ROGERS AND LAIRD STATEMENTS CONTRASTED Mr. WHALEN. Your comment on page 28, and I quote: Taken together, the limitations on Soviet strategic offensive forces, plus the low ABM limits on both sides are decidedly in the U.S. security interest. U.S. strategic offensive forces are sufficient to protect the United States and allied security interests and under the Interim Agreement will remain so. This seems to me to contradict the reaction of Secretary Laird who stated he couldn't support the treaty or Interim Agreement unless we moved ahead substantially on defensive weapons. Secretary ROGERS. Why is that inconsistent? Mr. WHALEN. Just reading your own language, the U.S. strategic offensive forces are sufficient to protect U.S. and allied security interests. Secretary ROGERS. They are sufficient. Mr. WHALEN. They are sufficient now? Secretary ROGERS. Yes; and under the Interim Agreement we are permitted to proceed with the offensive systems Secretary Laird referred to. By proceeding with them, they will continue to be sufficient. There is nothing inconsistent about that. NO ABM'S: SUFFICIENCY EASIER TO DEFINE Mr. WHALEN. I have a further interest in the treaty itself and the Interim Agreement. It seems to me that in limiting or stabilizing defensive weapons, we make nuclear sufficiency or strategic sufficiency more definable. Let me explain it this way: When nations increase their defensive forces in this case the ABM-and even though we may find that they are not as efficient as advertised, at least I think it clouds the effectiveness of the offensive weapons. Now that these defensive systems are stabilized, does it not make the definition of sufficiency more easily determined? Isn't that the purpose, the thrust of the agreements on the defensive weapons? Secretary ROGERS. To the extent in the equation you do not have to consider defensive systems, it does make it easier to define "efficiency." Mr. WHALEN. I have never been an advocate of the ABM. It can be overwhelmed and put out of commission. Nevertheless, a military commander can't take that for granted. Therefore, he wants to push ahead and accelerate the inventory of his offensive weapons. NECESSITY OF B-1 BOMBER, TRIDENT SUB I wonder, in view of this fact, why is it necessary to move ahead so rapidly with the Trident, the B-1, and other offensive weapons? Secretary ROGERS. I think it is important to continue to build our offensive weapons within the limitations prescribed by the Interim Agreement. First, we have to make it clear we won't become second-rate militarily, and secondly, I think it will help the prospects of the phase 2 SALT talks. Chairman MORGAN (presiding). Mr. Reid? MAINTAINING A STRONG DETERRENT Mr. REID. I want to welcome you, Mr. Secretary, and say how much I appreciate the thoughtfulness of your testimony. It seems your efforts, along with those of our President, have resulted in a very significant advance, a very hopeful one, and I think Ambassador Smith and his colleagues are much to be commended for their personal skill and patience. Mr. Secretary, I have just one basic question, and it is a question. I think this has run through the testimony here this morning. Let's see if I can phrase it a little differently. I think it is clear from the testimony that you and the present administration are concerned in trying to avoid an arms race where possible and equally that you not only want to break but maintain a break in the cycle of action and reaction, as you phrased it several times in your testimony. Equally, I don't think there is any basic disagreement, at least with me, that we must maintain a strong and balanced deterrent for a long time in the future. I certainly see that a deterrent is deserving in this regard. I am aware there are critical domestic needs and budgetary restraints that enter into this position. My question, given those premises, is how we can help negotiations and meet our needs at home, while maintaining a strong and balanced deterrent yet insuring that we do not take actions or initiatives that would reopen or accelerate the action-reaction curve. Ambassador Hammond has made the point on several occasions he thinks some of the statements coming out of the Department of Defense may be read somewhat differently in Moscow from the intention of the administration, and that there is the danger that if we go too far in some of these other initiatives, the marshals in the Soviet Union may interpret that to proceed more aggressively in certain areas. Inadvertently, the result could be to stimulate even though we seek to slow down or maintain a break in the cycle of action-reaction. The question, therefore, is, have you made some kind of judgment, can you give some kind of guidance to the Congress here as to those steps that perhaps the military would like to take but, nonetheless, could result in misinterpretation and start the cycle all over again. What would constitute an example of going too far in this area versus an action you think prudent and essential to future negotiations in our balanced deterrent strength? CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET LEADERS Secretary ROGERS. I think if we stay within the limitations of the agreement, we do not have that fear. In the discussions we had with the Soviet leaders, it was clear on both sides that each of us would proceed as we saw fit as long as we didn't exceed the limits. We also talked of the necessity to start phase 2 of the SALT talks quickly. If we can reach an agreement, we would like to and they indicate they would like to. I don't think there is any danger that they will misconstrue our efforts to have what we think is necessary for our national defense purposes as long as the agreement is not violated. They were more explicit on this than we were. Chairman Brezhnev, I guess he is called General Secretary Brezhnev, told President Nixon on a couple of occasions, very vigorously, that he was going to proceed and that he wanted us to understand that he was going to continue to have a buildup as long as it didn't violate the agreement and, if we were able to reach an agreement in the second phase of the SALT talks, that would limit it further and that would be fine with them. I don't believe there will be misunderstanding on that score at all. On the first part of your question, that is, of course, something Congress will consider. It has to consider our domestic needs and balance those against the defense requirements which we think are necessary. We have not asked for anything in our defense budgets that we think is unnecessary or wasteful both from the standpoint of our national defense and to the success of our negotiations in SALT phase 2. Mr. REID. Are there any specific examples you can give as to the kinds of things you mentioned to the Soviets, that we thought we must continue to do during pendency of the phase 2 negotiations, or an example of what the Soviets said they could continue to do absent an agreement on phase 2? Secretary ROGERS. No, I don't recall offhand there was any discussion about specifics. The Soviets are well aware of what we have on the drawing board. RESTARTING THE ACTION-REACTION CYCLE ON ARMS Mr. REID. