We formed a panel of 19 experts, individuals with wide experience in the management of reactor facilities, nuclear engineering, engineering of large energy systems, safety and environmental concerns, and physics. The panel was burdened by the presence of a geologist who happened to be Chairman of the Energy Reserch Advisory Board.

We divided that panel into four subpanels, each concentrating on one of the four technologies. This seemed to be the most expeditious way of getting through it in the time that was allotted to us.

I would like to point out that the ERAB was not requested to make recommendations in this report and did not rank nor directly compare the four technologies. We were not asked to do so. Rather we assessed each of the four technologies according to the criteria and considered risks and benefits. The report presents 14 findings and a table of strengths and weaknesses of each technology when used for an NPR.

The primary thrust of the charge letter from Secretary Herrington to the Energy Research Advisory Board was that the purpose of the NPR was to produce goal quantities of tritium. The schedule and cost data that was presented to the Energy Research Advisory Board and its panel was judged to be preliminary and useful only for qualitative comparisons. The information was prepared originally for other purposes and on a different basis in each case.

In regard to schedule and cost, the report notes that successful development, design, construction, and startup of an NPR requires a continued commitment from both the executive branch and the Congress over many years.

I have rather briefly summarized some of the issues that I feel are important to decisions on the NPR and I would be happy to try and answer questions on these or any other aspects of the ERAB NPR report, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JOHNSTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Schoettler. [The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF JOHN H. SCHOETTLER

Good Morning. I am John Schoettler, Chairman of the Department of Energy's Energy Research Advisory Board (ERAB). The Board advises the Secretary of Energy in response to specific requests from the Secretary and conducts itself in accordance with the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. I am pleased to be here today to discuss the recent assessment done by the ERAB of four reactor technologies that are candidates for new production reactor (NPR) capacity.

The Board was asked by the Secretary, in a letter to me on January 7, 1988, to review and assess the Department's proposed selection criteria for the NPR; the adequacy of each of the four technologies to meet the criteria; and schedule and technical risks, benefits and costs in implementing a NPR program with each technology. The letter requested a response by June 1, 1988, but the Secretary later agreed to a one-month extension of the response date because of the large amount of work involved and the limited time in which to do it.

The four reactor technologies to be considered were identified by the Department to be the Heavy Water Reactor (HWR), the High Temperature GasCooled Reactor (HTGR), the Light Water Reactor (LWR), and the Liquid Metal Reactor (LMR). Production of tritium is the primary mission of the NPR.

The Board formed a Panel of 19 experts to help perform the assessment. The Panel provided technical background and current information for use by the ERAB in completing its assessment. The Panel was chaired by Dr. Larry Papay, a long-standing member of ERAB and Senior Vice President of the Southern California Edison Company. The Panel included individuals with wide experience in the management of reactor facilities, nuclear engineering, engineering of large energy systems, safety and environmental concerns, and physics.

The Panel was divided into four subpanels, each concentrating on one of

the four technologies.

Each Subpanel chairman was assisted by one or two

additional technical experts to help evaluate the technical information that was presented by proponents for each of the reactor types and assist in drafting the reports. The DOE also provided a technical and administrative support team of DOE and contractor staff to help organize, assimilate, and evaluate in-depth the information.

The first ERAB meeting on this subject was held on February 10 and 11, 1988. The Board approved then an interim report on the assessment of the Department's selection criteria to the Secretary as requested on March 1, 1988. During preparation of the Interim Report, the Board requested clarification from the Secretary on the extent to which it should evaluate duality features; that is, diversity of reactor technologies on more than one site. The Secretary responded with a letter on April 28, 1988 specifically requested the ERAB to include duality issues in its assessment of the reactor technologies.

The Panel had several meetings during March and April to receive information from proponents of the various technologies and to examine classified material related to production technologies. The ERAB met for three days on June 13-15, 1988 to formulate its findings and to prepare its report to the Secretary.

The ERAB does not make recommendations in this report and does not rank or directly compare the four technologies. We were not asked to do so. Rather, we assess each of the technologies according to the criteria and consider risks and benefits. The report presents fourteen findings and a table of strengths and weaknesses of each technology when used for a NPR.

It may be useful to briefly state some of the findings of the ERAB in each of the areas of the Secretary's charge:

Criteria

The Board emphasized that the ability to meet safety and environmental requirements in the Department's suggested set of criteria should be of equal importance to the criterium on the ability to produce goal

quantities of tritium on a timely schedule, and that these two should be the primary criteria.

Adequacy of Technologies to Meet the Criteria

The Panel realized early in March that the target technology is a key technical feature that discriminates between the four reactor technologies. The target technology refers to the lithium targets that are inserted into the reactor to absorb neutrons and produce tritium. The HWR has a fully developed and proven target technology as a result of our long experience at the Savannah River Plant, while the other reactor types require further research, development, or testing.

The Board believes that the design features of the NPR should take full advantage of the results of reactor safety research and operational experience to date, and that the safety performance of the NPR should be at least equivalent to that of the best of present commercial power reactors.

Each of the technologies are expected to meet the requirements of a safety review process, although some technologies will take more time to obtain the necessary data and analysis capability than others. The Board urges the Department, in consultation with independent safety overview bodies, to establish the review process for the NPR project without delay.

The schedule and cost data that was presented to the ERAB and its Panel was judged to be preliminary, and useful only for qualitative comparisons. The information was prepared originally for other purposes and on a different basis in each case. In regard to schedule and cost, the report notes that successful development, design, construction, and startup of a NPR requires a continued commitment from both the Executive Branch and the Congress over many years.

The Board considered the possibility of completion of the WNP-1 Light Water Power Reactor on the Hanford site and conversion to tritium production as a NPR. We treated this a bit separately from our assessment of the basic technologies because it is a specific piece of hardware. We recognized that it was an important consideration because it offers the possibility of a shorter schedule and lower initial costs than that of a new reactor of any We were concerned, however, about uncertainties of the schedule associated with the WNP-1 because of the need to develop the target technology, the time needed to implement the legal processes to acquire the reactor, and the uncertainty of obtaining public acceptance of conversion of a commercial reactor to defense applications.

type.

Risks, Benefits and Costs

The ERAB noted that a very important factor in assuring safe and reliable production of nuclear materials is the maturity of the reactor and target technology. The HWR has an advantage in this respect.

The use of multiple smaller reactors of a given type offer advantages of protection against loss of all capacity, flexibility of operation and production, and increased potential for the use of passive safety features, but at some added cost. The ERAB believes that the use of multiple, smaller reactors should be considered for any technology that is selected.

The use of multiple reactors with diverse technologies and located at separate sites offers additional benefits of providing higher production assurance, reduced uncertainty in the schedule, and less technical risk, but again at higher cost. A single unit NPR is the lowest initial cost option, but carries the operational risk of unexpected loss of all capacity for an extended period. If a single-technology option were selected, it would be prudent to develop target technologies for other reactor types to provide for future contingencies.

The most significant effect on overall cost of the NPR would come from the revenue gained by the sale of energy produced by the NPR. The amount of