telegrams were received by Brossart at the same time. He conveyed the property to Noel in accord with the contract made by Boal & Jackson. The plaintiff claims that his acceptance of the offer by telegram was binding upon Brossart, and] that the contract was complete from the date of such acceptance. It is also claimed that Boal & Jackson were not authorized by Brossart to make a sale of the property; and it is charged that Noel acted in bad faith, and fraudulently interfered and prevented the plaintiff from closing up the purchase. We don't think such claim is well founded. Noel had the same right to purchase this property that the plaintiff had, and if he succeeded in making a valid purchase he only prevented the plaintiff from purchasing the property at much less than its value, as the evidence shows. When Brossart learned that he had offered the property at less that its value, or in any state of the case, it was his right to stand upon a strict acceptance of his offer. We don't think it is material to inquire whether Boal & Jackson had authority to make a valid sale. We think that Brossart was not bound to comply with the acceptance of plaintiff, because it was not an acceptance of the offer. It was coupled with a condition with which Brossart was not required to comply. It was Sawyer's duty to pay the money to Brossart. It was a direct offer, and required an acceptance in the terms of the offer. Brossart made no reply to the telegram from plaintiff. It was his right to ignore it by silence; and all the evidence shows that from that time he treated the negotiations as at an end. Brossart's offer entitled him to have the money paid to him at Los Angeles and to deliver the deed there. The conclusion we reach finds support in the following cases: Northwestern Iron Co. v. Meade, 21 Wis. 474; Baker v. Holt, 56 id. 100; S. C., 14 N. W. Rep. 8; 1 Pars. Cont. (6th ed.) 475. Affirmed. Sawyer v. Brossart. Opinion by Rothrock, J. [Decided Dec. 15, 1885.]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTE AUTHORIZING VERDICT BY LESS THAN TWELVE JURORS

RIGHT OF

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.-After a jury in an action against a municipal corporation to recover for personal injuries caused by a defective sidewalk had been impanelled, and the counsel for the respective parties had made their opening statements, the court adjourned the trial for two days; and when it convened again one of the jurors was reported sick, whereupon the court directed the trial to proceed with eleven jurors, as provided in Code, section 2793. Held, that as such section was unconstitutional, and a municipal corporation had the same right to a full jury as a private party, such order was erroneous; following Eshleman v. Chicago, B. & Q R. Co., 25 N. W. Rep. 251. Kelsh v. Incorporated Town of Dyersville. Opinion by Reed, J.

[Decided Dec. 18, 1885.]

CHATTEL MORTGAGE-DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTYUNCERTAINTY.-A description in a chattel mortgage of the property mortgaged as "sixty head of two and three year old steers, and forty head of yearling steers; also sixty-five acres of standing corn, situated in Clay township, Shelby county," is not sufficient. It does not purport to apply to specific steers. There is no suggestion that the steers were all the steers of that age which the mortgagor owned in that township, and if he had others the mortgage would apply equally to all. The plaintiffs rely upon Smith v. McLean, 24 Iowa, 322; Rowley v. Bartholemew, 37 id. 374; Yant v. Harvey, 55 id. 421; and Stephens v. Pence, 56 id. 257. In Smith v. McLean, the description held sufficient was in these words: "Five freight wagons

and twenty-five yoke of cattle, being the train now in my possession." The description was such as to imply that the mortgagor had but one train in his pos session. It purported therefore to cover a specifio train. In Rowley v. Bartholemew, the question was not as to whether the description was sufficiently definite to cover any property, but whether it was sufficiently correct to cover the property in question. In Yant v. Harvey, the property mortgaged was a horse, and was described not only by its color, but as being on a certain farm. In Stephens v. Pence, the property mortgaged was a stock of goods, and was described as being in a certain store. None of these cases appear to us to be applicable to the case at bar. Caldwell v. Trowbridge. Opinion by Adams, J. [Decided Dec. 19, 1885.]

MARRIAGE-IMPLIED AUTHORITY OF HUSBAND AS TO CONTROL OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS IN HANDS OF CARRIER.-Where a husband presents a railroad receipt for household goods in the name of his wife at a depot, and gives directions for reshipping them, the railroad company has a right to presume and act on the presumption that the husband is the duly authorized agent of the wife in regard to the shipment and coutrol of the goods. Furman v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. Opinion by Adams, J. [Decided Dec. 21, 1885.]

