Hearings, Reports and Prints of the House Committee on Foreign AffairsU.S. Government Printing Office, 1972 |
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Page 4
... effect , we agree to maintain mutual deterrence . I am convinced that the possibility of nuclear war has been dra- matically reduced as a result of the ABM Treaty . BASIC PROVISIONS REVIEWED I think it would be useful now . Mr. Chairman ...
... effect , we agree to maintain mutual deterrence . I am convinced that the possibility of nuclear war has been dra- matically reduced as a result of the ABM Treaty . BASIC PROVISIONS REVIEWED I think it would be useful now . Mr. Chairman ...
Page 9
... EFFECT OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT The effect of the Interim Agreement is to place limitations on cur- rent Soviet offensive programs , but not current U.S. programs . The Soviet Union may not increase the aggregate total of its strategic ...
... EFFECT OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT The effect of the Interim Agreement is to place limitations on cur- rent Soviet offensive programs , but not current U.S. programs . The Soviet Union may not increase the aggregate total of its strategic ...
Page 15
... effect , to ban them , but we were not able to achieve that . But as I said in my statement , Ambassador Smith made it clear if there was any attempt to employ such mobile missiles , we would consider it a very serious violation of the ...
... effect , to ban them , but we were not able to achieve that . But as I said in my statement , Ambassador Smith made it clear if there was any attempt to employ such mobile missiles , we would consider it a very serious violation of the ...
Page 23
... effect going to curtail our defense capabilities unilaterally , then there will be no particular incentive on their part to do it by a reciprocal ar- rangement . That would add further to their zeal to move ahead in the offensive field ...
... effect going to curtail our defense capabilities unilaterally , then there will be no particular incentive on their part to do it by a reciprocal ar- rangement . That would add further to their zeal to move ahead in the offensive field ...
Page 27
... effect , leave their industry and population defenseless to a retaliatory attack by the United States strikes me as being the best evidence that they do not have any intention to go for any first strike . That is , to my mind , one of ...
... effect , leave their industry and population defenseless to a retaliatory attack by the United States strikes me as being the best evidence that they do not have any intention to go for any first strike . That is , to my mind , one of ...
Table des matières
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114 | |
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141 | |
434 | |
445 | |
459 | |
31 | |
14 | |
31 | |
43 | |
50 | |
58 | |
7 | |
13 | |
26 | |
39 | |
iii | |
viii | |
36 | |
37 | |
43 | |
54 | |
62 | |
152 | |
29 | |
44 | |
52 | |
7 | |
29 | |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM radars ABM systems ABM Treaty Admiral MOORER agree Ambassador PORTER Ambassador SMITH American prisoners Article ballistic missile BARNET believe BINGHAM BLATCHFORD Chairman MORGAN Colonel BORMAN Colonel OVERLY Commission Committee of Liaison Communist concerned Congress Congressman defense deployed deployment families FASCELL FINDLEY forces FRELINGHUYSEN FRIEDKIN FULTON GALLAGHER Geneva Convention going Government Hanoi ICBM launchers interests Interim Agreement KAZEN Laos limitation ment Mexico military MIRV MONAGAN national technical means negotiations North Korea North Vietnamese nuclear Party Pathet Lao Peace Corps POW's President prisoners of war problem proposal question Red Cross release repatriation Republic of Korea Russians SALT agreements Secretary LAIRD Secretary ROGERS security deletion SLBM South Southeast Asia Soviet Union statement strategic offensive arms subcommittee submarines talk TELLER Thank tion troops United Viet Vietcong Vietnam volunteers weapons WEISS withdrawal ZABLOCKI
Fréquemment cités
Page 136 - Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 137 - The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 30 - Japan agree to establish durable relations of peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.
Page 482 - Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.
Page 138 - ... national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
Page 429 - Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present Convention, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing Article, if such there be.
Page 6 - Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife...
Page 139 - Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 135 - To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes: (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode...
Page 133 - Declaring their Intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.