namese people, the PRG in Paris has put forth their ten point initiative. If the United States would announce its intention to withdraw its troops by June 1971, then all parties will discuss the question of release of prisoners.

If President Nixon accepted that proposal there would be no need for this discussion now and all parties would be repatriated. But Mr. Nixon refused this proposal be insisting on not setting a date. Suppose President Nixon accepted the date limit of June 30, 1971-and it has been confirmed by an American general that to transport an American division takes five hours. Say there are ten American divisions, that would mean it would take fifty hours. Even if you were to multiply this by another ten that would be 500 hours. Therefore, there is plenty of time to bring back American troops by that date. Another aspect of the problem-if Mr. Nixon feels he cannot accept the June 30 date period he may propose another reasonable date and the parties can discuss that in order to find a way out. Once again this shows the flexibility of the Vietnamese. It is not a pre-condition or a prerequisite because the discussions must lead to the total release of all captured servicemen. We call it discussion, let the word be negotiations, on the release, but according to the Vietnamese language, discussion means negotiation, that is to say a discussion of all problems in order to come to a solution. Here again this shows the flexibility and good will of the Vietnamese. But to our understanding it is the desire of President Nixon not to end the war but to continue and to prolong it. Moreover, he shows no concern at all as to the fate of the prisoners of war nor does he show a concern for American servicemen who are fighting.

Then in 1954 when the Geneva Agreements were signed the United States refused to accept them. I just mention this to make clear that we must abide by the truth. Now if there is a war taking place in Viet-Nam, it is not because the Vietnamese have sent troops to attack the United States. Conversely, the United States has sent troops to attack Viet-Nam. We have to say it again, the United States has conducted the most barbarous war in history against the Vietnamese people. So far over eleven million tons of bombs and shells were dropped in Viet-Nam. Some 60,000 tons of toxic chemicals have been used and the highest act of barbarism has been perpetrated. American troops are killing civilians. They have cut off the ears of Vietnamese patriots. They have cut veins. Everyone knows about My Lai. No one could have imagined such a degree of human destruction. That is, the plain truth. That is why we say any impartial person who has the courage to look into the truth will realize this reality. That is why if he-President Nixon-is really concerned for lives he would set a date because the more he continues the war, the more there will be servicemen killed, the more there will be captured. If he really wants to see the men returned home safely he would do that. Moreover, in his recent statements of April 7 and April 16 he went so far as to put more conditions as to not stop the war. He said as long as a single prisoner is left, American troops will not withdraw. That only means he paves the way for more GIs to be captured. He also said as long as the Saigon administration has not the power to defend itself, American troops will not withdraw. That is absurd. That can only mean continued U.S. perpetration of American occupation. This is not the real way to show concern for GIs. This is why for our part we do not see any problem at all if only Mr. Nixon would set the date for withdrawal of troops. Just as we said, in the past there was no problem when we ended the war with the French.

Now I come to the second question as to why we did not talk to the Saigon administration. Mr. Nixon has said that it should be left to the Vietnamese people to decide their own destiny. I'll be very frank and straightforward about this. First of all we say that that statement is not true. Not only the Nixon Administration, but the former administration has said that they respect selfdetermination for the South Vietnamese people. Everyone knows, even during our resistance against the French, that Richard Nixon on many occasions came over— eight times in fact-to encourage the French during that war. He even came to Hanoi. He even went to the front to see how the French fought. Was it because it was his intention for respecting the right of Vietnmese self-determination? When the French were about to lose the war it was the policy of Mr. Nixon even then to have the intention of sending American troops.

When Nixon said on April 16 he would not withdraw all American troops from Viet-Nam as long as the Saigon administration cannot stand by itself that was nothing but direct interfering in the internal affairs of the country. If a question is being asked, "What is the present Thieu-Ky Administration in Siagon?" the answer is that everyone in that administration was set up by the Americans. Also everyone knows that Thieu, Ky, and Khiem were mercenaries in the French army, and everyone can remember Ky's remarks about Hitler. What is Thieu?

This man keeps saying there is no other way to defeat communism than a military victory. He says there is no other way but to get rid of neutralists. How can there be any possibility of unity or a coalition with anyone as long as they are there. Everyone remembers the 1967 elections in Saigon when there was a candidate. Dzu on the opposite side. He opposed them and as a result he was put in jail. He is still in jail. Thieu is putting everyone in prison who opposes him-monks, Buddhists, even Catholic priests. Just a few days ago two Catholic priests were jailed. Even invalids-veterans who demand improvement in their lives have been oppressed and jailed by Thieu. All of this means that the present Thieu/Ky/ Khiem regime is dictatorial, warlike, and a fascist regime. This is why the proposal by the PRG stipulated that only those three be excluded from the present Saigon government. You say the United States is not in a position of displacing a government, of deposing a government. We say the present Saigon administration was set up by the American administration. It is being financed, fed, and supplied by the United States. I don't know if you can remember what was stated once by President Kennedy. But we remember it very well. He said that the present Saigon administration is an offspring, an adopted child of the United States.

