licensing review. An analysis of the applicability of the existing technical basis for licensing has been conducted. This, along with probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) and preliminary safety evaluation reports, has been utilized by NRC to generate a set of licensing criteria against which licensing applications of the future would be judged. Licensability has not been demonstrated, but criteria and methods have been identified which, when exercised, should allow the plants to be licensed given the conduct of R&D programs and full-plant testing. A similar program has been conducted for the LMR. As to the matter of influence of target material in the reactor on the risks associated with licensability, we do not believe that the impact will be equal. Early HWR reviews included the conduct of reactor operations with targets of various kinds in the reactor core. No such reviews for licensability purposes have been conducted for HTGR's, LWR's or LMR's. Question: Why were the safety analysis tools (procedures, codes, etc.) for the HWR judged to be four years behind the other concepts? If the NRC has licensed two gas reactors and over 100 water reactors, do not most of the procedures and analysis codes directly apply to the HWR from the LWR? Answer: The SRP reactors, in their 30 years or more of operation, have accumulated an enviable record of safe operation. During accumulation of this record, the civilian nuclear power industry was born and the licensing process was evolving along with the growing industry. In the mideighties it became apparent that a number of safety codes and safety approaches used by the civilian reactor industry were not in use at SRP. Since that time, a considerable effort has been put in place to select and modify those tools and procedures which would contribute to improved SRP reactor safety. As the question implies, a significant portion of the codes was found to have general application to the HWR. However, for specific application, modifications to the codes must be made so they can be directly utilized in existing reactor operations. Question: Senator McClure stated and it was not denied by DOE that no target experimental data are available for the LWR? Is this true? What is the status of target development and the associated reprocessing requirements for each of the concepts? What are the relative costs? Answer: DOE has been supporting a target development program for the LWR technology, including N Reactor, for several years; specific results of this program are classified. The feasibility has been generally demonstrated. Further confirmatory testing, optimization studies, and large-scale manufacturing feasibility remain to be completed. The HWR has the most mature target technology of all concepts, and no target development work is anticipated. The MHTGR target technology development is at an advanced stage, but still requiring verification and qualification testing. A three to four year program for MHTGR target qualification is estimated to cost about $50 million. The LWR target technology has demonstrated feasibility, but requires further development and qualification testing. A LWR target R&D program is now estimated to cost $94 million. Target technology for the LMR is at an early stage of development. A 3-year target R&D program, including qualification testing in the FFTF would cost approximately $20 to $30 million plus the costs associated with the use of the test facility. Question: Define the NRC conditions of Class 9 accidents. Have solutions for the prevention of this condition been proposed by all concepts? Are all designs using passive safety techniques? Some of you will recall that I've consistently urged the Department to utilize the NPR procurement not only as a way to replace the aging production reactors at Savannah River, but also as a means to introduce new passively safe modularized nuclear plants to the marketplace. In March I was told the various technologies were considered essentially equal. Now the ERAB report appears to favor the Heavy Water Reactor. I hope that we're not at the end of the road in the process and that we don't miss the opportunity to do something about civilian nuclear power. We're all worrying, with cause, about global warming and pending energy shortages. there is no commercial application of the heavy water reactor, in my mind, it is even more critical to use a modular passively safe technology for the NPR, particularly since the new technology can contribute in reducing the global warming problem. What are your thoughts? Answer: Traditional NRC Class 9 accidents represent those accidents that involve failures not considered in the design basis of the facility. Thus, any accident that goes beyond the design basis is considered a Class 9 accident. Since reactors are designed to prevent the design basis accidents, any accidents in which the reactor fails to maintain critical safety function such as adequate core cooling are considered Class 9 accidents. Core melt accidents are considered Class 9 events. PRA techniques are used to investigate the progression and impact of these accidents. All of the NPR concept proponents committed to use PRA techniques in the development and implementation of the NPR designs. In addition, whenever applicable and cost-effective, passive safety techniques were incorporated into the proposed NPR concepts. Detailed designs are not complete for any of the concepts, but prevention of severe accidents will play a major role in the design criteria for all concepts. Passive safety techniques will also be included in the detailed design efforts wherever applicable and cost effective. The strategy recommended by Secretary John S. Herrington for the acquisition of NPR capacity involved two technologies: an HWR at Savannah River and an MHTGR at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. By this action, the DOE has considered the benefits to the nuclear industry by the recommendation of a technology that utilizes modular design and inherent passive safety features. Clearly, a vigorous nuclear industry with renewed interest in nuclear electricity will contribute to solving the global warming problem. However, the primary purpose of the NPR is to provide an assured source of tritium on an urgent schedule and in a safe manner. The HWR designs are characterized by inherent safety features such as passive decay heat removal and low temperature and pressure operation. