was an aggression for which an apology might have been made and accepted, provided all intention of following it up had been unequivocally disavowed. But, was the treaty annulled? Was any apology made for it? Did not the emperor persist in avowed interference in the internal affairs of France? Did he not make constant complaints of the clubs of France, and other matters which could only concern the sovereign of the subjects of that country? With respect to the King of Prussia, he had no pretext for attacking France. He did not even pretend that he had any. He never called upon us for those succours, which, had he not been the aggressor, we were bound by treaty to furnish him. Next, we were told, that the conduct of those powers with whom we were confederated towards Poland, was not to be considered with relation to the present war. From the same persons who held this language, he had often heard on former occasions, that a commercial connection with Poland might be one of the most valuable that this country could form. That system was now forgotten. Poland was no longer of importance in the scale of nations. Be it so: but, were we to shut our eyes to the perfidy of those powers with whom we contracted alliances? Where was the instance in the French convention, or the jacobin club, that could match the perfidy of the King of Prussia to Poland? He not only encouraged the Poles in modelling their constitution, but he publickly congratulated them on having made their monarchy hereditary in the family of his relation, the Elector of Saxony; and twelve months after, he had the unexampled impudence to declare, that this very alteration had given just offence to the Empress of Russia, and was a sufficient cause for joining his arms to hers against Poland. Surely, this was sufficient to teach us caution! When negociation with France was the question, we were told, "Think not of France as a nation, look not to general maxims of policy, consider only the morals and characters of the men with whom you must negociate." When the conduct of our allies was mentioned, we were told, "Think not of the cruel and perfidious dismemberment of Poland, look only to the present object, and the aid they can afford you to obtain it." Hence he conceived this was the inference, "Make peace with no man of whose good conduct and good faith you are not perfectly satisfied; but make an alliance with any man, no matter how profligate or faithless he may be."

When he spoke of kings, he desired always to be understood as speaking of courts and cabinets; for he held it to be, in general, as true in other countries as in this, that for the actions of princes their ministers were responsible. Till that disgrace on civilized society, the imprisonment of the virtuous

and meritorious La Fayette was done away, no Frenchman who loved his country could repose confidence in the professions of the combined powers. It was in vain that we had virtue, humanity, religion in our mouths, while passion and malignity were rankling in our hearts, and displayed in our actions. He had been informed that the King of Prussia, in answer to applications for the liberation of M. de La Fayette, had said, that La Fayette was not his prisoner, that he was the prisoner of the combined powers, and could not be released but by general consent. This answer he knew had been given; with what truth, ministers could best tell: but even if it was false, it was so much the more incumbent upon us to clear ourselves from the obloquy of being parties to the cruel treatment he had received. By our own declarations, although these were not all very consistent with one another, we engaged to support the constitution of which La Fayette was one of the principal authors. Under the constitution of 1789, we accepted of the surrender of Toulon, in trust for Louis XVII. According to the forms of that constitution, the government of Toulon was administered while we were in possession of it. Louis XVII. was not styled King of France and Navarre, as by the old government, but King of the French, as by the constitution of 1789. On the restoration of monarchy we offered peace to the French, and thus we explained, that we would be satisfied with that sort of monarchy which La Fayette had assisted in endeavouring to establish. Where was the French constitutionalist who did not then call for La Fayette? With how much more effect might he have been sent commissioner to Toulon than Sir Gilbert Elliot? But, mark the horrible contrast between our words and our actions. While we were holding this language to the people of Toulon, he who loved rational liberty, who loved his country and his king, who had sacrificed, in their defence, all that makes life desirable, was languishing in one of the most loathsome dungeons of a Prussian prison. About the same time that we were professing to support the constitution of 1789, General Wurmser had entered Alsace. What were his orders from the emperor? Did he profess to support the constitution of 1789? No: his orders were to abrogate every authority under that constitution, and restore the old form of government. This, which was matter of fact and practice, proved that the views of the emperor could not be the same with ours.

