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STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT B. BARKER, ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ATOMIC ENERGY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Senator JOHNSTON. Dr. Barker.

Dr. BARKER. Senator Johnston, Senator McClure, Senator Domenici, Senator Hatfield, I am basically here to say that the Department of Defense wholeheartedly endorses the Department of Energy Defense Programs budget and to add our voice in seeking your approval of the budget as presented.

I want to take this opportunity to amplify on some of the points Mr. Wade just reviewed.

NUCLER WEAPONS COUNCIL

I think, most significantly, the Nuclear Weapons Council, which was really in its first full year of operation in 1987, played a very major role in developing the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy Defense Programs budgets as they have been presented to you.

In January of this year in the aftermath of the budget summit, the Nuclear Weapons Council, in conjunction with OMB, really sat down and addressed the issue of the size of the Defense Programs budget that would be necessary to meet defense requirements after the defense alignment as a result of the budget summit. I think that the Nuclear Weapons Council in doing that work really performed the job that had been expected of it when it was established by Congress in 1986.

The Council is going to continue to look at the long-term relationship between DOD and DOE budgets. Certainly the study that Congress has asked us to do and report in December of this year will be a helpful mechanism through which to look at that. And what Defense is going to be doing is really sitting down and asking the question: What size stockpile can we afford? Also, we will try to level out the production load such that DOE can put together a sensibly sized complex that can meet that requirement.

We, of course, have thought we have done that exercise over the years, and so this is not something new. But, clearly, the budget summit resulted in significant cuts in the Defense programs, in general. Secretary Carlucci has said we see another $200 to $300 billion cut having to come out of the 5-year plan above what we had expected, and how it is going to affect Defense systems-nuclear weapons systems—and their ultimate impact on DOE is something we are going to be struggling with through the summer and into the fall.

The Nucler Weapons Council will play a critical role in looking at the diversion of effort between Defense and Energy to make sure they are synchronous.

NEW PRODUCTION CAPACITY

As part of this exercise, we also looked very hard at the nuclear materials situation. We wholeheartedly support the construction of a capability for new production of tritium as quickly as possible. Frankly, I go through life with my fingers crossed.

[Deleted.]

We have to keep our fingers crossed and hope that the Savannah ver reactors continue to operate through 1998, which is when DOE

tells us is the earliest we can expect to see a new production reactor in operation. So we are very strong supporters of a new production capability for tritium.

In the last year, the Nuclear Weapons Council initiated two phase 3 studies, one on the Small ICBM-that study is a little bit on the back burner right now since the administration has decided to let the next administration decide what the fate of that program will be. We also initiated a phase 3 program on the SRAM II warhead.

As you will remember, last year I pointed out the really critical need for this system. It has to be one of our highest priorities.

Over the years, we have initiated development programs that would ensure that only warheads with insensitive high explosive on them will be [deleted]. So it is very important to us that we keep the SRAM II program on track because that new missile will have an insensitive high explosive warhead.

Senator JOHNSTON. How far away will that be?

Dr. BARKER. It is going to take us until [deleted] to get SRAM II deployed if we proceed with the schedule we are currently on.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE

In addition, the Council has continuously reviewed the safety, security, and use control aspects of the stockpile, and annually those things are reviewed by a committee subordinate to the Nuclear Weapons Council and by the Nuclear Weapons Council itself.

Last year, I made a commitment to you that I would review with you a short status report on the stockpile. I think that this committee and its counterparts who review the Defense Programs budget are part of the system that makes our deterrent as safe and as credible as it needs to be, and I thought you might want a thumbnail sketch of what has happened to that stockpile out there in the last 12 months.

As of the end of last year-as of December 31-the stockpile had [deleted] what it was a year ago. The total now is some [deleted] weapons, and that is down from a peak [deleted] in 1967. So we have gone from [deleted] in 1967 down to less than [deleted] today.

Today, there are 27 different types of warheads in the stockpile, and that, in a sense, is much more important than the number of weapons in the stockpile in terms of what we asked of the Department of Energy. Clearly, we expect to be able to modernize the production complex. We also need to turn over the stockpile as it becomes technically obsolescent. So the size of the stockpile determines what the average production capability of DOE needs to be. But the whole RD&T complex is driven by the number of different types of weapon systems that must be maintained. Today that number is 27, and it has been about that number for some significant length of time.

However, in the [deleted] we will be retiring [deleted] of those 27 types. As a result of the INF Treaty, assuming its ratification, we will be removing the Pershing II, the ground-launched cruise missile, and the Pershing I from the stockpile and we will not be replacing those systems with replacement systems.

[Deleted.]

In the foreseeable future those [deleted] systems are to be retired. The only potential new system that might come in would be the tactical air-to-surface missile. The other things that will be placed into the inventory will basically be total replacements for things that are already there.

So the [deleted] will have set in motion things that will lead to a net decrease of [deleted] of 27 types, which is not an insignificant fraction in the stockpile.

Today, the stockpile yield is a little under [deleted] megatons. That compares to 1960 when it was over [deleted] megatons. That is an impressive reduction. Of course, the reduction in yield has tracked and paralleled the increase in accuracy of delivery systems and we have asked the Department of Energy to produce ever smaller warheads, smaller yields, in response to increasing system capabilities.

The biggest bomb in the inventory is the [deleted].

Senator JOHNSTON. How many [deleted]?

Dr. BARKER, How many? [Deleted] bombs.

The smallest weapon in the inventory [deleted].
Senator JOHNSTON. [Deleted.]

Dr. BARKER. [Deleted.]

Senator JOHNSTON, Which weapon is that?

Dr. BARKER. It is the [deleted].

The oldest single weapon in the stockpile is the Nike Hercules warhead. [Deleted.] That warhead will be 30 years old in September of this

year.

[Deleted]

STOCKPILE MODERNIZATION

Despite the fact that we have been modernizing the stockpile with some degree of success, the average age of the stockpile has actually increased by a half a year. That is, the average weapon is one-half year older today than it was a year ago. The average age has gone up from 12.8 to over 13 years on average.

Let me show you another snapshot of what has been going on.

[Chart deleted.]

Dr. BARKER. Working together with the Senate and with the Congress, we have modernized essentially one-third of the stockpile in the last 7 years, so that that stockpile now has modern safety and security features. That is the pie diagram on the left. I will amplify a little bit of what I mean by "modern." Modern means modern safety and security features in the weapons, modern weapons control features.

If we keep in motion every program we have started together, by [deleted] percent of the stockpile will meet this definition of modern. However, [deleted] percent will still be old technology.

Senator JOHNSTON. Now, that is PAL?

Dr. BARKER. Right. I am going to go through it in just a moment what I mean by those features when I say that.

The point is, of course, when I say modern, [deleted] percent will be Pedernized by [deleted]. Some of these systems will already have been

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