I wonder if you know Senator Mansfield. Well, you may also remember that he said since the Saigon administration is the tail of the dog, the tail cannot wag the dog. Only the dog can wag the tail. Also, in September of 1968-to be more precise December 16, 1968-Ky came to Paris and declared that he considers Henry Cabot Lodge as his father. This is why we think if it was really the idea of the United States to respect the right to self-determination, the United States would refuse to support these three persons-these three dictators. As for the proposal in the eight point solution offered by the PRG at the Paris talks it has been very clearly declared that the PGR stands ready to discuss with the Saigon administration-with the exception of these three persons-anyone in that administration who stands for peace, independence, neutrality and democracy. I can give you an example. The four-party conference started on November 6, 1968. It was because of the stubborn attitude of the American representative and the Saigon administration that only the discussions on the form of the table took two and a half months.

(I interjected that their side certainly was deeply involved in that discussion and certainly contributed to any prolongation. He answered that they proposed a round table. This was opposed with the proposition that the round table be cut in two or that there be a demarkation line in the middle of the green. This was absurd and indicated at the beginning a lack of good will.)

The obstacle to the success of the conference has been the difficulties created by Mr. Nixon, Mr. Thieu, Mr. Ky, and Mr. Khiem. The first proposal as a basis for negotiations was offered by the PRG-the ten point solution. Then there was the eight point peace initiative calling for U.S. withdrawal by June 30, 1971. Also the discussion of release of prisoners and setting up of a provisional government was proposed. Just because of the basic reality in South Viet-Nan-on the one hand you have the Saigon administration and on the other's the PRG. You still have another force not participating in either of these two governments. Because of this reality, the PRG offers a provisional coalition government covering all three factions, indicating the good will and flexibility of the PRG. There is also an attitude on the part of the PRG to offer an honorable way out for the United States-by the United States offering to disengage in Viet-Nam. The present Saigon administration keeps opposing a coalitional government. So far the Saigon administration has rejected any initiative concerning coalition or any national reconciliation.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN CONGRESSMAN SEYMOUR HALPERN AND NGUYEN THANH LE, DRV DELEGATION

HALPERN. In your remarks to me you say that you've been accused of being barbaric by the U.S. administration on the prisoner issue. You vow that is not so. Wouldn't it be the obvious thing, the simplest thing to allow inspections to verify your claims of very good treatment.

LE. It has been verified by many that we have been giving very good treatment to the captive pilots and the best medical care to the sick and wounded.

HALPERN. The Geneva Convention which you signed and which you seem to know so well calls for inspections on treatment of prisoners of war. You certainly are violating the principle by refusing to allow a verification of your claims of good

treatment by international inspection. The very least you can do is release of the sick and wounded and agree to internment in a neutral country. The way to prove that your treatment is humanitarian is to take these measures.

LE. You talk about our side not negotiating the release of the sick and wounded. If it were not for Nixon's bad intentions there would be no prisoner problem. HALPERN. But it would be in keeping with the principles of the Geneva Convention that there be inspections by a third party or international team.

LE. We were signatories to the Geneva Protocols. In full keeping with them we apply very good treatment to American pilots. The problem now is the security of the pilots and our own people. We must discontinue the visits.

HALPERN. You say you provided a list of the prisoners. We have cause to believe there have been more captured and that you have not given complete identification. You have not agreed to impartial inspection. You say they are treated very well. Yet you will not allow verification of this by neutral parties.

LE. We did give you an accurate list. We did start to release men. But now we take protective reaction against attacks by your aircraft and rescue missions. And President Nixon has threatened that as long as there is one prisoner of war left, he would not withdraw.

HALPERN. Well if you want the U.S. to withdraw .. wouldn't it be the obvious thing-the smartest thing the right thing-to release the prisoners under the repatriation proposals? Woundn't it be the right thing at least to update and complete the released lists? Wouldn't it be the right thing to allow inspection teams to verify the treatment you claim is so good? Wouldn't it be the right thing to remove the sick and wounded for internment in a neutral country?

You have told me in your remarks that you would talk about release of prisoners once peace is negotiated... You say on the signing of peace, prisoners would be released as soon as a solution is reached. But quite different from that principle was the proposal of the PRG who said the release would occur provided President Nixon declared a fixed date. Is your position the same as the PRG on this issue? LE. Our position is to support the PRG.

