Senator YOUNG. What you are saying is that if you carry the maximum or near maximum load, the life of the aircraft will be shortened?

General GLASSER. You just wear it out in an awful hurry. But if you operate it at low loads, then it will last forever.

This is the reason for the flight data recorders we spoke of earlier. We want to know exactly what this airplane has experienced because on the basis of that knowledge we will be able to tell you with considerable precision what remaining life is in that airplane.

Senator YOUNG. What do you consider a reduced load? How would a reduced load in the C-5 compare with other Air Force cargo planes? General GLASSER. It is still an enormous load compared to other aircraft.

Senator YOUNG. Specifically, how many tons are we talking about? General HILL. Fifty tons versus 100 tons.

General GLASSER. You see, most of the time in aircraft of this sort they tend to fill up in cubage before you ever approach the weight that you require. In other words, the size of the equipment is so great and the density is so low that you end up filling up the airplane and you can't put anything more in it but it is nowhere near close to maximum gross.

The only time you run into a situation of having very heavy gross weights is when you are carrying bulk cargo, ammunition or something of that sort, which is very dense. You stack a lot in there. Then you end up with a problem where you have weight restriction. but it is the only one.

Senator YOUNG. Will it carry our biggest tanks?

General GLASSER. Yes, sir.

Senator YOUNG. How many?

General GLASSER. I would like to correct this for the record, but it should carry five, as I recollect.

B-52 MODIFICATION

Senator YOUNG. I have just one other question. There is $210 million, I believe, of the $466 million requested for aircraft modifications, programed for the B-52.

General GLASSER. That is correct.

Senator YoUNG. What modifications are these? Are these wing related?

INSTALLATION OF SRAM MISSILE

General GLASSER. No, sir. The biggest one of these is to modify the B-52 to make it capable of employing the SRAM missile which we are just beginning to procure. That accounts for $94.5 million of it right there.

UPDATING OF ECM CAPABILITY

The Phase VI ECM is the next largest for $48.3 million. This is updating the B-52's ECM capability to accommodate what we now know as new equipment in the Soviet inventory.

INSTALLATION OF ELECTRO OPTICAL VIEWING SYSTEM

The next largest item which accounts for most of the remainder is the electro optical viewing system which is a new set of equipment whereby the pilot is able in a closed curtain environment to look outside to see through television and IR systems the terrain he is flying over. He can see the targets he is coming up on without opening his flash curtains.

This is an improvement we are putting on the aircraft.

WING FLEXIBILITY

Senator YOUNG. Are the B-52's experiencing wing fatigue to the extent that they will have to be phased out?

General GLASSER. We will eventually cut down the B-52G's and H's. Those are perfectly adequate for now insofar as their fatigue life is concerned.

Senator YOUNG. I am amazed at how the B-52 wings have held up so many years with the four engines extending so far out. There must be considerable flexibility in those wings.

General GLASSER. Indeed there is. They are very flexible wings. If they were not, they would wear out very, very much faster. That very flexibility is what gives them the life.

EARLY-YEAR MODIFICATIONS

Chairman ELLENDER. In the case of the B-52's, you didn't have the difficulties that you had in the C-5. They came nearer meeting the specifications than your C-5's.

General GLASSER. I would not want to open too many doors but we had a great many difficulties with the B-52's in the early years and had to put rather substantial modifications in the B-52's because of structural problems.

Chairman ELLENDER. Was that after you had bought them?
General GLASSER. That is correct, sir.

F-111 MODIFICATION

Chairman ELLENDER. You also have modifications on the F-111. That is another plan that you have had difficulty with. What do you contemplate doing with those planes?

General GLASSER. The F-111 has $29.9 million, the bulk of which is in the MOD update program. There are some very modest safety of flight items in addition to that.

INVENTORY AND CONTRACTED AIRCRAFT

Chairman ELLENDER. How many of those have you on hand now? General GLASSER. The number delivered, sir?

Chairman ELLENDER. The number that you have on hand. General GLASSER. The inventory on hand as of now, as of January 31, is 260, with an additional 146 that are in production. Chairman ELLENDER. When do you expect delivery on those?

General GLASSER. They will be delivering out in December 1973, that will be the final delivery of those on contract now.

Chairman ELLENDER. Have you experienced such difficulty that you had to make extensive modifications?

General GLASSER. No, sir. We did have a considerable amount of difficulty a few years back which we have been working our way out of. As of this time, I think the F-111 is in quite good condition. Chairman ELLENDER. Proceed.

SUGGESTED ABANDONMENT OF C-5A IN FAVOR OF C-141

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask something there? Chairman ELLENDER. Surely.

Senator SYMINGTON. General Glasser, we had trouble with the F-111. It now looks as if it is going to be all right, but that is a combat airplane. The C-5A is not a combat airplane. The figures, as I understand it, are that we expected to get 120 for $3.4 billion and now are going to get 81 for $4.5 billion.

Inasmuch as the C-141 is a good airplane, made by the same company, why don't we just forget the C-5A after what we have, take it with the wing loading we can get under present restrictions, in effect not run the risk of pouring a lot of good money after bad; and buy more C-141's for the mission?

Nobody was stronger for the C-5A, as you know, but to date it has been a failure.

The Air Force cannot, in my opinion, afford to have more of this type and character of failure, regardless of whose fault it is.

Why don't we go ahead with 141's? They are not as big, but work well, and are twice as big as the C-130's.

General GLASSER. Senator, first of all, we have bought the C-5. We are in the situation now where the 81st airplane is essentially produced. Senator SYMINGTON. After those 81?

General GLASSER. We have no plans to purchase any more than those 81. That is our program.

C-54 WING STRENGTH

Senator SYMINGTON. The question of the money that is going to be put in the wings: how much will that be?

