effort being borne by eac Assess the role and capabilities of conventional forces-now and state-in raising the nuclear threshold so that we can deter at every deter not only war but political intimidation.

NATO'S CONVENTIONAL LEVEL PROBLEMS

Senator NUNN. Since NATO's biggest problem is at the convent would think that the alliance would be taking the lead in trying Soviet Union in meaningful negotiations on major and stabilizing re ward-deployed forces. Yet General Secretary Gorbachev has put N fensive in terms of conventional arms control, and we have yet to ag selves on the substance of a counter-offer.

Why do you think NATO has been unable to formulate bold and ventional arms control proposals?

What is the future of MBFR? Should it go on if the new negotiat tional arms reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals get underway? In a speech in Brussels last month, I sketched out a proposal for a reduction of forward-deployed forces in Central Europe in which th

remove some thirteen divisions and the United States would withdraw two-plus divisions. This would amount to about a 50 percent reduction by each side of currently deployed forces. What is your assessment of that suggestion?

General GALVIN. As a corps commander in Europe from 1983 to 1985, I operated at the tactical level of conventional war. Since that time, I have been totally immersed in defining and developing the means to fight a low intensity war in Latin America. Thus, I have had little time to ponder the stalemate in the MBFR negotiations.

However, it is my view that the issue of arms control for any of the escalatory states of Flexible Response cannot be viewed in isolation; rather, it must be viewed in full light of the threat and our strategy for deterring that threat-politically and militarily. To the extent that there are serious asymmetries at one end of the spectrum of conflict in Europe, we accept risk of excessive dependence on deterrence at the nuclear level.

If history is any lesson, then it should be clear that meaningful arms control negotiations have taken place when both sides deal from a position of strength.

Just as the alliance took the difficult political choice to field Pershing II and GLCM while pursuing arms control in 1979, member nations must now fulfill commitments made with regard to budgetary expenditures-3 percent annual increase-and to improved outputs as approved by the NATO Ministers in 1985 for inclusion in national Force Goals in order to approach an equitable balance in conventional forces. At the same time there could be conventional arms control negotiations outside the MBFR framework. The terms suggested by Senator Nunn in Brussels come to mind as one approach worth closer examination. Addressing only reductions of East and West manpower as now discussed in MBFR, doesn't seem to me to really get at the problem.

AMERICA'S COMMITMENT TO REINFORCE EUROPE

Senator NUNN. General Galvin, some observers believe that the United States has an inappropriate division of military labor with our NATO allies. A key concern is America's commitment to rapidly reinforce Europe with heavily armored and mechanized divisions. The strategic mobility required to rapidly deploy these forces or the pre-positioning of equipment for such forces is staggering. Given the European military manpower that is potentially available, it would be much more logical for the Europeans to provide more heavy ground combat formations and for the United States to emphasize capabilities that we can more easily bring to bear, like tactical air.

Do you believe that the alliance has an inappropriate division of military labor, especially regarding the extensive U.S. commitment of heavy divisions?

General GALVIN. Narrow statistical burdensharing arguments have characterized intra-alliance debate for the past three decades. To focus exclusively on the narrow military aspects of burdensharing and even here, there is honest disagreement on national contributions-is to miss the broader underpinnings of our alliance effort. It is an effort which involves political and economic as well as military contributions.

If burdensharing could be exactly quantified, the task of ensuring that everyone contributed "his fair share" would be easy. National willingness to assume political, economic and military burdens depends on national perception of threat and risk. The best answer to the question of military burdensharing may well be that not all allies are doing poorly and therefore they should not be lumped together. Second, we ourselves are guilty of inconsistency in our own policy choices and have often led our NATO allies down one path only to change course with little or no warning. As I indicated in my earlier response, I must withhold judgment on the specifics of burdensharing until I have a full appreciation for the intricacies of Flexible Response and the force requirements to successfully deter at every level. My judgments will be based on the understanding that collective efforts for military security underwrite our ability to effectively use other policy instrumentalities. NATO's member nations can only make progress together since our collective futures are inextricably intertwined. That progress has a price which must be shared by all. The question is whether in toto, each member nation shares equitably and efficiently in the various political, economic and military taxes and burdens that will perpetuate our Western ideals of peace and prosperity with freedom.

BALANCED TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE

Senator NUNN. General Galvin, last year, this committee introduced an initiative called the Balanced Technology Initiative, which is intended to address many of our

conventional defense shortcomings. It is meant to focus long-term research on ways to increase the rate of obsolescence of Soviet ground-force equipment, doctrine and tactics-kind of a "leapfrogging" strategy, rather than making marginal improvements in our own weapons. This year, the committee continued the BTI and earmarked $500 million for both new and ongoing projects. General Galvin, do you support this initiative?

General GALVIN. The Balanced Technology Initiative (BTI) is both an innovative and needed means to address known conventional shortcomings and serves as a companion piece to our traditional research, development and acquisition process. Indeed, we and our allies do need to take steps which will allow Western weapons technology to leapfrog Warsaw Pact technological improvements and, in particular, to redress the Pact's numerical superiority in many categories of fielded weapons and forces.

NATO'S FORWARD DEFENSE STRATEGY

Senator NUNN. General Galvin, NATO's forward defense strategy, designed to protect every inch of West German soil, appears to be a political strategy, not a military strategy.

From a military perspective, is NATO's forward defense strategy a sound coordination of NATO's military means and political ends?

