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not have availed against such a preponderance of force armed and led as were the Prussians. The unfortunate general fell early, vainly attempting to rally his men, and the division was soon in disorderly retreat, carrying off indeed some of its wounded, but leaving 600 prisoners and a gun in the enemy's hands, with the camp in which it had been surprised. The Crown Prince had so hastened the opening of his campaign as to come up without his two Prussian cavalry divisions; and to this and from the long march of the day before from Landau we must ascribe the fact that the defeated division was not annihilated. Its march southward was so rapid as soon to take it beyond direct pursuit, and to outstrip any attempt to cut it off made by the Baden troops, which had crossed unopposed at Lauterbourg, using boats that the commonest caution should have caused the French to destroy.

The moral effect of this action, the first serious event of the war, was naturally immense. The French, who had eagerly expected news of a real victory to follow the skirmish at Saarbrück, were immoderately cast down. The Germans on their side recounted the particulars triumphantly, and comparing them with the same Prince's success over Ramming's corps at Nachod, prophesied a new Königgrätz for their foes whenever the dashing young general should draw near the real object of the campaign, the Imperial main army. Alas for the French! Disasters far beyond that of Königgrätz were to fill the next page of their nation's chequered history. Defeats greater than Germany had ever experienced at the hands of the First Napoleon himself, were to overtake his successor in the new encounter of the nations.

MacMahon had heard of the disaster of his lieutenant too late to remedy the fault which had exposed a division singly to be crushed by an army.

He gave no credit to the rumours of the fugitives that the force advancing from Landau was so large that to encounter it even with a corps was but to multiply disaster ; and having rallied the troops flying from Wissembourg upon his other divisions, he took up a strong defensive position fifteen miles to the south-west, on the lower spurs of the Vosges, and drew his forces together, about 55,000 strong in all, ready to check the further invasion of Alsace. His front, looking generally north-east, was semicircular, the right thrown back so as to be parallel to the great road and railroad from Wissembourg along the Rhine to Strasburg, while his left pointed rather to the west, covering the railroad which turns off from the main line just mentioned at Haguenau, and traverses the Vosges by the pass of Bitsche. It was impossible that an enemy's

Armies on the Saar would still occupy a week to complete in full, notwithstanding that the French had spared the railroads, so vast were the masses of Prince Frederic Charles' force. But the Crown Prince had farther to go, with a circuitous march through a hilly country to make, before he could reach Lorraine. Better informed than his eneny, Moltke knew there was no force on MacMahon's side that could equal that gathered at Landau; and as surprise was an important element in the accomplishment of this part of his design, the Crown Prince received orders to advance over the frontier forth with. On the 3rd August he was drawing up to Wissembourg with a force too moderately estimated at 100,000 men. Of these the Badish division, followed by the Wirtemburgers, who only arrived that day, were directed ten miles to the left on Lauterbourg to outflank the enemy, should he be in force at the chief passage of the Lauter, on which the main body moved.

We have seen that General A. Douay was at Wissembourg, and the reason of his being sent there. MacMahon's orders to close in to his left from Strasburg had been some days received, so that the division of Douay had reached its advarced position before the end of July, and had sent patrols across the Lauter which exchanged shots with outposts of Bavarian cavalry. But so strict and able were the measures of the Crown Prince's staff to prevent intelligence reaching Wissembourg, that Douay encamped with security within two miles of the frontier-line, utterly unconscious that a force ten times his own strength was within a single day's march. For the isolation of his division MacMahon must be in some sort responsible; but Douay's troops had himself chiefly to blame for the temerity which exposed them to the surprise of a vastly superior enemy. The country on the Bavarian side of the Lauter was so wooded as to conceal all movements. There was no military purpose gained by thrusting his camp close to the frontier which would not have been in every sense better answered by keeping it ten miles to the south, and watching the passages of the little stream with detachments of cavalry. Probably the convenience of being near the town, and the fact that there was a good position behind looking towards the Lauter, decided the general's choice. Choosing thus however he put himself at the mercy of the enemy, who drew up close to the stream just before daybreak on the 4th ; and when at early dawn he discovered the Germans crossing directly in his front and on both flanks in resistless force, it was too late to draw away from the shock. Forced into sudden and hopeless action, Douay and his men for a while fought gallantly, but had they been paladins all, it would not have availed against such a preponderance of force armed and led as were the Prussians. The unfortunate general fell early, vainly attempting to rally his men, and the division was soon in disorderly retreat, carrying off indeed some of its wounded, but leaving 600 prisoners and a gun in the enemy's hands, with the camp in which it had been surprised. The Crown Prince had so hastened the opening of his campaign as to come up without his two Prussian cavalry divisions; and to this and from the long march of the day before from Landau we must ascribe the fact that the defeated division was not annihilated. Its march southward was so rapid as soon to take it beyond direct pursuit, and to outstrip any attempt to cut it off made by the Baden troops, which had crossed unopposed at Lauterbourg, using boats that the commonest caution should have caused the French to destroy.

The moral effect of this action, the first serious event of the war, was naturally immense. The French, who had eagerly expected news of a real victory to follow the skirmish at Saarbrück, were immoderately cast down. The Germans on their side recounted the particulars triumphantly, and comparing them with the same Prince's success over Ramming's corps at Nachod, prophesied a new Königgrätz for their foes whenever the dashing young general should draw near the real object of the campaign, the Imperial main army. Alas for the French! Disasters far beyond that of Königgrätz were to fill the next page of their nation's chequered history. Defeats greater than Germany had ever experienced at the hands of the First Napoleon himself, were to overtake his successor in the new encounter of the nations.