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS--BOND EXECUTED BY ONE SURETY-AGREEMENT AS TO EXECUTION BY OTHER SURETIES-ESTOPPEL.-The executors' bond, having been executed by the executors, was signed and sealed by Sabin as surety, and by him left with the judge of Probate, the statutory obligee, by whom it was afterward duly approved, and letters testamentary issued accordingly. Upon this simple state of facts the bond would be taken to have been completely executed by Sabin, and so as to bind him according to its tenor. It would have been signed, sealed and delivered to him. But it appears that Sabin sigued the bond upon an understanding between him and the exexutor at whose request he signed it, and with the expectation that Seymour and Jackman would execute it as co-sureties, which they did not do. Sabin claims that this understanding amounted to an agreement that it should not take effect until they had signed it. In our opinion the trial court was right in finding that it did not amount to an express agreement. But whether it amounted to an agreement of any kind or not, there is no evidence that any such agreement, express or implied, was communicated to the judge of Probate, or that he was affected with notice of it, directly or indirectly. In the view most favorable to the appellant, Sabin, the case is then one of a bond, perfect upon its face, signed, sealed and in fact delivered by principals and surety to the obligee named therein, who has acted upon the faith of it, to his prejudice if it be not held valid, and without notice, actual or constructive, of an alleged agreement between principal and surety, by which the bond was not to take effect until executed by other sureties. That in such circumstances the surety ought to be and is estopped to set up the alleged agreement in defense against the boud is not only clear upon principle, but is settled by an irresistible weight and concurrence of authority. Dair v. U. S., 16 Wall. 1; State v. Peck, 53 Me. 284; Deardorff v. Foresman, 24 Ind. 481; Comstock v. Gage, 91 Ill. 328; Smith v. Peoria Co., 59 id. 413; McCormick v. Bay City, 23 Mich. 457; Ward v. Hackett, 30 Minn. 150; Pence v. Arbuckle, 22 Minn.

421; Brandt Sur., § 355, and note. Berkey 'v. Judd. Opinion by Berry, J.

[Decided Dec. 24, 1885.]

DEED-RELIGIOUS CORPORATION-CONVEYANCE OF LAND FOR PURPOSE OF ERECTING A CHURCH THEREON

ONLY. In a conveyance of land to a religious corporation the words "for the purpose of erecting a church thereon only," following the description of the property, do not of themselves create a condition subsequent. There is however a class of cases in which, as in this case, the deed expressed that the land should be used for a special purpose, and no other, but contained no technical words of condition, and no express words to the effect that a default should defeat the estate granted, in which the courts have had some difficulty in determining whether a condition was created, and upon which the declsions are not entirely agreed. In Hunt v. Beeson, 18 Ind. 380, where land was donated on a town plat "for the purpose of erecting a tan-yard on it," it was held to cre. ate a condition. But that decision seems to have been

