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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1973
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE FOR THE FISCAL. YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1973,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS ALLEN J. ELLENDER, Louisiana, Chairman1 JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas, Chairman' JOHN C. STENNIS, Mississippi MILTON R. YOUNG, North Dakota
JOHN O. PASTORE, Rhode Island MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Washington GORDON ALLOTT, Colorado
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
ALAN BIBLE, Nevada NORRIS COTTON, New Hampshire
GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming » CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
Ex Officio Members From The Committee On Armed Services
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri STROM THURMOND, Sooth Carolina
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
William W. Woodruff, Francis S. Hewitt, And Joel E. Bonnes
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1973
TUESDAY, JUNE 13, 1972
Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 2:10 p.m. in room S-126, the Capitol, Hon. Allen J. Ellender (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Ellender, Pastore, Young, Smith, Allott, Hruska, Cotton, Symington, Jackson, and Thurmond.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Impact On Budget Of SALT Agreements
STATEMENT OF HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, U.S. NAVY, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS)
AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
TIMELY REPORTING OF APPROPRIATION BILLS
Chairman Ellender. The subcommittee will please come to order.
Mr. Secretary, we are glad to have you with us.
On May 30, 1972, Secretary Laird by letter advised me that he was available to discuss with the subcommittee the impact of the SALT agreements on the pending fiscal year 1973 Defense budget. He also advised me of his desire to discuss other prospective changes in Defense programs, including Southeast Asia.
It is now obvious that we will not be able to have the Department of Defense appropriation bill for fiscal year 1973 enacted by June 30. This is a great disappointment to me, because I had set as one of my personal goals for this session the enactment of the Defense appropriation bill before the beginning of the fiscal year. The subcommittee
started its hearings on February 24 in an effort to accomplish this goal. I am confident that, if the required authorizations had been enacted by June 1, we could have completed work on the appropriation bill by June 30. Unfortunately, this has not been the case.
Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Chairman Ellender. Mr. Secretary, you may proceed as you wish.
PROCESS AND REQUIREMENTS OF PEACE AS RELATED AGREEMENTS AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
Secretary Laird. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I have come here today at your request to talk about the process of peace and its requirements, both as they relate to the agreements reached in Moscow and to the current situation in Southeast Asia.
President's Message To Congress
Today the President of the United States has provided to the Congress the interim agreements on strategic offensive arms and submitted to the U.S. Senate the treat}' of defensive weapons.
I will be referring to the statements made in the messages sent to the Congress today by the President of the United States, and perhaps, Mr. Chairman, you would like to put in the record at this point the statement which was transmitted to both Houses today.
Chairman Ellender. Without objection, that will be done.
(The statement follows:)
[From the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, June 19,1972]
The White House, June 13, 1972.
Strategic Arms Limitation
(The President's Message to the Senate Transmitting the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms. June 13,1972)
To The Senate Of The United States: I transmit herewith the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Anns signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. Copies of these agreements are also being forwarded to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. I ask the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty, and an expression of support from both Houses of the Congress for the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms.
These agreements, the product of a major effort of this administration, are a significant step into a new era of mutually agreed restraint and arms limitation between the two principal nuclear powers.
The provisions of the agreements are explained in detail in the Report of the Secretary of State, which I attach. Their main effect is this: The ABM Treaty limits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two designated areas, and at a low level. The Interim Agreement limits the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces. Together the two agreements provide for a more stable strategic balance in the next several years than would be possible if strategic arms competition continued unchecked. This benefits not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but all the nations of the world.
The agreements are an important first step in checking the arms race, but only a first step; they do not close off all avenues of strategic competition. Just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was an essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to ensure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be readied.
The defense capabilities of the United States are second to none in the world today. I am determined that they shall remain so. The terms of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement will permit the United States to take the steps we deem necessary to maintain a strategic posture which protects our vital interests and guarantees our continued security.
Besides enhancing our national security, these agreements open the opportunity for a new and more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship, characterized by negotiated settlement of differences, rather than by the hostility and confrontation of decades past.
These accords offer tangible evidence that mankind need not live forever in the dark shadow of nuclear war. They provide renewed hope that men and nations working together can succeed in building a lasting peace.
Because these agreements effectively serve one of this Nation's most cherished purposes, a more secure and peaceful world in which America's security is fully protected—I strongly recommend that the Senate support them, and that its deliberations be conducted without delay.
Richard Nixon, Military Strength
Secretary Laird. The security of the United States depends on both military strength and resolve. These are the two basic essentials of a successful quest for global peace.
President Nixon's nistorie journey for peace to Peking and Moscow has achieved the first steps—but only the first steps—in what must be a continuing journey toward lasting peace.
These trips and the movement from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation could not have been successful without the resolute support of this committee and a majority of the Members of Congress and, of course, the American people, which is reflected through the Congress. Lasting peace requires adequate strength founded on a true sense of partnership between the executive branch and the legislative branch—coequals under our system of government.
NATIONAL DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS AND MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENT'S STRATEGY FOR PEACE
I am not here to suggest that peace can be bought cheaply. On the contrary, I am here today—in fulfillment of my responsibilities as Secretary of Defense—to share with you candidly and fully the requirements of national defense.
I believe it is most appropriate that I appear before you during these final stages of your deliberations on the fiscal year 1973 Defense budget to present my current assessment of where we are and where we are going in areas which represent two of the most important elements of President Nixon's strategy for peace: (1) Strategic arms limitations, and (2) Southeast Asia.
I will first summarize these two areas, and then discuss each in more detail. I will make this statement as brief as possible to permit ample opportunity for your questions and those of other members of your committee.
STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS
Wo were determined to approach the strategic arms limitation talks from a position of strength. We have done so. The ABM treaty and the interim agreement on offensive weapons reached at SALT will