Overall Personnel Assessment. The report recommended a reduction of 11,782 manyears and $121,668 million. While the rationale expressed in justifying the strength related reductions is appreciated, the overall impact will far exceed that which appears intended.

Due to the fact that reductions cannot be implemented until well into the fiscal year a far greater end strength than manyear reduction will result. This is aggravated by the fact that most of the reductions would have to be taken by reducing accessions. The majority of the officers and enlisted in the billets recommended for elimination are careerists with tenure or contractual privilege. These accession drops would be primarily enlisted because of the severe drawdown already levied on the officer community. The enlisted accession represents a cost avoidance of about $5,000/manyear as opposed to much higher costs used in the various recommendations of the report. A nominal end strength reduction of some 50,000 would result from the combining of these factors.

1.

2.

3.

4.

DEDICATED ARMY LIEUTENANT GENERAL POSITIONS

Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, United States Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, United States Army
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army

5.

6.

7.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, United States Army
Chief of Research and Development, United States Army
Chief, Office Reserve Components, United States Army

11.

12.

Commanding General, United States Army Combat Developments Command Deputy Commanding General, Continental Army Command 13. Commanding General, First United States Army 14. Commanding General, Third United States Army 15. Commanding General, Fifth United States Army 16. Commanding General, Sixth United States Army Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps

17.

18. Commanding General, III United States Army Corps

19.

20.

21.

Commanding General, United States Army Air Defense Command

Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command
Commanding General, VII United States Army Corps, Europe

22. Deputy Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff, United States Army, Pacif 23. Deputy Commanding General, Eighth United States Army

24.

Commanding General, I United States Army Corps, Korea Commanding General, USA Ryukyu Islands, IX United States Army Corps 26. Deputy Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam

25.

27. System Manager, Ballistic Missile Defense System (SAFEGUARD)

Commanding General, XXIV Corps, United States Army, Vietnam
Director of Military Support, United States Army

Commanding General, V United States Army Corps, Europe
Chief of Staff, United States European Command

Commanding General, Theater Army Support Command, USAREUR
Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army

36.

Deputy Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Europe

Overall Personnel Assessment. The Esperantolul a

11,782 manyears and $121,668 million.

justifying the strength related reductions in impact will far exceed that which appeara kitandaÅ

་་་་་་

An alternative examined, if the full $121,7M reduction was imposed, would necessitate the following actions, all in the enlisted area:

A reduction of accessions and end strength by 35,000

A 3 month early release commencing in October and running through
the remainder of the fiscal year (about 42,000 early releases,
mostly petty officers)

Cancellation of 48,000 petty officer advancements (a 30% reduction)

A reduction of over 25,700 manyears

The impact of the above actions is apparent; they would undermine readiness to the point where the Navy's mission capability would be placed in jeopardy.

Military Strength Shortfall. The HAC committee report cites the reduction of 2950 manyears in strength which the Navy took at apportionment time and assesses a $26,516,000 cut against that reduction. The reduction (500 officer M/Y 2450 enlisted M/Y) was taken by Navy as a cost avoidance measure to compensate for personnel cost increases (i.e., longevity increases, separation payments, station allowances) and thus remain within the budgeted dollar. A lower than planned enlisted begin strength was used as a factor in accepting the manyear reduction; however, it was not intended as a permanent reduction in enlisted end strength. High recruiting accessions are being realized to make up for the begin strength shortfall and are necessary to meet Navy's manpower requirements. Thus, the action to reduce MPN by $26,516,000 for the self-imposed manyear reduction, in effect, penalizes Navy for taking management actions to remain within budgeted dollars. The HAC report provided funding in the amount of: $9.5 million for subsistence, $1.4 million for clothing, and $4.8 million for BAQ. Inasmuch as all of these items were included in the increased costs cited above this total of $15.7 million should be considered as an offset against the $26,516,000 cost avoidance. Therefore the amount to be restored would be reduced to $10.816 million.