made on the authority of Hayden v. Stoughton, 5 Pick. 528; and in the latter case there were technical words of condition-a fact which the court in 18 Ind. undoubtedly overlooked; so that case is of very little weight as an authority. In Horner v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 38 Wis. 165, in which land was conveyed "only for depot and other railroad purposes," there being no consideration except the expected enhancement in value of the grantor's other adjacent lands iu consequence of locating the depot there, from this the court concluded that the grantor intended to convey the land upon the condition that if the grantee failed to construct the railway and locate and erect the depot thereon, he should have the power to destroy the estate of the grantee in the land by re-entry. The court recognized the canons of interpretation in such cases, but we cannot help thinking it failed to properly apply them. At any rate it is the only case we have found squarely in point on that side the question. On the other hand, in Wier v. Simmons, 55 Wis. 637; S. C., 13 N. W. Rep. '873, where the grant was "upon the express condition that the grantee should pay to third persons, strangers to the deed, certain sums, the court construed the provision as not creating a condition subsequent, but as granting the land absolutely, subject to the sums specified as a charge or lien on it. The case illustrates how averse the courts are to uphold conditions that will defeat an estate vested. So in Strong v. Doty, 32 Wis. 381, where land was conveyed in trust to be devoted to a designated use, the court held that because there were no words in the deed expressing an intent that the land should revert, there was no condition subsequent. In Craig v. Wells, 11 N. Y. 315, it was decided that a clause in the deed excepting and prohibiting specified uses of the land did not create a condition. In Thornton v. Trammell, 39 Ga. 202, the words "it being expressly understood that said tract is not to be put to any other use than" (specifying it) were held to create a covenant, but not a condition. In Rawson v. Inhabitants of School District, 7 Allen, 125, the grant was "to have and to hold," etc., "for a burying-place forever," and it was held not a condition. In Packard v. Ames, 16 Gray, 327, it was held that a grant for a specified purpose, without other words, cannot create a condition. In Sohier v. Trinity Church, 109 Mass. 1, the words "in trust nevertheless and upon condition always" (to use the premises for public worship), in a deed to a religious corporation, were held to create only a trust, and not a condition. In the last case, as in some others, stress is laid upon the fact that the purpose for which the property is to be used being in its nature general and public, it indicates rather a

trust than a condition. There is no doubt that the grantor may make such use of the land a condition, but the matter is to be considered in arriving at the intention. Farnham v. Thompson. Opinion by Gilfillan, C. J.

[Decided Dec. 5, 1885.]

PAYMENT-DURESS-MAY BE RECOVERED. When one, in order to recover possession of his personal property from another, who unjustly detains it, is compelled to pay money which is demanded as a condition of delivery, such payment, when made under protest, is deemed to have been made compulsory or under duress, and may be recovered back; at least when such detention is attended with circumstances of hardship or of serious inconvenience to the owner. Shaw v. Woodcock, 7 Barn. & C. 73; Parker v. Bristol & E. Ry. Co., 7 Eng. Law & Eq. 528; Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137; Cobb v. Charter, 32 Conn. 358; Chase v. Dwinal, 7 Greenl. 134; Chamberlain v. Reed, 13 Me. 357; Scholey v. Mumford, 60 N. Y. 498; Briggs v. Boyd, 56 N. Y. 289; Beckwith v. Frisbie, 32 Vt. 559; Lafayette & I. R, Co. v. Pattison, 41 Ind. 312; Hackley v. Headley, 45 Mich. 569. The detention of this cargo of grain, amounting to over 50,000 bushels, upon the unauthorized claim for demurrage, constituted such duress of property that the payment of the demand must be deemed to have been made under moral compulsion, and not voluntary, and the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The amount and the presumable value of the property as compared with the sum demanded, and the fact shown that the wheat had been sold or contracted for delivery beyond Buffalo, are enough to lead to the above conclusion. Fargusson v. Winslow. Opinion by Dickinson, J. [Decided Dec. 19, 1885.]

VERMONT SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

WILL-CONDITION AGAINST MARRIAGE.-The will provided that the legatee should have the income of the estate and such further sums as her wants might demand, so long as she remained the wife of T. A. Thayer; but if she was "left a widow, or for any cause should cease to be the wife of said "Thayer, the whole estate should be given to the legatee. Held, that the condition is valid, and not against public policy. The ground upon which it is claimed that the provision of the will violates public policy is that it furnishes an inducement to the wife to become the widow of her husband, or to separate herself from him in such a manner that she would cease to be his wife. The appellants, to sustain this claim, rely upon the rule as stated in 2 Redf. Wills, 293; 1 Story Eq. Jur. 291, and the case of Conrad v. Long, 33 Mich. 78. The cases cited in support of the rule laid down in Redfield and Story it will be found on examination, do not sustain the rule as here sought to be applied. They are generally cases in which an inducement was directly held out to encourage a voluntary separation of husband and wife, and where the intent to encourage such a separation could be found in the language employed in making the bequest. They are none of them so similar in their facts to the case at bar that they can be considered authorities in it. The first object is to ascertain, if possible, what the intention of the testatrix was; and we find no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that it was to have her estate disposed of just as it has been by the Probate Court. It was a wise and prudent provision to make for her daughter. While she should remain a wife her husband would be under obligation to support her, and hence the income only was absolutely left her during the coutinuance of that

relation; but when she should cease to be a wife, and so become dependent upon her own resources, it was just and wise to provide that she should have the entire estate. Thayer v. Spear. Opinion by Royce, C. J. [Decided Jan. 15, 1886.]