HALPERN. But to be more specific. The PRG tells me it will enter discussions on the release of all its prisoners of war once an appropriate fixed date is set. You said to me earlier you'd talk about release of prisoners only after peace is negotiated. There seems to be a difference here. Could you clarify it for me?

LE. We would include the pilots captured in North Viet-Nam as part of this. HALPERN. Let me be sure I understand this. And I emphasize that the PRGand I repeated to them their own words only today and I repeat it here. They told me they will discuss the release of all prisoners of war once an appropriate date is set. They explained when they say discussions they mean ways and procedures for the actual release. Do you mean the same thing?

LE. Of course we mean it, providing an appropriate deadline is set. Then all parties to the problem would discuss the procedures. Once this is done, it is our intention to release all captive pilots-not only the wounded and sick-but all, so they can return safely and directly home.

HALPERN. Then I take it that it is your intention to release prisoners if there was agreement on a fixed date. And it is not your intention to then give consideration only after a peace is signed. You agree you would release them after a date is set and immediately discuss the procedures.

LE. Yes. We have no intention of holding them. We'll even give them transportation. In fact they can bring home flowers from Viet-Nam.

HALPERN. You say you cannot allow verification of treatment because of security reasons. Does this mean you couldn't trust an international inspection made up of representatives of neutral countries?

LE. In regard to this and to your statements about verification of treatment, there were visitors. If I wanted to I could cite many instances. The Canadian General is not a communist. You also remember that famous operation to release prisoners. Nixon and Laird have said there would be others. Because of the security of servicemen we cannot allow others. The statements by Nixon and Laird have made other visits impossible. It is because of these threats.

HALPERN. You talk about the security aspect as the reason for not releasing prisoners, and not allowing inspection teams to verify treatment conditions. Why don't you free them and eliminate the security aspect altogether? At least you can allow inspections and release the sick and wounded to a neutral country.

LE. If you don't mind, the United States doesn't take into account any international law. The Geneva Accords of 1954 call for unity, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Viet-Nam. Also the Geneva agreements forbid the introduction into Viet-Nam of foreign military personnel, weapons, war materials. But the United States has taken no account.

HALPERN. In your remarks you talk about the eventual release of prisoners. I talk also of the treatment of prisoners right now. What I'm talking about is not negotiable, but what you should be doing as a matter of course. Why, and I ask in the name of humanity, do you not accept our proposals? I believe your attitudes on the handling of the prisoners issue is just plain stupid. There would be a lot more support for a disengagement if the American people knew that the agreement on conditions was two-sided-not a situation where we must do this or that, and then you'll discuss the situation.

LE. We cannot do so because of the security. We must repeat that during 19681969 we have released nine of the pilots. But instead of taking this as a good will attitude by the Vietnamese, Mr. Nixon turned it into a campaign of slander and distortion against us.

HALPERN. The cause of peace would be enhanced if your side showed compassion on the prisoner of war issue. You would gain more trust by showing your good faith on this issue.

LE. I assume you are sentimental. We deem you understand we've been victims of many wars of aggression causing pain to millions of Vietnamese families and we deem it that American people should show compassion for Vietnamese families.

HALPERN. You talk about the feelings for peace in the United States. You mention demonstrations. Of course Americans want peace, but that doesn't mean it must be purely on your terms. Let me assure you the American people are completely united on the prisoner of war issue. That is why if you were smart you'd be willing to fulfill what is not only in accord with the Geneva Convention but recognized international practice and allow a third party-an international inspection-to verify your claims of humane treatment. You would allow the internment of the sick and wounded to a neutral country. You would supply us with continuing complete lists of prisoners.

LE. Let me assure you they are treated well-very well. People have seen this; it has been verified and reported in your press. You can take our word for the good treatment.

HALPERN. Can I go to visit the captive pilots and see this for myself?

LE. I said earlier many people have verified the good treatment and good care and this has been written in the press throughout the world, including the American press. But for the security reasons I mentioned we must refrain from visits. HALPERN. I find it impossible to accept that reasoning on a subject of basic humanity, not to mention the principles of the Geneva Convention and international practice. As a first step, the American administration has proposed a repatriation of all prisoners or their internment in a neutral country. I fervently ask that you reconsider your policy and agree to this.

You mention support in the United States for disengagement. By supporting proposals for disengagement, it certainly doesn't mean agreement with all your positions. But the advocates would like to take seriously your assurances of intentions to negotiate a just and lasting peace. I appeal to you for a more enlightened, more compassionate and humanitarian policy-in keeping with your earlier remarks to me about Vietnamese ideals-on the captive pilots. Your present policy has greatly damaged your posture and is jeopardizing support for the peace effort.

LE. There is absolutely no problem, provided a date is set. Meanwhile we give our word we are giving the best treatment.

