Would you comment on that please? Mrs. VINSON. I couldn't agree with you more. I was in Paris in September of 1969 and I did meet with the North Vietnamese. They told me at that time that they had no grudge against the American people. It was the administration. I think that if you can get mobilized the American people, that Hanoi will hear and the other Communists in Southeast Asia will hear. Mr. CLAUSEN. And the fact of the matter is that while there isn't a one of us in this room that isn't against war in general, but the fact of the matter, as I see it, is that a number of the so-called antiwar groups are in fact adding to Hanoi's leverage as a result of this activity. Would you agree with that? Mrs. VINSON. Yes, I would. ADJOURNMENT Mr. ZABLOCKI. Are there any further questions? Again, on behalf of the committee I want to express our commendation to you, our great respect for you; I want to applaud all of your efforts. And, in closing, I want to reassure you that we join you in your efforts, and we will not stop until the men are returned. This hearing is adjourned until 10 a.m. tomorrow in this same room when our witnesses will be Col. Frank Borman, special representative of the President for prisoners of war affairs, and spokesmen for the American National Red Cross.. Thank you again, ladies and gentlemen. The subcommittee stands adjourned until tomorrow at 10 a.m. (Whereupon, at 12:58 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m. of the following day, Wednesday, March 24, 1971.) AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1971 WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1971 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, POLICY AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10:05 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. ZABLOCKI. The subcommittee will please come to order. Today is the second session in a series of hearings by the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments on the problem of American prisoners of war in Southeast Asia. The objective of the hearings, as I stated in yesterday's session, is to inform the members of the subcommittee as fully as possible in order that we may act wisely on the many resolutions on the POW issue which currently are pending before us. INTRODUCTION OF COL. FRANK BORMAN Yesterday, one of our witnesses-the wife of a pilot missing in Southeast Asia-said a U.S. Government which can put a man on the moon and bring him back safely, surely can obtain the release of American prisoners of war. Today, appropriately, we have as our first witness a man who has been to the moon and back and now is devoting a considerable amount of his time and energies to the task of obtaining humane treatment and ultimate release of our American prisoners of war. He is, of course, Col. Frank Borman. Colonel Borman has been appointed by the President as his special representative on prisoner of war affairs. In that capacity, he has traveled widely throughout the world, talking to national leaders, diplomats, the press, and all who might aid in his efforts. Late last year, Colonel Borman addressed a joint session of the House and Senate on the frustrating lack of results in the campaign to move North Vietnam on the prisoner issue. Now an executive with Eastern Airlines, Colonel Borman has continued to serve as the President's international representative on prisoner of war affairs. 59-590 0-71-5 Colonel Borman, we are indeed privileged to have you with us today and look forward to hearing from you. It is my understanding that you have no prepared statement. STATEMENT OF COL. FRANK BORMAN, FORMER SPECIAL REPRE SENTATIVE TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRISONER OF WAR AFFAIRS Colonel BORMAN. No, sir; I have a summary of the results that have previously been alluded to in my report to the joint session that I could cover, if you are interested. Mr. ZABLOCKI. If you will proceed, sir. Colonel BORMAN. Yes, sir. As I reported to the joint session last fall, during the month that Colonel Kegley and I traveled to some 14 countries on behalf of the prisoners, we essentially carried the message that this country was extremely interested, not only in the wellbeing, but the immediate release of our prisoners. We outlined several different proposals, including third-country internment, unilateral releases, and we attempted to negotiate with the North Vietnamese diplomats, in an effort to secure permission to visit Hanoi for further discussions. We were rebuffed in every attempt to discuss the situation with the North Vietnamese, from Paris to Moscow to Algiers to Laos. We found, in a general way, complete sympathy for the position that this country had taken, with an understanding in many countries, but at every turn, an unwilling-not an unwillingness, but an inability to accomplish anything in dealing with the North Vietnamese concerning our prisoners. So we returned, after a month, in a sense discouraged, and certainly disheartened over the very perplexing and very human problem of the several hundred Americans that we feel certain are held in Southeast Asia. I think it is important to note that in the interim, we have had-I have had-additional contacts with some of the countries that we visited, and I do contemplate additional trips, in the very near future, in attempting to follow up on contacts that were made last August. My own recommendations concerning this situation are, number one, to continue a maximum amount of public exposure and public pressure on the problem. A PROGRAM OF THIRD-COUNTRY INTERNMENT I would continue to urge a program involving third-country internment, and I strongly support large and significant unilateral releases of North Vietnamese prisoners