OHIO SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

CONTRACT-OFFER TO SUBSCRIBE TO STOCK OF RAILROAD-REVOCATION BY DEATH.-An offer in writing to subscribe to the capital stock of a railroad company, conditioned upon the construction of its line or road along a designated route, is revocable, at the option of the party making such offer, at any time before its delivery to and acceptance by such company; and his death before such delivery and acceptance works such revocation. Until some action is taken on the basis of a subscription to a benevolent or other enterprise, it may be revoked. "The promise in such case stands as a mere offer, and may by necessary implication be revoked at any time before it is acted ou. It is the expending of money, etc., or incurring of legal liability on the faith of a promise, which gives the right of action, and without which there is no right of action. Until action upon it, there is no mutuality, and being only an offer, and susceptible of revocation at any time before being acted upon, it follows that the death (or insanity) of the promisor, before the offer is acted upon, is a revocation of the offer." Pratt v. Trustees, 93 Ill. 475. See also Beach v. Church, 96 id. 179; 1 Whart. Cont., §§ 12, 528; Poll. Cont. 20: Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. Div. 475; Tayloe v. Ins. Co., 9 How. 390; 1 Redf. Rys. *203. Wallace v. Townsend. Opinion by

Owen, J.

[Decided Nov. 17, 1885.]

PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

MASTER AND SERVANT-SAFE APPLIANCES-USUAL RISKS.-It is a well-settled rule of the law that the master must adopt, provide and maintain reasonably suitable instruments and means with which to carry on his business, so that his servant may perform his duties with relative safety, and without exposure to dangers which are not reasonably incident to his employment. Co-relative to this is the rule, equally well settled, that a servant will be deemed to have assumed all risks naturally and reasonably incident to his employment, and to have notice of all risks, which to a person of his experience and understanding are, or ought to be, open and obvious. Railroad Co. v. Keenan, 7 Out. 124. These rules are elementary and fundamental, and are everywhere recognized. They grow out of the necessities of the relation of master and servant, and are encouraged and sustained by public policy. If however a person specially undertake to perform a peculiarly perilous work, by operating a machine obviously wanting in suitable appliances for safety, knowingly and voluntarily, he cannot afterward complain, in case of injury in consequence thereof, that the machinery was of a dangerous kind, and that it was wanting in appliances reasonably necessary to render it safe. Railway Co. v. Bressmer, 1 Out. 103; Marsden v. Height & Co., 14 Week. Notes, 526. So upon an analogous principle, if an employee, after having a full and fair opportunity to become acquainted with the risk of his situation, makes no complaint whatever to his employer as to the machinery,

which he knows to be wanting in appliances for safety, takes no precaution to guard against danger, but accepting the risks voluntarily continues in the performauce of his duty, he cannot complain if he is subsequently injured by such exposure. Whart. Neg. 214. He is not bound to risk his safety in the service of his master, and he may, if he thinks fit, decline to do that which exposes him to imminent peril. Runnell v. Dilworth. Opinion by Clark, J.

[Decided Jan. 4, 1886.]

NEGLIGENCE-PAVEMENT-AREA-LANDLORD AND TENANT. A building was leased piecemeal to different tenants, so that each tenant was only lessee of his respective part, and while having the right to use the entry, stairways and other appurtenances, was not in exclusive possession, nor had the entire control thereof. An accident was occasioned to a person walking along the pavement by reason of the fact that the same was not in repair, and had been permitted to crumble away along the edge of a certain unguarded area. In an action to recover damages the court below charged that the owner was responsible for the injury in so far as it was occasioned by a defect in the pavement, but that in so far as it was caused by a defect in the original construction or guarding of the area, and provided the area was entirely in possession of one tenant, the owner would not be liable, as he had purchased the property so short a time before the accident that he had not had it in his power to take possession thereof. The jury found for the plaintiff. Held, that the instructions were quite as favorable as the defendant was entitled to demand. Brown v. Weaver. Opinion per Curiam. [Decided Feb. 8, 1886.]