HALPERN. It is impossible for me to understand why you refuse to sit down and negotiate for peace here in Paris. You say you will not talk to the representatives of the Saigon regime. You knew who they were when you accepted to join these talks. They're the same people. If you're serious about wanting peace, then why not sit down and get these talks moving. Then use as a basis of negotiations your concept of what the Saigon government should be. In other words, you'd say "Okay we'll talk." and then give your terms regarding the personnel of a proposed new government.

...

LE. We join with the PRG in our position that we will talk to anyone in the Saigon administration other than Thieu, Ky and Khiem. anyone who believes in democracy, peace, neutrality and independence. And the proposal for a new government in South Viet-Nam by the PRG was meant to reach national accordharmony. So the problem is clear. Who wants peace; who wants war; who wants union; who does not. I am trying to be very frank with you.

GENERAL COMMENTS MADE BY PRG DEPUTY SPOKESMAN NGUYEN VAN TIEN TO CONGRESSMAN SEYMOUR HALPERN, APRIL 28, 1971, PARIS, FRANCE. (FROM WHICH QUESTIONS IN FOLLOWING DIALOGUE WERE DEVELOPED)

I would like to give you our point of view. The United States has sent expeditionary troops to South Viet-Nam to wage a war of aggression. In order to end the war the United States must:

1. End aggression;

2. Withdraw all its forces as soon as possible and the sooner the better;

3. Let South Viet-Nam run its internal affairs without interruption;

4. In so doing not only would the war end, but also favorable conditions would be created for a friendly bond between the people of the United States and South Viet-Nam.

As a matter of fact-and this is another problem-in launching the war of aggression against South Viet-Nam, the United States has installed their puppet administration and is using it as an instrument to carry out its war of aggression. This is an old trick resorted to by all kinds of aggressors. So, in order to end the war and restore peace, the United States must withdraw its support of this administration and let the people of South Viet-Nam settle their internal affairs. The Saigon administration, headed by Thieu/Ky/Khiem, is a corrupt, rotten, dictatorial, warlike administration which is hated by the South Vietnamese people who are struggling to demand the replacement of that administration by another administration which would be broadly representative—an administration that is democratic and stands for peace, independence and neutrality. It is unreasonable of the United States to waste untold lives of young Americans and to make many Americans get wounded as well as to waste billions of U.S. dollars to support such rotten and dictatorial administration.

By refusing to withdraw its support to this clique the Nixon Administration has shown that it is not willing to solve peacefully the South Viet-Nam problem. Instead, it is clinging to its scheme of using this clique to continue the war under the form of the Vietnamization program.

In our eight point peace initiative and our three point statement on the question of a cease-fire, we have stated clearly that since the United States has waged a war of aggression it must end this aggression and withdraw all its forces from South Viet-Nam. In September of 1970 in our eight point initiative and in December of 1970 in our three point statement on the cease-fire, we stated that if the Nixon Administration declares it will withdraw all its forces from South Viet-Nam by June 30, 1971, then a cease-fire will be immediately implemented between the U.S. forces and South Viet-Nam's People's Liberation Armed Forces. And our side would take measures to assure safety for American troops who are withdrawing or preparing to withdraw and at the same time the parties would enter immediately into talks on the question of the release of the captured military men.

Since then, until now, the Nixon Administration has refused to declare the withdrawal of all forces by June 30, 1971. This proves that the Nixon Administration has paid no attention to end the war in South Viet-Nam. And at the same time the war is not only in South Viet-Nam but also is being expanded into Cambodia and Laos. The operation into Laos in February of this year has revealed that the Nixon Administration is obstinantly intensifying and prolonging the war. At the same time the United States has bombed and shelled the territory of North Viet-Nam by aircraft, warships, and artillery. This shows that the United States is plunging itself deeper into the war in Indochina.

If the United States Government really wants to put an end to war and solve the Viet-Nam problem and if it had declared total withdrawal of its forces from Viet-Nam by June 30, 1971, a short time after we made public the eight point peace initiative, then by now the war could well already have been ended. And all the American troops as well as all American captured personnel would have been returned home safely.

But the Nixon Administration refuses to accept such a deadline by saying that June 30, 1971 set by our side is a unilateral proposal and that is why it cannot be accepted by the United States Government. Then we stated if for any reason the United States Government refuses to accept the June 30, 1971 deadline, then it propose another appropriate date and we will take this into consideration.

Up to now the United States Government has not shown any concern for the setting of a date and it still refuses to set a date for total withdrawal of troops from South Viet-Nam. Therefore, the public opinion all over the world and in the United States itself posses the obstinancy of the Nixon Administration. As an obvious proof of this the meetings and demonstrations taking place all over

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