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HATFIELD Hearing on the New Production Reactor (NPR) Question: The recent report of the Energy Research Advisory Board (ERAB) has raised serious questions about the Department of Energy's ability to demonstrate and certify new tritium target and recovery technologies for Light Water Reactors (LWR) in the nearterm. In fact, the ERAB report stated, and I quote, "The main schedule risk for the LWR stems from uncertainties in target technology and the potential need to develop and qualify the selected target configuration in an operating LWR, a process that could take as much as four years to complete." (ERAB Report, p. 23) Does DOE, today, have demonstrated tritium target and recovery technologies for LWR's, in particular WNP-1 at Hanford, which will assure that goal quantities can be met and if not when will those technologies be demonstrated and certified? Answer: The Department of Energy (DOE) does not today have in hand fully demonstrated tritium target and recovery technologies for WNP-1 at the Hanford site. If fully funded at the requested level, the conversion program, including the target work, would be brought to completion in about 5 years. Question: The United States, since the very inception of our atomic energy and Atoms for Peace programs, has maintained a strict separation between our civilian and military programs and with good reason. Even though we are a nuclear weapons state, we have wanted to abide by the same non-proliferation limitations that we hope other nations will honor and we do not want the export of our civilian technologies or their development here at home to run afoul of public and international concerns about nuclear proliferation. It seems to me that the control of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technologies around the world is every bit as important to our national security as maintaining our own nuclear arsenal. Given this long-standing U.S. policy, how can we defend taking a nuclear powerplant that ratepayers in my state and in the Northwest have paid $2 billion dollars to build, which was issued a construction permit by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a civilian powerplant, and converting it to a defense production facility? Wouldn't we be outraged if a developing nation did this? And wouldn't this action limit our ability to convince other nations to prohibit the use of their civilian nuclear programs for weapons production? Answer: In the evaluation of candidate technologies for an NPR, the Energy Research Advisory Board, and independently DOE, considered the issue of the public acceptability of the technology. With respect to the Washington Public Power Supply System's WNP-1 nuclear project, the evaluation process considered issues such as the acquisition of title, financing, and the public perception regarding appearance of mixing defense activities with civilian activities. It has been concluded that there are no treaty or legal reasons pertaining to nonproliferation that would prevent acquisition of WNP-1. However, these issues and those you have identified will be deliberated in the Department's activities on solving the institutional issues associated with the acquisition of the WNP-1 reactor at the Hanford site. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MCCLURE Hearing on the New Production Reactor (NPR) Comment to Joe Salgado: Over the past few years, in your role as Under Secretary of Energy, you have had to appear before Congressional hearings many times. Many times you have had to account for serious problems with DOE/AEC actions taken in the past. Every time there has been a large scale attack on the Department-and I am thinking specifically about the NAS report on defense reactors and the $100 billion clean-up cost of the DOE facilities-you have had to bear the brunt for decisions that were not made "on your watch". I want to say today that I hope this hearing can provide you with an opportunity to help someone else who will be sitting in your chair 10 to 20 years from now, to prevent serious problems from arising in the future. So I urge you to make very careful and judicious use of the ERAB report as well as the information that comes from this hearing and from other sources. Question: I hope you have read the ERAB report as carefully as I have, because I want your reaction to my conclusions concerning the technology options considered in the report: a. The LMR is probably not a contender because of the lack of tritium target development, the relative immaturity of production design concepts, and the paucity of industrial infrastructure. b. C. The LWR is not a near--term option because of the need for at least 4 more years of target development work, and the hazy line that selection of this technology would draw between commercial and military applications. The conversion of WNP-1 (also a LWR) is not practical nor o It would take at least 4 years to prove a target The legal and institutional problems associated with WNP-1 conversion have not been addressed at all, and we don't even know if they can be resolved, let alone when they'll be resolved. The quality assurance and operability questions associated with completing a plant that has been sitting "mothballed" for a decade have never been answered, and add unnecessary risk to the project. The public perception problems associated with conversion of a commercial plant to military uses are potentially the worst problems you might have to face with respect to WNP-1 conversion. 0 Finally, there is a perception out there that WNP-1 conversion is being driven by politics instead of science. Who is pushing the conversion of WNP-1? (I know of at least one politician--the senior Senator from Oregon...who has publicly stated his objections to use of the WNP-1 reactor). I don't think I need to remind you that a decision on the future nuclear deterrence capabilities of this nation transcends politics, and must be driven purely by the right Lechnological approach. d. The advanced LWR (ALWR), while only mentioned briefly in the RAB report, is only in its infancy, and again suffers from the same 4 year tritium target lag problem I've already mentioned. e. A single, full sized plant of any design suffers the Construction of all the capacity at a single site provides g. Construction of the entire capacity using a single technology does not insulate you from generic design flaws (thank goodness all the Savannah River reactors were not the same design as "C" Reactor, which is permanently shut down due to a design flaw in its pressure vessel) or a safety problem (such as the safety issue that now prevents ux from operating the existing HWR plants at Savannah River above 45% power), Auxwes We generally agree with some elements of your põservations and with the general conclusions you have reached. Regarding your comments on WNP 1. the Department notes that there we autential cost and schedule advantages for converting to a BWN Than Madun, han this reason the Secretary has As a further contingency, work should continue as farvet vere'anment for LAR and on solving the institutional #X\\\#With acquisition of the WNP¬ Ï‚ * Question 41 of the thought processes that I have just taken you through in the grenous question "eaus me ta are f`na” WN 46' aid that goes 28 *2**ms? |