held in the South. And finally, I think that although this is not a recommendation, we must recognize that the true problem really is focused upon the absolute refusal of the North Vietnamese Government to negotiate in any meaningful way on the prisoners. I think that as we grope for other plans and for other alternatives, we oftentimes overlook the fact that the continual stumbling block seems to be in this area. I think that these hearings have exposed some of the areas that we can see develop in perhaps a wider range, as the families and the wives and the loved ones that are left behind become more restive, and certainly become dismayed at the seeming lack of progress in dealing with this situation. I also would suggest that we can expect and perhaps be prepared for continued and perhaps further public statements by the prisoners, and even statements after their return, concerning the war and so on. I think that we should be prepared to accept this, and to realize that it will occur, as this situation draws on and on. That, sir, I believe sums up my statement. REACTION TO INTERNMENT PROPOSAL Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Colonel. I want to again commend you for your efforts in this regard. You stated that one of your recommendations would be thirdcountry internment. Colonel BORMAN. Yes, sir. Mr. ZABLOCKI. I have not really heard of any emphasis on this particular proposal in the past. Was this indeed proposed at any time in the negotiations in Paris? Colonel BORMAN. I am not certain whether it was proposed by Ambassador Bruce. We proposed it in our visits with intermediaries, and in our attempt to discuss it with the North Vietnamese. As a matter of fact, we discussed, the alternative of several different countries. Almost any country would be acceptable, including some Communistoriented countries. Mr. ZABLOCKI. What was the reaction? Colonel BORMAN. The reaction on the part of the diplomats that we discussed it with was very favorable. Mr. ZABLOCKI. You had no reaction, however, from any representatives of North Vietnam? Colonel BORMAN. They refused to meet with us at any time, sir. Mr. ZABLOCKI. Did you have any reaction that they might have conveyed through a third party? Colonel BORMAN. I had no feedback on that. The only real return that we had from the North Vietnamese was a reasoned one from some of the diplomats that contacted them for us, and the universal opinion in every country that we visited was that the North Vietnamese consider the American prisoners hostages. They were continually referred to as North Vietnam's trump card. They recognize that this country places a great deal of importance upon these men, and they feel that they are an extremely important pawn in their bargaining process, in Paris. Mr. ZABLOCKI. I would imagine that internment is a possibility. Some positive word would certainly be most welcome by the families, and certainly by the prisoners. I hope you will pursue all leads. Colonel BORMAN. Yes, sir. Mr. ZABLOCKI. And certainly I think these hearings should explore every possibility, and give each sufficient attention, so that that a particular proposal will be given its due consideration. Colonel BORMAN. Yes, sir. VIETNAMIZATION AND THE POWS Mr. ZABLOCKI. Colonel, some critics of current policy have charged that the Vietnamization process, without negotiations, holds out little hope for the prisoners of war. Do you agree? Colonel BORMAN. I am concerned about the eventual withdrawal of all American forces from Southeast Asia, with the American prisoners remaining in North Vietnam. I think implicit in this concern, though, is whether we do accept that these prisoners are hostages. I do not think that this country can accept that position. We can't, in my opinion, modify our entire foreign policy with a gun at our head, so to speak, by the treatment of the prisoners. So I would say that I do not really see how Vietnamization, or withdrawal of American troops, can be predicated upon the release of the prisoners. IMPORTANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS Mr. ZABLOCKI. Colonel, in exploring the possibilities of how the release of the prisoners can be obtained, we will not resort to force. It is probably unthinkable that we would at this point forcibly go into North Vietnam and try to free the prisoners. Negotiation is, of course, another method. How important do you believe negotiations are in this issue? And if we don't have negotiations, what are the alternatives to negotiations, which could result in a safe return of the prisoners? What might they be? Colonel BORMAN. Sir, I think negotiations are extremely important, and I would suspect that we may find that they may progress in areas other than Paris. We seem to, as you know, be deadlocked in Paris. The alternatives that I would suggest are unilateral releases of North Vietnamese prisoners and continuing public awareness. It has been, I think, magnificently mobilized, and many of the private groups have done a great job, and from everything we gather, at least the treatment of the prisoners has improved since the public exposure of their plight. The truth is that the problem is extremely perplexing, and I am not certain that we have within our grasp, even though we are the supreme power in the world, the leverage to force the release of these prisoners. PROPOSAL FOR UNILATERAL RELEASE Mr. ZABLOCKI. In a unilateral release, North Vietnam would be given the release of their prisoners now in South Vietnam. But the North Vietnamese prisoners are under the control of the South Vietnamese. Colonel BORMAN. Yes, sir. Mr. ZABLOCKI. However, we are negotiating only for our prisoners, are we not? Colonel BORMAN. Yes, sir, but in our discussions- |