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The HWR presents the least schedule risk because of the existing facilities, personnel, and experience at Savannah River. Given at least ten years to achieve full production status, all candidates could meet the schedule.

• A HWR, being a low temperature reactor with no production of
steam or electricity, would have the lowest initial cost of any new
NPR. The other technologies offer the possibility of revenues from
energy sales that, in some circumstances, could offset a significant
fraction of the NPR costs.

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Conversion of the WNP-1 reactor, a partially completed commercial power reactor on the DOE site at Hanford, to nuclear materials production is a special case of the LWR technology. It offers the possibility of a shorter schedule and lower initial cost than a new NPR. Safety and environmental aspects would be comparable to those of present commercial LWRs. Target development similar to the LWR is required for the WNP-1, and the cost and time required to obtain public acceptance of conversion of a "commercial" reactor and to implement legal processes to acquire the reactor are uncertain.

Duality and Energy Sale

The cost of the NPR program and the national defense need for the tritium product (and possibly plutonium) require strong assurance that the reactor will perform as specified. Factors considered here are redundancy and diversity of production facilities (duality), and the effects of power production by the NPR.

O Multiple smaller reactors of the same type offer advantages of protection against loss of all capacity, flexibility, and increased potential for the use of passive safety features, but at some added cost. This approach should be considered for all technologies.

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A multiple reactor strategy, possibly with diverse technologies,
would provide high production assurance, reduce uncertainties in the
NPR schedule, and minimize the technical risks to national security,
but at increased cost. A single unit NPR is the lowest cost option,
but carries the operational risk of unexpected loss of all capacity
for an extended period. If a single-technology option were
selected, it would be prudent to develop or qualify target
technologies for other reactor types to provide for future
contingencies.

With early planning, there is an opportunity to gain revenues to offset costs by the sale of steam at the site boundary for power production.

Urgency of the Schedule

The ERAB is convinced that it is urgent for DOE to begin the long process to acquire new production capacity. There are several factors that affect the schedule:

Each of the technologies can be utilized for a NPR with further preparation. The needed preparation differs in each case and may include research, development, or qualification of part of the technology, and it will include analysis and testing to provide data for a safety review and approval process.

o DOE, in consultation with its independent safety overview bodies, should establish the review process for the NPR project without delay. The DOE should provide adequate qualified personnel and budget.

• A strong management organization with authority and accountability for all aspects of the NPR program is necessary to achieve the schedule.

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Successful development, design, construction, and startup of a NPR requires a continued commitment from both the Executive Branch and the Congress over many years.

DOE should seek an expedited schedule for acquisition of the NPR, including legislative relief from existing constraints where needed.

Options

If there is a need for full tritium production as early as possible, then options are limited to the HWR and WNP-1 conversion. The HWR appears to have the best chance of quickly providing the needed capacity because of the existing facilities, personnel, and experience at Savannah River. The ERAB recognizes that the WNP-1 may provide a unique opportunity for conversion to tritium production at relatively low capital cost while providing some revenues from the sale of steam. However, there are schedule risks because of the need to demonstrate an adequate target technology, uncertainties of public acceptance of conversion to defense purposes, and possible delays because of the legal processes required to acquire the WNP-1 facility.

If new production capacity to provide goal quantities of tritium can be phased into operation over a time period beginning in about ten years, then additional opportunities are presented. The Board believes that a combination of technologies, including advanced technologies, offers a unique opportunity that should be carefully considered, even at increased costs, for a step increase in reactor safety and a substantial improvement in commercial reactor technology.

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The tritium and plutonium production technology, fuel cycle facilities, waste system, and operational support infrastructure are fully developed and in production at Savannah River and have generally operated well. This is a major strength.

The low temperature and pressure operation simplifies the reactor engineering. Greater use of passive decay heat removal is possible than in current Savannah River Reactors.

The preoperational and capital costs of a HWR facility sited at Savannah River are substantially less than those of other new NPR options because auxiliary facilities are already in place.

There is good confidence in the construction schedule and moderate confidence in the cost estimates based on HWR and relevant LWR experience, and on tritium production experience.

The HWR lags the other technologies in experience with current safety and environmental review processes and in investigations of severe accident phenomena. There is some risk of significant delays.

Technical issues raised by the 1987 National Research Council report on production reactors must be resolved and have been addressed in the proposed NPR designs.

There are no revenues from the sale of energy.

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The modular design provides flexibility for phased expansion and assignment of individual units to special production tasks, and could generate improved power revenues because a portion of the energy could be considered firm.

Target technology development is at an advanced stage, and could be qualified in a research reactor.

Small modular units with inherent safety features including passive decay heat removal, offer a potentially significant advancement in safety over current commercial reactors and improve the potential for successful safety review. Fuel and target microspheres provide good containment of tritium and fission products.

There is limited design, construction, licensing, and operating experience in the U.S. with HTGR technology. Development concerns are addressed in

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The reactor technology, fuel technology, and safety review methodology are established and well understood based on commercial power reactor applications.

Commercial operating experience and experience with
construction and startup schedules is extensive and
varies widely. There is good confidence in the NPR
construction and safety review schedule if the
commercial experience is used properly.

Cost estimates are of moderate confidence based on commercial power plant experience. Most components of the proposed reactor have already been reviewed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

There is a large industrial infrastructure supporting the LWR.

Conversion of WNP-1, a partially completed LWR on the Hanford site, to a production reactor is a unique and potentially low cost alternative.

The target technology has demonstrated feasibility but requires further development and qualification testing, most likely in a full-scale LWR. This would require access to a commercial reactor and reviews by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. For the WNP-1 conversion, testing in-situ is possible after the reactor has been completed.

Plutonium production would require a large and costly uranium fuel inventory.

While there is good likelihood of success, the target development entails cost and schedule risk. Coupling a commercial power reactor (e.g. WNP-1) or fuel cycle to a defense application, may have a negative connotation.

The time needed to complete the legal process to acquire WNP-1 and public acceptance of conversion to tritium production are uncertain, and introduce schedule risk.

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