General GALVIN. As General Rogers indicated to this committee in March, should deterrence fail, the strategy of Flexible Response envisions the use of the following responses to restore the territorial integrity and security of NATO:

Direct defense to defeat an attack or place the burden on the aggressor.
Deliberate escalation on NATO's part, to include the use of nuclear weapons.
General Nuclear Response.

NATO is committed politically and militarily to the Forward Defense of all NATO territory. Good military theory would say that you must destroy initial attacks from Warsaw Pact ground and air forces while at the same time delaying disrupting and destroying follow on forces if the conventional defense is to be successful.

Stationing troops forward and in defense in depth offers no early encouragement to enemy forces by allowing early success and avoids the necessity of having to retake ground ceded to the enemy. While serving as a Corps Commander in Germany, I did not envision direct defense as a thin line of troops along the border; rather, I deployed my forces in depth in the best defensible terrain near the border with a covering force to develop the battle between those forces and the border. I also maintain a sizable reserve, up to one-third of my force, which emphasized flexibility, firepower, mobility, speed, surprise, initiative and maneuver to seize the initiative from the attacker and turn it to my own advantage.

ARMOR/ANTIARMOR BALANCE

Senator NUNN. In a recent interview in Armed Forces Journal (May 1987), Phil Karber, a respected defense analyst, said about the widespread Soviet deployment of reactive armor, and I quote:

"I can't think of a Soviet conventional technology in the last 20 years that has come on so fast with such profound implications for the balance."

At another point, Mr. Karber asserted:

"Conservatively, 95 percent of NATO's infantry antitank capability is hurt by Soviet reactive armor."

General Galvin, do you agree with Mr. Karber's assessment of the armor/antiarmor balance?

General GALVIN. Mr. Karber's interview is in two parts, the second of which will be published in June. However, if the assessment prescribed in the first part of the interview is true, we must concern ourselves both with the rapidity with which reactive armor has been deployed and a true assessment of how that deployment impacts on our ability to conduct a forward defense in depth with ATGMs while retaining a defensive maneuver capability based on tanks. Perhaps the most significant statement of the interview is that which notes that "the Soviets ignored a threat for which there was no solution-Kinetic rounds-and concentrated on a capability which could be greatly reduced [ATGM's]." Put another way, Mr. Karber raises the question of traditional Western reliance on quality to offset Soviet numerical advantage. I look forward to his further analysis and recommended solutions next month.

BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE

WARNER. General Galvin, occasionally we read in the press repor he Bradley fighting vehicle. I would be interested in hearing your a is vehicle.

| GALVIN. Several Bradley battalions were fielded in the 3rd Infantry I was VII Corps Commander and we worked hard to field it properl it into the M-1/Bradley maneuver teams. Clearly we must under Bradley is intended to be employed within a tactical environment th nix of air and ground fighting systems. In my view the improveme bat capability represented by the Bradley fighting vehicle and Ab been dramatic.

STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY

WARNER. One of the critical issues continually confronting this comm standardization and interoperability among our forces in NATO. The port on standardization in NATO dated April 1987 indicates that whi ng progress, a great deal more needs to be done to strengthen NATO' defense capabilities. I would be interested to hear your views and you have for further improvement in this vital area.

GALVIN. Rationalization, Standardization, Interoperability [RSI] is cl tant key to our ability to make the best use of limited defense reso in each of the member nations. To the extent nations continue to al prerogatives in R&D and the production of weapon systems, how ot reach desired levels of efficiency in collective use of resources. The naintained their numerical superiority while closing the technological rship of Secretary Taft, coupled with the efforts of the NATO Confe al Armaments and the permanent representatives and backed by th is committee in funding NATO Cooperative R&D Programs, Side-by he Balanced Technology Initiative [BTI] and the Conventional Defens DI] are useful steps in redressing the imbalances and adverse trends. grams will require adequate further funding and the political will to perative R&D programs into production. Of course, should any cooper Decome economically and militarily unsound, it should be terminated. or ExON. Thank you, and we are adjourned. reupon, at 4:40 p.m. the meeting was adjourned.] nomination of Gen. John R. Galvin was reported to by Senator Nunn on May 28, 1987, with the recomme at the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was by the Senate on June 3, 1987.]

t 9:35 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Buil or Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Levin, Dixon, Shelby, War hond, Humphrey, Wilson, Symms, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl taff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, depu taff director; Jeffrey H. Smith, general counsel; Patrick inority counsel; and Andrew S. Effron, counsel; Rober ohn J. Hamre; George K. Johnson, Jr.; Ronald P. Kelly ocher III; David S. Lyles; and Frederick F.Y. Pang, I taff members; Pamela G. Powell, staff assistant.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Weaver, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, a Senator Kennedy; Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Sena Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. istant to Senator Warner; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; Samu son, assistant to Senator Symms; and Patrick A. Putign nt to Senator McCain.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHA Chairman NUNN. We meet today to consider the nor Gen. Carl Vuono of the U.S. Army to be the Army Chi General Vuono is presently the Commanding General Army Training and Doctrine Command, and has held th since June of 1986. General Vuono comes to this job wi range of experience within the Army.

He started as an artillery officer. He served 2 years in He served in Europe, most recently as Commanding Ger 8th Infantry Division. General Vuono has served in sev ities in the Army staff, most recently as Deputy Chief o erations and Plans.

General Vuono has been nominated for this position time in the transition of the Army, and an important t transition of the Defense Department. The Army is in of a major equipment modernization program.