Hearings, Reports and Prints of the House Committee on Foreign AffairsU.S. Government Printing Office, 1972 |
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Page 3
... forces between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. However , there was not then , and there is not now , any question that the United States could and would maintain strategic forces ade- quate to meet its security requirements - forces second to ...
... forces between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. However , there was not then , and there is not now , any question that the United States could and would maintain strategic forces ade- quate to meet its security requirements - forces second to ...
Page 9
... forces up to date if they are to continue their central role for deter- rence . We must keep these strategic forces up to date . These forces must be such that no one underestimates our ability and determination to protect U.S. and ...
... forces up to date if they are to continue their central role for deter- rence . We must keep these strategic forces up to date . These forces must be such that no one underestimates our ability and determination to protect U.S. and ...
Page 37
... forces in being and in prospect to do two things : One , to be sure that there is an adequate capability for retaliatory action after a first strike ; and the other to be capable of such action in the eyes of our allies and third ...
... forces in being and in prospect to do two things : One , to be sure that there is an adequate capability for retaliatory action after a first strike ; and the other to be capable of such action in the eyes of our allies and third ...
Page 40
... forces , plus the low ABM limits on both sides are decidedly in the U.S. security interest . U.S. strategic offensive forces are sufficient to protect the United States and allied security interests and under the Interim Agreement will ...
... forces , plus the low ABM limits on both sides are decidedly in the U.S. security interest . U.S. strategic offensive forces are sufficient to protect the United States and allied security interests and under the Interim Agreement will ...
Page 42
... forces as the Soviet Union will continue to modernize its forces , the action - reaction cycle should not start up again . I do think there is also a line at which it could be started if , for instance , we started an entirely new ...
... forces as the Soviet Union will continue to modernize its forces , the action - reaction cycle should not start up again . I do think there is also a line at which it could be started if , for instance , we started an entirely new ...
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29 | |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM radars ABM systems ABM Treaty Admiral MOORER agree Ambassador PORTER Ambassador SMITH American prisoners Article ballistic missile BARNET believe BINGHAM BLATCHFORD Chairman MORGAN Colonel BORMAN Colonel OVERLY Commission Committee of Liaison Communist concerned Congress Congressman defense deployed deployment families FASCELL FINDLEY forces FRELINGHUYSEN FRIEDKIN FULTON GALLAGHER Geneva Convention going Government Hanoi ICBM launchers interests Interim Agreement KAZEN Laos limitation ment Mexico military MIRV MONAGAN national technical means negotiations North Korea North Vietnamese nuclear Party Pathet Lao Peace Corps POW's President prisoners of war problem proposal question Red Cross release repatriation Republic of Korea Russians SALT agreements Secretary LAIRD Secretary ROGERS security deletion SLBM South Southeast Asia Soviet Union statement strategic offensive arms subcommittee submarines talk TELLER Thank tion troops United Viet Vietcong Vietnam volunteers weapons WEISS withdrawal ZABLOCKI
Fréquemment cités
Page 136 - Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 137 - The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 30 - Japan agree to establish durable relations of peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.
Page 482 - Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.
Page 138 - ... national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
Page 429 - Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing Article, if such there be.
Page 6 - Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife...
Page 139 - Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 135 - To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode...
Page 133 - Declaring their Intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.