RAILROADS

SIGNALS

BELLS

NEGLIGENCE FRIGHTENING HORSES.-In an action for negligence where facts have been shown from which negligence may reasonably be inferred, the court may properly direct a verdict for the defendant. A part of a railroad company's track was built upon a public street in a built-up portion of a city, and was crossed at grade by numerous streets at right angles to it. Plaintiff was driving on this street before a horse and wagon. The bell of an engine coming in the opposite direction was rung when about thirty feet from the horse, who took fright and veered around so that the cart which he was pulling was struck by the locomotive and plaintiff was injured. The company afterward put a fence between the track and the street. In an action for damages, held, that there being no evi dence from which negligence by the defendant could reasonably be inferred, the court was right in instructing the jury to find for the defendant. Fouhy v. Pennsylvania R. Co. Opinion per Curiam. [Decided Jan. 25, 1886.]

CORRESPONDENCE.

DEFECTS IN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

I heartily second the suggestions made to the legislative judiciary committees, in the letter of District Attorney Lang, of St. Lawrence, as published in your issue of the 13th inst. Of the many imperfections of the Criminal Code, there are probably uone more patent than those to which attention is called by that letter. I think however that there is a key to the apparent incongruity of sections 56, 211 and 701, and that they may stand together without conflict. Section 56 says that "Courts of Special Sessions except in the city

and county of New York and the city of Albany have in the first instance exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine," etc., of the offenses therein stated. Referring to section 699 it says that in the cases where Courts of Special Sessions have (exclusive) jurisdiction When the defendant is brought before the magistrate the charge must be read, and the defendant required to plead; and (section 701) "upon a plea other than a plea of guilty, if the defendant do not demand a trial by jury the court must proceed to try the issue. From these sections it is apparent that no preliminary examination is contemplated in such cases. More than that, it cannot be claimed as a matter of right, by the defendant, for that the trial shall proceed when defendant is brought into court is made imperative by that section. Now returning to section 211, giving the defendant his election in cases where that court has jurisdiction, as to whether he shall be tried by jury after indictment or by a Court of Special Sessions, the question naturally arises whether there are offenses in which a Court of Special Sessions has concurrent jurisdiction with courts that may find and try indict. ments. In other words, whether any Court of Special Sessions has larger jurisdiction than those outside of the "county of New York and the city of Albany? If there are, then the inference that is drawn from that section that persons accused of misdemeanors, embodied in section 56, have the right to preliminary examination, is exploded. The answer is found in sections 64 and 68, which confer jurisdiction upon Courts of Special Sessions in New York and Albany, respectively of all misdemeanors within prescribed limits, and such jurisdiction is of course concurrent with courts of original criminal jurisdiction. Thus if information be laid before a magistrate in a Court of Special Sessions in New York county, accusing it of the crime of libel under section 242 of the Penal Code, it may elect to have a preliminary examination when brought into court. Section 211 then attaches if he shall be held for trial and it may then be proceeded with in the same court. If however the information had been laid in a similar court in Clinton county for the same offense committed in that county, the examination follows as a matter of course, and then should it appear that the crime had been committed, he is held to answer the same by the magistrate's order in a court having jurisdiction which a Court of Special Sessions in Clinton county has not. Writing the word "exclusive" in section 699, certainly limits its scope, but that it should be there, seemed so obviously the meaning of the statute, that I considered it justifiable to insert it as merely discriptive. Very truly yours, WILMER H. DUNN.

CHAMPLAIN, N. Y., Feb. 22, 1886.