Recruiting Programs. The proposed cut of 400 enlisted canvassers would seriously hamper the Navy's recruiting efforts. In FY 1972, 2834 Navy canvassers recruited 85,347 recruits for an annual production per recruiter of 30.1 per year. In FY 1973, 3164 Navy recruiters will be required to recruit about 125,000 recruits for an annual production of 39.5. If the 400 enlisted canvassers are cut the productivity requirement will rise to 45.2 recruits/recruiter per year. In the long term, a sustained recruit canvasser production of 36 enlistees per year appears to be a high workable goal. Therefore, if the cut is imposed the Navy may not meet its enlisted recruiting needs, which is particularly crucial as we approach an AVF environment. The 60 officers cut will be disrupting to officer procurement teams recruiting on campus, as well as to the management and leadership requirements of the enlisted recruiting program and the USN/USNR one Navy recruiting effort.

Training Base Reductions. The HAC report states that "All of the services revised personnel plans for fiscal year 1973 reflects a lower recruit input into the training base." Additionally, the report states, "Also, a further reduction of 500 enlisted manyears is imposed against the Navy's program because the general reduction made under the category of strength shortfalls is not sufficient to provide a reasonable reduction in the training program". Navy has no plan for a lower recruit input into the training base, therefore, the initial comment is incorrect as applied to Navy. To offset anticipated FY 1973 losses, and make up end FY 1972 shortfall, Navy requires about 125,000 new accessions. This high accession requirement has not been

adjusted downward, and therefore the stated requirement for a substantial
increase in recruit and other specialized training remains valid. The

July accomplishment in recruiting was 11,840 and August was 13,988. So
far in September the accessions are slightly ahead of plan. Further,
as stated above, higher recruit accessions are being realized, and Navy
expects to achieve its planned manpower goals for FY 1973. Implementation
of this training reduction as recommended by the Committee would deny Navy
the manyears required to meet trained strength requirements.

Support to Other Nations. As a result of the President's Vietnam withdrawal program, Navy has reduced the number of in-country advisors. The manyear requirements for Program 10 as displayed in the budget were valid at the time the budget was prepared. Because of the importance

of the Vietnam program, it was given the highest priority in budget
preparation and other priority programs were left unaccommodated as a
result. These Vietnam billets are now available to Navy for reprogramming
to other high priority fleet manning needs which were deferred to meet
what was expected to be the requirements in Vietnam. Reprogramming
plans include fully manning ships, and squadrons in accordance with
validated requirements. With the continuing reduction in force levels
it is even more imperative that each ship and squadron be fully manned
and ready to perform its assigned missions. The reduction in manyears
associated with the Military Assistance Program ship Transfer and
Training Teams would interfere with the implementation of the President's
Total Force Concept. Unless our allies are provided with forces being
struck from the Navy, they will be lost from the total defense forces
of the Free World. Transfer of these forces require Transfer and Training
Teams.

As in other manpower reduction demands, when made at this late date, in imposed reduction would of necessity have to be taken against recruit Accessions since the incumbents of the vacated billets are, in the main, areerists with tenure.

Transients. The HAC in reviewing Transients observed that "...current evels show some growth over the pre-Vietnam fiscal year 1964 levels," nd recommended a reduction of 3,000 manyears to the Navy program. This s not correct for Navy. Although Navy remains heavily involved in SEASIA perations, the requested transient level is below FY 1964 level as the following able shows:

(Actual)
FY 1964

(Planned)
FY 1973

Total End-Strength
Transient End-Strength
Transient as of E/S

667,596

38,401
5.75%

601,672
27,035
4.49%

The Transient strength requested understates actual Navy requirements id our ability to manage the transient accounts. Further reduction in ansient manyears will probably not lead to a reduction in actual transients, it to an increase in temporarily empty billets throughout the Navy, including le fleet operating forces.