PROBLEM OF LAND-MOBILE MISSILES

There is a question why the United States was unable to obtain agreements from the Soviets banning mobile missiles. What is the strategic importance of such missiles and is there a grave danger the Soviets might deploy such missiles without the United States knowing about it?

Secretary ROGERS. I would like Ambassador Smith to discuss this at greater length. This was the subject of long negotiations by the delegation.

I think I can say at the moment we don't believe it is an important factor in the planning of the Soviet Union.

Certainly it is not in our planning. We attempted to have some language in the Interim Agreement to that effect, to ban them, but we were not able to achieve that. But as I said in my statement, Ambassador Smith made it clear if there was any attempt to employ such mobile missiles, we would consider it a very serious violation of the spirit of the agreements and I think they understand that.

This is a subject that will, of course, be discussed further at the next phase of the SALT talks. We do not think that they could employ mobile launchers for missiles except over a short period of time. Över a short period of time we think they would be detected so we don't think this would be a significant strategic factor.

WERE THERE SECRET UNDERSTANDINGS?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. This understanding that you have on mobile missiles, that you referred to, it further encourages this question. There has been speculation that there were some discussions or understanding between the United States regarding the SALT agreements which were either not put down on paper but understood by both sides but not yet made public.

Are there such understandings, and, if so, when will, or can, they be made known to the Congress and the American public?

Secretary ROGERS. There are no such understandings. This is one where we made a unilateral statement. Ambassador Smith can explain it.

PROBLEM OF LAND-MOBILE MISSILES

Ambassador SMITH. May I first say that the rationale that the Soviets gave for not wanting to include mobile missiles was twofold. They said this is just a freeze, it is not a definitive limitation on all offensive strategic weapons. Therefore, since mobile ICBM's are not in existence on either side, they should not be covered by a freeze.

Second-and they didn't say this, but it is my surmise they want in the subsequent formal agreement to have mobile missiles permitted under some sort of aggregate ceiling. They don't want to have that option closed and, therefore, they didn't want to set any precedent or prejudice that outcome by agreeing to what, in effect, would be a complete ban on mobile missiles during this interim negotiating period.

On the question of our capability to detect any deployment, I don't think I can improve on the Secretary's analysis, I think that is quite right.

POSSIBILITY OF A MIRV BAN

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We were unable, of course, to have any serious negotiations on MIRV's. Yet, Mr. Secretary, on page 12 listing the agreement not to develop certain phases of ABM's and interceptor missiles-would this be an indication that in SALT phase 2 negotiations we may look forward to some agreement on banning MIRV's?

Ambassador SMITH. I think the two questions are quite separate. The multiple target warhead for defensive missiles is a relatively marginal question. No such systems are in existence at the present time and as long as you keep the level of the interceptors very low as we have, to 200, it does not offer potential for expansion of the defense capabilities.

Whereas in the offensive field, as you know, we have already deployed a substantial number of MIRV's. The Soviets have not yet tested any and I think that they would not agree to a MIRV ban. They indicated they would not, on the terms that we proposed at least, back in 1970.

Whether in subsequent negotiations we will go for a MIRV ban or not, or some sort of MIRV limitation, we are not now in a position to say.

We do not yet have our guidance on the subsequent negotiations. But I don't think one should take very much comfort from the fact that the Soviets have agreed to this in the defensive field and consider it as a precedent for a MIRV ban in the offensive field.

PROXY WARS AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Secretary, you end your prepared statement with a very optimistic note that the threat of nuclear war is dramatically reduced and the world thus has greater hope for the future.

Some speculate, indeed, since the chance of nuclear warfare has lessened among the superpowers, that the liklihood of smaller proxy wars among the smaller nations may, indeed, have increased.

Is this, first of all, in your opinion, true and, if so would it not therefore equally be important to seek some kind of international agreements to stop or limit proliferation of nonnuclear weaponry and lastly, is the Nixon administration prepared to aggressively seek such agreements?

Secretary ROGERS. I think you are correct. Among the smaller nations there is some slight concern on the score you mentioned. I had discussions with some leaders on this subject in my recent visits.

I don't believe it is a realistic concern, but in any event, there is no reason why this is not a subject that should be discussed and considered at a European Security Conference which may take place in 1973.

It certainly is a good reason for encouraging other nations to sign and ratify the NPT, which has the very objective that you referred to, of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and to do what we can to minimize the concern that is felt on the part of some.

As I say, I don't believe it is a realistic concern. I think that the threat of nuclear war, as I said in my statement, has been dramatically reduced as a result of the ABM Treaty, and I think that is recognized by most nations.

When you think about it and just limit your thinking to the ABM Treaty, you will see why that is the case. Both of us have agreed not to protect our populations. Each of us recognizes that a first strike would not succeed in destroying the other nation's retaliatory capability.

The result is that each of use realizes that a nuclear war would be the destruction of both countries. That seems to me to be about the strongest possible deterrent human beings can be living under, that realization.

The thought that other nations will engage in nuclear conflicts I don't think is realistic.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Frelinghuysen?

