AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1971

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

59-590 O

MARCH 23, 24, 25, 30, 31; APRIL 1, 6, 20, 1971

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1971

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 Price $2.50

Stock Number 5270-1090

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

THOMAS E. MORGAN, Pennsylvania, Chairman

ROY J. BULLOCK, Staff Administrator

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS

To deal with all matters affecting our foreign relations that concern matters of national security and scientific developments affecting foreign policy, including the national space program, mutual defense, and the operation of our high strategy generally. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman

JOHN H. SULLIVAN, Staff Consultant
JUNE NIGH, Senior Staff Assistant

FOREWORD

This volume contains the record of the third series of hearings which the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments has held on the subject of American prisoners of war and missing in action in Southeast Asia, and congressional resolutions on that problem.

Hearings have been held in 1969, 1970 and now in 1971 on POW/ MIA's because the subject is one which deeply troubles Members of Congress and, indeed, the hearts of all Americans.

The number of American prisoners of war is not large by the standards of recent wars like World War II and the Korean conflict. Some 7,000 Americans were believed captured in Korea. Today approximately 460 men are known to be prisoners and an additional 1,184 are listed as missing in Southeast Asia.

While the numbers of prisoners may not be exceptionally large given the scale of the fighting in Vietnam, the circumstances surrounding their captivity are particularly troubling.

For the first time in American history some prisoners of war have been in captivity for 6 years or longer.

For the first time in history the wives and children, mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters, of American prisoners have organized to spur Government action in freeing their loved ones.

And, finally, for the first time in American history, we see a war winding down in terms of American involvement, without any encouraging signs of obtaining the release of our prisoners.

Little wonder that the POW issue is such a raw nerve in the body politic.

Today the American people are disturbed and frustrated at the inability of our Government to obtain-by one means or another-the release of our prisoners.

My mail reflects that frustration, as does the mail of many other Members of Congress and indeed mail to the President, Defense, and State Departments.

Some of the anguish and emotion might be harnessed to worthwhile activities on behalf of the prisoners, if there were a clearer understanding among our people of the issues involved.

Regarding our prisoners we should have, I believe, three rather distinct objectives:

First, to obtain humane treatment for all prisoners of war held by North Vietnam and its allies in Southeast Asia, as specified by the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;

Second, to obtain immediate release of all sick and wounded prisoners-again as specified in the Geneva Convention;

And, third, to obtain the ultimate release of all American prisoners of war-the kind of release which normally occurs with the termination of hostilities.

Let us examine each of those objectives in turn.

First-we must obtain humane treatment for American prisoners. This is an issue only because the North Vietnamese and their allies have steadfastly refused to honor their obligations under the Geneva Convention.

North Vietnam ratified the Geneva Convention but has failed to adhere to any of its provisions on the specious grounds that our servicemen are "war criminals" and therefore removed from the protection of the treaty.

There is evidence that the North Vietnamese have subjected our prisoners to inhumane and sometimes brutal treatment. A similar plight has been experienced by our American prisoners held in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

The rising concern both in the United States and elsewhere in the world about the plight of our men has resulted in quiet diplomatic moves by third countries, in resolutions of concern passed by international bodies, and in a tremendous outpouring of mail to the leaders in Hanoi.

Sensitive as they have shown themselves to be at times to public opinion, the North Vietnamese seem to have responded to these pressures by relenting, at least partially, from their intransigent position on prisoners.

Since the subcommittee began its intensive concern with the POW question in 1969, there have been some signs of progress.

Two years ago, only a few sporadic letters had been received from the prisoners. Today letters are being sent to, and received from, almost all the American prisoners whom the North Vietnamese admit they hold.

Two years ago, packages to the prisoners were being returned to heart-stricken wives and mothers. Today some packages are going through, reaching the prisoners to make their bleak and lonely confinement somewhat more tolerable.

Two years ago we had no list of prisoners from Hanoi. Thousands of families spent their days in agony, wondering if their loved one was alive or dead. Today some of those families have the certain knowledge that their servicemen-though prisoners-are alive.

While the list provided by Hanoi undoubtedly is incomplete, it marks a distinct improvement over no list at all and provides a starting point for further inquiry.

Finally, there is evidence to be gleaned from the letters sent by the prisoners that conditions of their captivity have improved somewhat in recent months.

Much of the credit for the progress must go to the wives, mothers and other relatives of those who are prisoners and missing. Their efforts, combined with those of the American National Red Cross, veterans groups and other organizations, have been effective in arousing the American public to an awareness of the problem.

So much remains to be done, however, to insure humane treatment for all American prisoners-wherever they are held-that there is no time now to take bows. Efforts like the "Write Hanoi" campaign are

continuing; all concerned Americans should join this effort and others aimed at making North Vietnam live up to its obligations under the Geneva Convention.

The second of our three objectives must be to obtain the swift release of sick and wounded prisoners, as specified by the Geneva Convention. In that category we might include those men who have been held captive for periods of five or more years. Their health must certainly have suffered from their long confinement.

Many suggestions have been made-exchanges of sick and wounded prisoners, POW internment in third countires, unilateral releasesbut none have found North Vietnam responsive.

The stubbornness of Hanoi on this point should not discourage us unduly. Two years ago there seemed to be little hope of obtaining a list of prisoners in North Vietnam.

I am convinced that if we persist toward this second objective some response will be forthcoming, perhaps in the form of releases of some sick and wounded.

Our third objective is the ultimate release of all prisoners of war. This objective must, I believe, be sharply distinguished from our first two objectives: humane treatment for all prisoners and release of the sick and wounded.

Those first two objectives are primarily humanitarian in their purpose. Moreover they are required by the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

Our third objective-release of all prisoners-is primarily a political objective. Because it is of a different character than our first two objectives, it should be kept distinct in our international statements and in our appeals to Hanoi.

Unfortunately, some public statements by American leaders have not always made the distinction clear. The result has been confusion in the public mind, and a sense of frustration and helplessness domestically about the prisoner issue.

The other side, as well, has reacted adversely to the merging of political and humanitarian objectives. It has accused our leaders of duplicity, with further deterioration of the climate for fruitful arrangements on the prisoner issue.

The point is this: Historically the release of all prisoners has attended the termination of hostilities. In past wars, this has been the practice of the United States and other nations.

This is not to deny that unilateral releases of able-bodied prisoners have occurred in the past. In the Mexican War, for example, the United States released 10,000 captured Mexican soldiers, apparently because they were a burden. In recent times, however, such cases are exceptional.

International law, as embodied in the Geneva Conventions, does not require a country to release prisoners who are not sick or wounded before an armistice or peace has been agreed.

For this reason, we must employ a different strategy in attempting to gain the release of all prisoners.

Mobilizing world opinion may well improve the treatment accorded our POW's-it may eventually obtain the release of some sick and wounded prisoners but it is unlikely to convince Hanoi to release all the prisoners.