HERBERT SPENCER ON CODIFICATION. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Reading a few days ago Herbert Spencer's essay on over-legislation, I found that incidentally to the subject he was treating he had said something on codification, which would be interesting to your readers at this time. In discussing the evils entailed by the eagerness of legislators to enact laws on every subject, he mentions as perhaps the greatest evil their neglect of the primary function of government, the efficient administration of justice, the "rendering of justice, pure, certain, prompt and cheap." He recites the "legal abominations so familiar to litigants and on the possibility of codification says:

"Lawyers perpetually tell us that codification is im

possible; and there are many simple enough to believe them. Merely remarking, in passing, that what government and all its employees cannot do for the acts of Parliament in general, was done for the 1,500 customs acts in 1825 by the energy of one man, Mr. Deacon Hume, let us see how the absence of a digested system of law is made good. In preparing themselves for the bar, and finally the bench, law-students, by years of research, have to gain acquaintance with this vast mass of unorganized legislation; and that organization which it is held impossible for the State to effect, it is held possible (sly sarcasm on the State) for each student to effect for himself. Every judge can privately codify, though 'united wisdom' cannot. But how is each judge enabled to codify? By the private enterprise of men who have prepared the way for him, by the partial codifications of Blackstone, Coke and others; by the digests of partnership law, bankruptcy law, law of patents, laws affecting women, and the rest that daily issue from the press; by abstracts of cases, and volumes of reports, every one of them unofficial products. Sweep away all these fractional codifications made by individuals, and the State would be in utter ignorance of its own laws! Had not the bunglings of legislators been made good by private enterprise, the administration of justice would have been impossible!"

Had codification been his theme, instead of overlegislation, and the vast mass of unorganized decisions, as well as the vast mass of unorganized legislation with which the student of law is obliged, or supposed, to gain acquaintance, been considered, he would have seen that years of research were inadequate to gain that knowledge which lawyers are supposed to possess; and wondered still more at the simplicity of laymen and legislators in listening to the objections of lawyers to making the law comprehensible by themselves. I know that many eminent members of the bar will affect to despise the opinion of any outsider, even though he be the most philosophic thinker and careful observer of modern times. However it is a healthy process for lawyers, as well as for the rest of mankind, to see themselves as others see them. The perusal of the whole essay could not but benefit lawyers and legislators, even if it should not free them from "many a faultie and foolish notion."

SUBSCRIBER.

AUSTIN'S FARM LAW AND GAME LAWS. The Law concerning Farms, Farmers and Farm Laborers, together with the Game Laws of all the States. By Henry Austin. Boston: Chas. C. Soule, 1886.

A very concise and well arranged manual, and sufficiently exhaustive, stating very particularly the law of fixtures, animals, manure, crops, timber, fires, ways, boundaries, fences, trees, water, sea-weed, game, etc., with a few good forms. We do not discover any allusion to the restriction on agricultural leases by Constitution in this State. The singular cases of Buckingham v. Elliott, 62 Miss. 296, concerning an invasion of a well by tree roots, and Cottle v. Spitzer, 65 Cal. 456; S. C., 52 Am. Rep. 305, holding that fruit trees are not "growing crops" exempt from taxation, will do for Mr. Austin's second edition. The book is

from the unsurpassed University Press. It would be

much easier to learn law if all law books were as well printed as this.

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

McColl, appellant, v. Josiah J. Frith, et al., respondents; Charles Rothschild, et al., respondents, v. Chas. Werner, et al., appellants; James H. Chambers, appellant, v. William H. Appleton, et al., respondents; Peter Townsend, respondent, v. Cassius H. Read, et al., appellants.Order of General Term reversed, and judgment on report of referee affirmed with costs-Orson C. Luiderman, respondent, v. Marion J. Farguharson, appellant. Judgment of Genera. Term reversed, that of Special Term affirmed-Daniel A. Moran, appellaut, v. Long Island City, respondentl -So much of the judgment as allows commissions on the unsold land reversed, without costs to either party-Phillips Phoenix and another, surviving trustees, respondents, v. Maria W. Livingston, et al., impleaded, appellants.Order of General Term reversed, and judgment on the verdict affirmed, with costs-Charles Snowden, et al., appellants, v. William H. Guion, respondent.-Order affirmed and judgment absolute ordered on the stipulation, with costs Clara B. Allen, appellant, v. Walter S. Allen, respondent. Order affirmed, with costs - United States Trust Co., of New York, v. West Shore & Buffalo R. Co. Appeal dismissed, with costs-People ex rel. James A. Wright, appellant, v. Alfred C. Chapin, comptroller, respondent.-Judgment of General and Special Terms, so far as appealed from, reversed: new trial granted; costs to abide the event-Royal Wheel Co., respondent, v. Robert W. Fielding, et al., appellants. Judgment as to Thompson reversed and complaint as to him dismissed, with costs to be paid by the respondent. So far as the judgment relates to property other than that conveyed to Thompson by

