AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS TUESDAY, JULY 20, 1972 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D.C. The committee met at 10:20 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman of the committee) presiding. Chairman MORGAN. The committee will come to order. This morning the Committee on Foreign Affairs begins consideration of resolutions expressing congressional approval of the Interim Agreement on limitation of strategic offensive arms concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union. Two agreements were signed affecting strategic arms limitation at the time of the President's visit to Moscow last May.1 The agreement on defensive weapons has been submitted in the form of a treaty to the Senate only for its "advice and consent." The Interim Agreement on offensive weapons has been submitted to both Houses of the Congress for approval. This approval is to be given through the passage of a joint resolution. Several such resolutions of approval have been introduced into the House and today's hearing is concerned with them. On June 15, the President addressed members of this and other concerned committees on the subject of these arms limitation agree ments. At the time he said: I think that the hearings that you will conduct must be searching, because only in that way will you be able to be convincing to yourselves and only in that way will the nation also be convinced. Mr. Secretary, this committee intends to give full consideration to this legislation, and to the agreements. For that purpose, hearings will be held during the next 2 weeks. To open this series, we are privileged to have with us this morning Secretary of State William P. Rogers. He is accompanied by Hon. Gerard C. Smith, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and chief U.S. negotiator at the SALT talks. Do you both have statements or just one of you has a statement? STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS, SECRETARY OF STATE Secretary ROGERS. I have a statement; also Ambassador Smith will be able to answer any questions on specifics of the negotiations themselves. 1 For text of agreements, see p. 117. Chairman MORGAN. You may proceed. Secretary ROGERS. It is a pleasure to meet with this committee to support the treaty on the limitation of ABM systems and the Interim Agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The President, in his June 13 letter to Speaker Albert, urged congressional support for the two agreements. He asked for an expression of support from the House of Representatives for the Interim Agreement. The two agreements before you represent an uprecedented step in controlling strategic arms. These agreements lay a basis for enhancing strategic stability. They are concrete evidence of what can be achieved through patient negotiation. The United States and the U.S.S.R. remain competitors with important differences between them, but both recognize that there can be advantages in reaching agreements in certain areas. Placing limitations on strategic arms is a continuing process. The United States and the U.S.S.R. will seek additional mutual limitations. The SALT agreements are not only in the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union; they are in the interests of all nations. They are the most significant achievements to date in the era of developing negotiations. SALT PROCESS ITSELF USEFUL The SALT process has in itself been useful. The negotiating dialogue has led to greater understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result of the SALT talks and SALT agreements, we appreciate and understand better Soviet interests and concerns in the strategic area the most sensitive area with respect to national security-as they do the concerns and interests on our side. This has led to a more accurate perception of each by the other, which should be an important contribution to a more stable relationship between us. CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS Mr. Chairman, during the course of the SALT negotiations over the past several years, we have endeavored to maintain close contact with the Congress, and to consult regularly with our allies. I understand the SALT delegation consulted with Mr. Zablocki's subcommittee on a regular basis. We have undertaken this continuing consultation in order to ensure the broadest possible support for agreements reached. The administration is pleased that the Congress is giving full consideration to these two documents. Our allies have approved of the results of SALT, and recognize them as enhancing our common security interests. I believe there is also broad support for these agreements in the Congress. Judging them on their merits based on a realistic assessment of what has been achieved, can, I submit, lead only to a positive conclusion. A "ROUGH BALANCE" IN STRATEGIC FORCES As you know, in the mid-1960's the United States chose to concentrate on improving its strategic offensive weapons through modernization programs, rather than deploying more missile launchers. The U.S.S.R., on the other hand, was engaged in an intensive program to increase the number of its missile launchers. Enhancing U.S. security by strategic arms limitations seemed good sense to the present administration when it came into office early in 1969. We faced a situation where there would be in the not-too-distant future a rough balance in strategic forces between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. However, there was not then, and there is not now, any question that the United States could and would maintain strategic forces adequate to meet its security requirements-forces second to none. This situation presented an opportunity to maintain a sound strategic posture and at the same time to achieve a more stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union through success in SALT. The agreements that have been reached achieved these objectives. The President recognized that a continuing arms race would be pointless. Intense strategic competition could only dissipate resources and make more difficult the bettering of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations which might otherwise occur in other areas to the advantage of the American and Soviet peoples, and, indeed, of all peoples. The administration, therefore undertook detailed studies to prepare for what the President has termed the most important arms control negotiation in history. HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS Negotiations began in November 1969, in Helsinki. We learned quickly that both of us had much to learn about how the other viewed the strategic situation. The early dialog was devoted mainly to exploring strategic principles and establishing an agenda to guide the more detailed negotiations to come. In the next several rounds of discussion, alternating between Vienna and Helsinki, problems developed with respect to the scope of initial limitations. Although various comprehensive approaches and proposals were discussed, it became doubtful that a single comprehensive agreement could be negotiated as a first outcome of SALT. The U.S.S.R. had been pressing for an initial agreement only limiting ABM systems. It was our judgment that the first outcome of SALT should include limitations on offensive as well as defensive strategic forces, since an agreement only limiting ABM's would make less of a contribution to strategic stability. The problems in SALT that made it evident that an initial single comprehensive agreement was not likely were resolved by the breakthrough announced by the President on May 20, 1971. As you recall, it was agreed to work out a definitive limitation on ABM's, and at the same time to agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The May 20 understanding provided a new impetus for the negotiating process. A number of major issues, and many more lesser ones, re mained to be addressed by the negotiators. The main issues were two: how much limitation of offensive forces could be agreed, and how to formulate mutually acceptable specific limitations on ABM's. SALT AGREEMENTS: CONTRIBUTE TO STRATEGIC BALANCE The two agreements reached as a result of the ensuing year of negotiating on these difficult questions will contribute to maintaining a stable strategic balance and thereby reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. In the ABM Treaty, both sides have committed themselves not to build nationwide or heavy ABM defenses. The importance of this undertaking is fundamental. It places both sides in a position where neither will have a substantial defense against major missile attacks. In effect, we agree to maintain mutual deterrence. I am convinced that the possibility of nuclear war has been dramatically reduced as a result of the ABM Treaty. BASIC PROVISIONS REVIEWED I think it would be useful now. Mr. Chairman, for me to run through some of the basic provisions of the two agreements. I will not go into detail since the committee has before it the documents transmitted by the President, which include a detailed article-by-article analysis. As I said at the beginning, at the conclusion of my remarks, Ambassador Smith will be glad to join with me in answering questions. Our aim in both agreements has been-where necessary-to put detailed obligations in the texts of the agreements themselves. If one of the sides had a preference for including clarifying material or elaboration in agreed interpretations, and this was sufficient, that approach was used. The agreed interpretations include initialed statements and other common understandings. They have been included in the President's transmittal package to the Congress. The transmittal package also included formal unilateral statements of U.S. views in certain cases where agreement could not be reached. There are, Mr. Chairman, and I want to make it clear there are no secret agreements. What we have submitted to the Congress represents the agreements that were reached between the Soviet Union and the United States. THE ABM TREATY Let me start with the ABM Treaty. It is a definitive agreement of unlimited duration, the central feature of which is the commitment by both sides to no more than a low level of ABM defenses, at two small and widely separated locations. The treaty permits deployment of one ABM complex in an ICBM deployment area, and one for defense of the National Command Authority. There can be no more than 100 ABM launchers and an equal number of associated interceptors at each complex, for a total of 200. Strict limitations are placed on ABM radars, a matter of particular importance since radars are the long leadtime item in deployment of an ABM system. |