General GLASSER. As we were discussing with the chairman, we don't know exactly what that will be because we have not run all the trade-offs of what we ought to do.

Senator SYMINGTON. Suppose you cut down the load factor to, in effect, what you can load in a 141. Would you still have to fortify the wings because of poor design?

General GLASSER. We can carry substantially more than we can carry in the 141.

Senator SYMINGTON. Even though you did not change the wing? General GLASSER. And still not change the wing.

I am afraid that we are exaggerating the problem in our desire to be completely candid. If we were to make a rather modest relaxation in the maximum gross weight, we would have no problem at all.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why do we take a chance, then, on running into heavy cost for wings which might not work?

General GLASSER. We are not taking that chance. What we are doing is flying the aircraft in a very conservative fashion in peacetime. Senator SYMINGTON. You are not going to ask for money to fix the wings?

General GLASSER. We are not. We have no money in this program which contemplates that sort of effort.

As I described earlier, that is something which comes up for analysis and which will be included in IRAN in future years. I think it will be prudent to apply some of those because in many cases, as you know, this is the changing of some taper lock bolts or adding a doubler on some portion of the wings. It is a very inexpensive thing to do when you have the aircraft opened up, anyway. It pays off handsomely.

Senator SYMINGTON. You will come up here and tell us what you are going to do and how much it will cost?

General GLASSER. Indeed we will be. It will be an insertion in the MOD program for whatever particular year we ask for it. Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

ALLOCATIONS OF AIRCRAFT: AIR FORCE INVENTORY

General GLASSER. Returning to page 2, only 73 of these aircraft are for the Air Force inventory. They include 30 F/TF-15A's, 12 F111F's, and three E-3A AWACS aircraft, eight T-43A navigation trainers, 14 attaché aircraft, four VC-X's for our Special Air Mission wing and two Advanced Airborne Command Post aircraft.

The remaining aircraft are being procured for direct or indirect support of our allies.

One hundred and twenty UH-1II helicopters are being purchased to pay back to the Army the UH-1's they have transferred to the Vietnamese Air Force. Also, 57-5E international fighters are being procured for the military assistance service fund program.

Chairman ELLENDER. Will the Army appear to justify before us the Lecessity for these?

General GLASSER. I do not know the answer to that, Mr. Chairman. These aircraft have been previously justified and purchased by the Army. They then provided them to the VNAF, which was an Air Force obligation. What we are requesting now is the appropriation to y airplanes to pay them back. So, it brings them back to a level that was previously established.

EVIDENCE OF ARMY'S AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENT AND REQUEST

Chairman ELLENDER. Have they made requests of you for them? General GLASSER. Yes, sir.

Chairman ELLENDER. Did they do it by letter?

General GLASSER. I would have to verify that, Mr. Chairman. Chairman ELLENDER. Will you give us evidence that they do need them and that they requested them of you?

General GLASSER. Yes, sir.

Chairman ELLENDER. We will put it in the record at this point.
General GLASSER. We will do that.

(The information follows:)

The Army request for the payback of 120 UH-1H helicopters was in the form of a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), dated 25 August 1971, and signed by the acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics (Atch 1). As a result of the Army memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense wrote a memorandum to the Secretary of the Air Force, on 16 Sep 1971, amending the Air Force Program Decision Memorandum of 25 Aug 1971 "to procure 120 UH-1HS in fiscal year 1973 and [deleted] UII-1Hs in fiscal year 1974 as payback to Army for helicopters transferred to the VNAF"" (Atch 2).

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
Washington, D.C., August 25, 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATION AND LOGISTICS)

Subject: Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) UH-1H Helicopters.

The Army has been providing UH-1H helicopters to the VNAF out of Army assets since 1969 with the agreed understanding they would be replaced one for one by the Air Force.

Total UH-1H requirements for the VNAF by end fiscal year 1974 are estimated to be [deleted] aircraft of which [deleted] will be provided from the Army inventory. The requirements are estimated on a Unit Equipment (UE) of [deleted] plus 50 repair cycle float and attrition computed at [deleted] per hundred UH-1H authorized as UE per month. Actual VNAF UH-1H attrition rate for fiscal year 1971 was [deleted] USAF has funded 642 UH-1H for payback to the Army, resulting in a projected deficit by end fiscal year 1974 of [deleted] VNAF attrition, which could result in a further drawdown of Army inventory beyond fiscal year 1974, is now estimated at 90 UH-1 per year. This estimate will be updated as experience dictates.

The Air Force POM for fiscal year 1973 does not contain UH-1H for payback to the Army. Informal discussion with Air Staff representatives indicates that the Air Force does not intend to add any paybacks of UH-1H to the Army in the fiscal year 1973 budget.

The Army baseline AAO (Blue Case) for Utility Tactical Helicopter is [deleted] with projected assets end fiscal year 1974 of [deleted] This includes 150 substitute UH-1B not considered fully capable in the lift ship role. In order to produce UH-1H for Army essential requirements, to maintain a warm production base and to replace future VNAF attrition beyond FY 1974, it is considered most important that the Air Force fund a minimum buy of 120 UH-1H paybacks in fiscal year 1973 with deliveries beginning in January 1974.

I would greatly appreciate your attention to this matter to assure that the Air Force does include funds for procurement of 120 UH-1H paybacks to the Army in the fiscal year 1973 budget.

VINCENT P. HUGGARD,

Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army.

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
Washington, D.C., September 16, 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Subject: Amended Program Decision Memorandum for the Department of the Air Force (U).

I have given careful consideration to the issues raised in your memorandum of 3 September, regarding the decisions in the Program Decision Memorandum of 25 August.

I approve the program designated in the Air Force Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Base Case with the specific changes identified in the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) of 25 August, as amended below, in response to consideration of the Air Force reclamas.