MacMahon had heard of the disaster of his lieutenant too late to remedy the fault which had exposed a division singly to be crushed by an army. He gave no credit to the rumours of the fugitives that the force advancing from Landau was so large that to encounter it even with a corps was but to multiply disaster ; and having rallied the troops flying from Wissembourg upon his other divisions, he took up a strong defensive position fifteen miles to the south-west, on the lower spurs of the Vosges, and drew his forces together, about 55,000 strong in all, ready to check the further invasion of Alsace. His front, looking generally north-east, was semicircular, the right thrown back so as to be parallel to the great road and railroad from Wissembourg along the Rhine to Strasburg, while his left pointed rather to the west, covering the railroad which turns off from the main line just mentioned at Haguenau, and traverses the Vosges by the pass of Bitsche. It was impossible that an enemy's force could pass by towards Haguenau and Strasburg without danger to its flank, whilst to penetrate into the Vosges the Germans must dislodge him by direct attack. The position was strong in itself, and strategically well-chosen had the forces been fairly matched; but the Crown Prince, pushing on steadily from Wissembourg on the 5th, was close to it that evening with 130,000 men, and discovered that the French were before him in force. Though certain from the information furnished him from head-quarters that the district he was entering was guarded by little more than a single corps, he would have deferred the battle to allow his Prussian cavalry and some other detachments still in rear time to arrive; but the impatience of his outposts and those of MacMahon brought on heavy firing early on the 6th. After sending orders to break this off, which were literally obeyed by but one of the corps, Hartmann's 2nd Bavarians, he deployed to support the troops engaged, and the battle was soon fairly joined.

It is not our intention to repeat here details that must still be fresh in our readers' memories. The French on the day of Woerth fought gallantly, and the Crown Prince only forced them from their position late in the afternoon by using his superior force freely to outflank them. The Bavarian and Wirtemburg horse followed up the success partially into the hills, and captured guns and prisoners in addition to those taken in the fighting; but the striking point to observe is this, that the right of the French, though not pressed at all after its ground was once yielded, gave way to a panic rout such as is only paralleled in modern history by the raw fugitives of Bull's Run at the opening of the American War. Fleeing madly, though wholly unpursued, crowds of men on foot, or, worse, on horses stolen from the guns and trains, rushed pellmell through Haguenau towards Strasburg, where 3,000 of such fugitives arrived without their arms, to take refuge in the fortress, which at once embodied them in its slender garrison. Shameful as the disorder was on this side, the centre and left of MacMahon's behaved hardly better on the retreat, which their own misconduct turned into a disastrous rout. Their officers, who had neglected to maintain order in time of peace, found it impossible to rally them under the pressure of panic, and when MacMahon on the following evening reached Saverne after a cross-march through the hills, but three of his infantry regiments had kept their ranks. The fatal indiscipline, the total want of mutual confidence between officers and men, the utter prostration under reverse which have constantly characterised the army of the Second Empire since the war began, were at once fully manifested in this shameful retreat, the sad presage of greater misfortunes to come.

Bitter as it was to the French to hear of the defeat of France's favourite marshal, and the ruin of her finest corps, there were other events on the same 6th August which bore no less hardly on their future, and of which it must be our next task to speak briefly.

The news of a sudden advance of a force of unknown strength through Wissembourg, and of the disaster that Douay's division had suffered, reached the French headquarters on the 5th, and spurred the Emperor's staff to take steps for that concentration which had hitherto been only generally designed. Though even yet neither Ladmirault nor Bazaine was at once moved up to support him, orders were given to General Frossard to withdraw the troops lately left overlooking Saarbrück, for fear that a similar surprise to that of Douay might be attempted from the woods beyond the Prussian frontier-line. On the morning of the 6th, therefore, they were out of sight when the leading division of the First Army arrived at Saarbrück under General Von Kameke, and Goeben, the corps conmander, pushed it on to discover whether the enemy were really in retreat. Crowning the hills which Frossard had just abandoned, the Prussians discovered him not far off, his troops lying about Forbach, where another and steeper hill bounds a little plain lying just within the French frontier. Goeben knew that part of the 8th corps was following his own, and he was also aware that divisions of the Second Army were coming up from Mayence in rear of both, Saarbrück in fact being the junction point where the masses of Steinmetz and Prince Frederic Charles were to meet. Under these circumstances he did not hesitate to take the responsibility of an attack, and was so vigorously supported by reinforcements from both German armies, that he was enabled finally, with a dexterous flank movement, to mass to his right the troops first engaged and to carry the steep hill of Spicheren, on which the French left rested, by a direct attack of the favourite company columns of the army of his nation. Forced thus off the direct road to Metz, which their enemy had now seized, and seeing little of their commander, who had proved himself quite unable to meet his adversary's tactics, Frossard's troops made a hurried night retreat southward. More confusion, more indiscipline, more causeless panic, was again the result, though no attempt was made by the Germans to follow up their success; for the battle closed at dark, and Steinmetz, now in person on the ground, was quite unaware, as were the other generals, of the real measure

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