THEA

Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event-Kings County Fire Ins. Co., appellants, v. Hannah Stevens, respondent; Germania National Bank of New Orleans, respondent, v. William G. Taaks, et al., appellants; William H. Hills, respondent, v. Peekskill Sav. Bank, et al., appellants; John G. Smith, appellant, v. Thomas Boyd, et al., respondents; Erastus B. Searles, respondent, v. Manhattan Ry., appellant; Eliza Allison, appellant, v. Village of Middletown, respondent; Mary Price, respondent, v. Septimus Brown, et al., appellants; John Sweeney, respondent, v. Berlin & Jones Envelope Co., appellants; Frederick Benzing, appellant, v. Steinway, & Sons, respondents.— Judgment affirmed with costs-Ellen Greany, respondent, v. Long Island R. Co., appellants; Helen B. Simmons, respondent, v. Joseph W. H. Havens, appellant; Henry Knight, et al., respondents, v. N. Y. & Manhattan Beach Ry. Co., impleaded, appellants; Alice Lake, respondent, v. N. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., appellant; Edward Materne, et al., appellants, v. Bernard Horwitz, et al., respondents; Henry Newman, respondent, v. Emil Greefe, et al., appellants; Edward Kelly, et al., appellants, v. Francis A. Geer, respondent; Joseph Martin, et al., v. Traders' Ins. Co., respondent; Edward D. McCarthy, respondent, v. Robert Bonynge, appellant; Elias Bach, et al., respondents, v. David Levy, et al., appellants; David C. Carlton, appellant, v. Mayor, etc., of New York, respondents; David Griffin, respondent, v. George K. Otis, appellant; Geo. Jackson, et al., v. Horace Tupper, et al., appellants; Charles S. Griffin respondent., v. Cornelia Gray, et al., appellants; Stephen F. Dowling, appellant, v. Joab L. Clift, survivor, respondent; Sarah E. Nichols, adm'rx, respondent, v. Charles F. MacLean, appellant; John A. Husson, respondent, v. Wm. G. Oppenheim, appellant; Myron E. Favor, respondent, v. Anthony W. Dimock, et al., appellants; People ex rel. John Swinburne, respondent, v. Michael N. Nolau, appellant; Jeffrey

of the Brooklyn, Flatbush & Coney Island Railroad company, and other individual property held or owned by Lewis, the judgment should be modified by directing the appointment of a receiver thereof, with the usal powers of a receiver in such cases, and as so modified, affirmed, without costs of this appeal to him or the respondent-Fuller Electrical Co., respondent, v. Benjamin Lewis, et al., appellants.- -Motion for re-argument denied, with costs-Wm. J. King, Jr., appellant, v. Thomas Leighton, respondent.

NOTES.

There are thirteen prisoners in a Mississippi jail charged with murder. It is feared that the unlucky number may prove fatal to some of them.-Tribune.

A dentist in St. Louis kills another man for seducing his wife. How much better it would have been, and how much keener a revenge to extract his teeth without " gas." But the prisoner's mother says his "mind is unbalanced," and that probably accounts for it.

Judgment was given in the Superior Court, Montreal, in favor of Mr. Primeau, a pew holder in Notre Dame great church, for $20 damages and costs, that in the aggregate amount to $260, against Mr. Demers, one of the wardens, who insulted plaintiff on two consecutive Sundays by passing his pew without handing the collection plates into it. The Fabrique ecclesiastical authorities passed a resolution to pay the costs out of the funds of church for the warden, but plaintiff and others have moved for an injunction to restrain the Fabrique from paying the amount from the source in question. The defense to the suit for damages was that previous to the warden passing the pew of plaintiff without presenting the plate he never gave a cent when it was offered.