PRAISE FOR AMBASSADOR SMITH

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to begin by congratulating Ambassador Smith and other members of our delegation for the substantial achievements they have accomplished. I hope that Ambassador Smith especially will continue in his present position, because it does seem to me he has a very unique experience and he certainly has proven his ability, so I hope you have no plans for a change of activity, Ambassador. I was very much interested in the discussion

Secretary ROGERS. In that connection, he said he is tired of hotel rooms and is looking for a small house.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I hope he can find something suitable.

UNA REPORT ON NPT RATIFICATION

The discussion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty calls to my mind the fact I met yesterday with some individuals who were discussing the new report issued by the United Nations Association.

They seem much concerned about the fact that a number of countries with nuclear capacity have not ratified the treaty. I don't know how much leverage we have, but I assume it remains a high priority objective to secure ratification of more nations to the Treaty? Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

ROLE OF THE HOUSE IN SALT PACTS APPROVAL

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is not clear to me yet the relationship between the treaty and the Interim Agreement is or why the House is involved in the process of approval.

Of course, it is good for our own self-esteem to be brought into a problem like this that normally would fall to the lot of the Senate. This is called an Interim Agreement. Does this have anything to do with an executive agreement. It is called interim because it is not substantial enough to be called a treaty; is that it?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct. But it is an agreement of considerable importance. It relates to the treaty for obvious reasons, reasons I mention in the statement.

Therefore, they should be acted upon together. We did not submit the Interim Agreement to the Congress because of congressional selfesteem, but we think it is a matter of national interest, and we think the House should give full consideration to the agreement and in a

sense to the treaty itself, although, as you point out, you do not have the power of ratification. But they are of such significance, these two agreements, that we felt it was desirable to have full consideration by Congress.

I think it was a wise decision.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is a peculiar role for the House.

You spent most of the time talking about the treaty, which, in theory, has no relationship to our immediate responsibilities, yet the Treaty is so bound up with the Interim Agreement that you couldn't appreciate the agreement without understanding what the treaty provides.

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

I suppose we could have proceeded on the basis that it was only necessary to get ratification of the treaty and the agreement could be signed by the President without any congressional authority, but we decided that was not the wise course to follow for the reasons I mentioned.

Your analysis is correct. They are linked together. They are linked together in the Interim Agreement itself. It says this Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notice of acceptance by each party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the treaty on the limitation of ABM's.

PRESIDENT'S POWERS ON AGREEMENTS

There is a clear expressed linkage.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The Executive would have the power to notify them of an acceptance once the treaty is ratified without respect to a formal approval of the Interim Agreement, would he not?

It is a judgmental decision on the Executive's part that he wants full approval of both documents before the notice of acceptance is Secretary ROGERS. As long as we have proceeded this way. I would rather not get involved in a controversy over the President's power. In this case it is academic.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I wasn't looking for a contest. I think this is a good thing. There is an increasing interest on the part of Congress in Executive agreements.

But this is a different kind of agreement.
Secretary ROGERS. That is right.

THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is not clear to me, either, about the way the Standing Consultative Commission will work.

I think Ambassador Smith said their responsibilities would have to do with enforcement of both the agreement and the treaty. I don't see any reference to the agreement in the description of what the consultative commission's responsibility would be.

Ambassador SMITH. There is a specific provision in the Interim Agreement: Article 6, which spells that out.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yes, I had not seen that.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Monagan?

Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I am delighted that we have reached this stage in these negotiations and certainly there could be no more significant objective for the major powers than to bring about some control of the use of nuclear weapons and I also want to express my appreciation as a Member of Congress for the dedicated efforts of Ambassador Smith through this whole long period of negotiations.

I think that he has made a great contribution to the Nation in this work.

POSSIBILITIES FOR LAUNCHER IMPROVEMENT

This communication to the Congress from the President says that the agreement provides for restriction of 5 years on strategic of fensive missile launcher deployments.

I think it is true, however, that this does not act as a complete straitjacket on the Russians, isn't that so?

There are certain things they can do under this agreement?
Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Zablocki referred to the mobile launchers. You said that Mr. Brezhnev indicated that they were going to go ahead with certain developments. What was he referring to at that time, specifically?

Secretary ROGERS. He was referring to the fact that they intend to continue construction of their offensive weapons within the limitations prescribed by the Interim Agreement.

We didn't go into the details, of course; what he is saying, in effect, is, you understand that there are limitations on the construction of offensive weapons and we are going to continue to do what we can within those limitations.

We indicated we would, too.

LIMITATION ON NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS

Mr. MONAGAN. Now, there is a limitation on the overall number of launchers, is that so?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Mr. MONAGAN. Within that limitation, is it a fact that the heavy launchers are at a stage where that number can be increased?

Secretary ROGERS. No.

Mr. MONAGAN. There is no leeway between the number that exists at the present time and the limitation?

Secretary ROGERS. On the ICBM launchers, they cannot start any new construction of those launchers. They can improve within the present system so they could increase the number of warheads on a missile but they cannot build or start construction on any new ICBM silos.

Mr. MONAGAN. The number of warheads could be increased by modernization?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, just as we can.

Mr. MONAGAN. Is that a serious defect in this whole agreement? Secretary ROGERS. It is not a defect in the agreement, it is a recognition that we have not reached a comprehensive agreement on offensive weapons yet.