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. One final question, Ambassador Smith. Is there anything you care to comment on on the danger of the restarting of the action-reaction cycle? Ambassador SMITH. Mr. Reid, I think that if the United States continues to modernize its forces as the Soviet Union will continue to modernize its forces, the action-reaction cycle should not start up again. I do think there is also a line at which it could be started if, for instance, we started an entirely new program that is technically permitted by the agreement. For example, there is nothing that would not permit us from putting a lot of launchers on surface vessels. I think that would indicate we are increasing our forces instead of modernizing. There is a problem of balancing between too little and too much, between not keeping up the modernization of our forces and going too far in the arms drive. I believe we are prudent enough to avoid getting into such extreme positions. Mr. REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman MORGAN. Thank you very much, gentlemen. The committee stands adjourned. (Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, July 27, 1972. The committee met on July 27, 1972, as scheduled and heard testimony on the Interim Agreement from the Honorable Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, which was classified "Top Secret" and therefore is not included in the printed record of the hearings.) AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2, 1972 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D.C. The committee met at 10:15 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman of the committee) presiding. Chairman MORGAN. The committee will come to order. This morning the committee is meeting to continue our consideration of a resolution expressing congressional approval of the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms concluded last May between the United States and the Soviet Union. Our witnesses this morning are the Secretary of Defense, Hon. Melvin R. Laird, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, of course, with them at the witness table are two members of the U.S. negotiating team at SALT, Hon. Paul H. Nitze, who represented the Department of Defense at the talks, and Lt. Gen. Royal B. Allison, who represented the Joint Chiefs. Mr. Secretary, we will open the session by presenting your statement, followed by the admiral's statement, and after that we will direct our questions to you individually or as a team. You may proceed, Mr. Secretary. STATEMENT OF HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Secretary LAIRD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to be here today to continue discussions with the Congress on matters related to the ABM treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons. As you know, I heartily endorse the consultative process with the Congress which this administration has fostered. I recognize the need fort his exchange of views-a recognition which originated in my days as a Member of Congress and a recognition which has been reinforced during my tenure as Secretary of Defense. Today, I am here to respond to your questions and to briefly outline for this committee my perception of the ABM treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons. The specifics of the agreements and other considerations related to them are, of course, being treated by other officials of the administration who have appeared before the committee, such as the Secretary of State, the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The President has asked me to concentrate on the relationship of the agreements to the defense of the United States. In doing so, I will emphasize the critical importance of proposed U.S. strategic programs to the viability of the agreements already reached, and the continued importance of these programs to the follow-on negotiations which could begin this autumn. In my view, the national security requirements of the United States make it urgent that: (1) the Senate ratify the ABM Treaty; (2) the Congress approve the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons; and (3) the House and Senate reinforce these initiatives for arms limitation with strong support for the President's defense budget proposals. SUPPORTS SALT AGREEMENTS As you know, the limitations contained in the SALT agreements were brought about through carefully prepared, lengthy and intensive negotiations. We did not pursue a course dictated by wishful thinking, but rather a course based on the realities of the existing strategic balance and the potential inherent in ongoing programs. As a result, the agreements reflect the fruits of our successful national security programs upon which realistic negotiations were based. I believe the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons now before the Congress move us closer to our ultimate goal— a world system in which peace is a universal practice rather than a hope. These agreements enable us to sustain our confidence in the effectiveness and realism of our strategic deterrent and to maintain a position of strength-the essential foundation for successful negotiations. I am confident that the provisions of these agreements can be verified by national means. NEED FOR A STRONG DEFENSE POSTURE In my view, the opportunities for enhanced security embodied in the SALT agreements would be nullified and our national security jeopardized in the long term unless there is continued strong support for an adequate defense budget. The success of SALT and prospects for ultimate peace depend on sustained strength. I believe the majority of the Members of Congress and the majority of all American citizens agree on the need for a strong defense posture. The programs that we are recommending in the defense budget now before Congress will provide this strength. The President reported upon his return from Moscow that Mr. Brezhnev and his Soviet colleagues had made it absolutely clear that they intended to go forward with programs in the offensive area that are not limited by these agreements. It should be no surprise when I report to you that this is precisely what they are doing. Both as a Member of Congress and when I became Secretary of Defense, I thought it was essential to apply the brakes to the onrushing Soviet strategic weapons momentum. With ratification of these agreements, we will have accomplished this objective. As a legislator and as a member of the executive branch, I have always felt that it is essential for us to maintain technological superior |