Hearings, Reports and Prints of the House Committee on Foreign AffairsU.S. Government Printing Office, 1972 |
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Page 2
... interests of the United States and the Soviet Union ; they are in the interests of all nations . They are the most significant achievements to date in the era of devel- oping negotiations . SALT PROCESS ITSELF USEFUL The SALT process ...
... interests of the United States and the Soviet Union ; they are in the interests of all nations . They are the most significant achievements to date in the era of devel- oping negotiations . SALT PROCESS ITSELF USEFUL The SALT process ...
Page 9
... interest . United States strategic offensive forces are sufficient to protect U.S. and allied security interests , and under the Interim Agreement will remain so . The SALT agreements make a major contribution in protecting our security ...
... interest . United States strategic offensive forces are sufficient to protect U.S. and allied security interests , and under the Interim Agreement will remain so . The SALT agreements make a major contribution in protecting our security ...
Page 17
... Congress because of congressional self- esteem , but we think it is a matter of national interest , and we think the House should give full consideration to the agreement and in a sense to the treaty itself , although , as you 17.
... Congress because of congressional self- esteem , but we think it is a matter of national interest , and we think the House should give full consideration to the agreement and in a sense to the treaty itself , although , as you 17.
Page 25
... interest . I believe we ought to go ahead with whatever strategic arms programs we think are necessary for our security , and from that process there will be plenty of motivation for us and the Soviets to reach an additional strategic ...
... interest . I believe we ought to go ahead with whatever strategic arms programs we think are necessary for our security , and from that process there will be plenty of motivation for us and the Soviets to reach an additional strategic ...
Page 29
... interest in getting ABM's under control led them to conclude that they should respond to our wish to have measures in the offensive field , even though they affect just one side . 82-108-72- -3 NO U.S. PROGRAMS IN OFFENSIVE AREA Mr ...
... interest in getting ABM's under control led them to conclude that they should respond to our wish to have measures in the offensive field , even though they affect just one side . 82-108-72- -3 NO U.S. PROGRAMS IN OFFENSIVE AREA Mr ...
Table des matières
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114 | |
127 | |
141 | |
434 | |
445 | |
459 | |
31 | |
14 | |
31 | |
43 | |
50 | |
58 | |
7 | |
13 | |
26 | |
39 | |
iii | |
viii | |
36 | |
37 | |
43 | |
54 | |
62 | |
152 | |
29 | |
44 | |
52 | |
7 | |
29 | |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM radars ABM systems ABM Treaty Admiral MOORER agree Ambassador PORTER Ambassador SMITH American prisoners Article ballistic missile BARNET believe BINGHAM BLATCHFORD Chairman MORGAN Colonel BORMAN Colonel OVERLY Commission Committee of Liaison Communist concerned Congress Congressman defense deployed deployment families FASCELL FINDLEY forces FRELINGHUYSEN FRIEDKIN FULTON GALLAGHER Geneva Convention going Government Hanoi ICBM launchers interests Interim Agreement KAZEN Laos limitation ment Mexico military MIRV MONAGAN national technical means negotiations North Korea North Vietnamese nuclear Party Pathet Lao Peace Corps POW's President prisoners of war problem proposal question Red Cross release repatriation Republic of Korea Russians SALT agreements Secretary LAIRD Secretary ROGERS security deletion SLBM South Southeast Asia Soviet Union statement strategic offensive arms subcommittee submarines talk TELLER Thank tion troops United Viet Vietcong Vietnam volunteers weapons WEISS withdrawal ZABLOCKI
Fréquemment cités
Page 136 - Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 137 - The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 30 - Japan agree to establish durable relations of peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.
Page 482 - Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.
Page 138 - ... national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
Page 429 - Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing Article, if such there be.
Page 6 - Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife...
Page 139 - Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 135 - To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode...
Page 133 - Declaring their Intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.