When Dumourier, the most enterprising and the most active general that had lately appeared, proposed joining the Prince of Saxe Cobourg, he was declared a wise and virtuous citizen, resolved to give peace to his country, and to assist

with his army in restoring, not the old despotic system, but the limited monarchy of 1789. Why was this proclamation issued by the prince of Saxe Cobourg? Because he meant to adhere to it? No such thing. As soon as Dumourier's defection was found to be, not the defection of an army, but of a general and a few followers, all his wisdom and his virtue vanished with his power, and within four or, at most, five days, the Prince of Saxe Cobourg, without waiting to see what effect his proclamation would produce in France, with audacity and effrontery unparralleled in history, issued a second proclamation retracting every word of it. This he mentioned to shew, that there was as little sincerity in the emperor's professions as in those of the King of Prussia. The Prince of Saxe Cobourg was not a man to issue proclamations hastily or without orders; and from the dates, and other circumstances, it was evident, that he must have had the second proclamation by him when he issued the first. Soon after, the "wise and virtuous" Dumourier came to this country, which he was almost immediately ordered to quit; and he had since been reduced to a situation not much to be envied by a French general even before the revolutionary tribunal. What was the lesson thus held out to Frenchmen? That it was better to run the hazard of the guillotine in France, than to take the certainty of misery and contempt among the allies. Such was the capacity we had shewn for overthrowing the jacobin power in France! Had the King of Prussia, or had Russia, acceded to our views any more than the emperor? If they had, what better security for their good faith had they given us, than they had given to Poland? Were they, who held themselves bound by no engagements, to make a splendid ex ception in our favour, and keep sacred to us promises which were given to others only to betray? We talked of indemnity for the past, and security for the future, as our objects in the war. Let us suppose ourselves in the situation of a welldisposed person in France, an enemy to the tyranny of the jacobins, and see how these would operate. Security we might think reducing the exorbitant power of France, and to this the well-disposed Frenchman might assent. For indemnity, we might be content with some of the West-India islands; and to this also the Frenchman might agree. But, then, our allies would want an indemnity, and what would be enough for them? If the Frenchman looked to Poland, he would see that nothing short of the partition of France would satisfy them; and could he be expected to risk his life by rising in opposition to the convention, when the most flattering prospect was the ultimate ruin of his country? If France should be subdued, (an event which he never considered as probable,)

the whole kingdom might not be sufficient to indemnify all the powers at war; and then we must have to fight for the division of the spoil, without even that delusive calm, which had been said to be all that could now be obtained by a peace with France. It was pretty well known that some of our allies were not very cordially disposed towards one another. Where Prussian and Austrian troops were brought together they were much more inclined to fight with each other than against the common enemy, and were only restrained by the strong arm of power. Except ourselves and Holland, not a state had joined the confederacy but those under absolute monarchies. Holland, we all knew, had been drawn into the combination by influence equivalent to force, and would rejoice in an opportunity of getting out of it with safety.

But he should be told, that it was easier to look back and find fault than to look forward and point out a remedy. The motion made by his honourable friend presented the means of finding that remedy. The inclination of Holland to peace could not be doubted; Spain, if he was not much misinformed, would consent to it without any indemnity; and it was very generally reported and believed, that Prussia demanded of us a subsidy of 700,000l. as the condition of prosecuting the war. This, if true, was a fortunate circumstance, for it opened a door for peace with the consent of all the allies. The late campaign had been called successful beyond our hopes. The latter part of it, certainly, was not that which could be thought the most fortunate. Now, after being told, as the House was repeatedly told last session, that France was only capable of one desperate effort; and after seeing that effort baffled, in the early part of the campaign, but the loss nearly repaired in the subsequent part of it, not by desperate efforts but by perseverance, he could not entertain very sanguine hopes of the next campaign, even if it should begin as brilliantly as the last. He was not bold enough to assure himself, or the House, that we should be able to obtain the restoration of Savoy, which we had bound ourselves by treaty to obtain; but if he were, he should still object to giving the means of making peace out of our own hands. When ministers were charged with neglecting the business of convoys, they answered, that France, in the first instance had reaped the fruits of her unexpected aggression; yet this unexpected aggression, as it was called, was made several months after the conquest of Savoy, after the battle of Jemappe, and the invasion of the Austrian Netherlands.

Mr. Fox said, it was matter of great consolation to him, that in spite of popular clamour, he had used every endeavour

to prevent the war; and, when it was unfortunately commenced, to render it as short as possible. Believing now, that several of the allies were disposed to peace, he thanked his honourable friend for affording him an opportunity of repeating and recording his opinion on the subject. He would say nothing of the calamities inseparable from war, although on every question they were perfectly in order. It was idle to say, that because they were general topics, and applicable to every war, they were fit matter of argument against none. The very circumstance of their generality, rendered them matter of serious consideration before we entered upon any war. It was impossible to devise productive taxes that would not fall ultimately upon the lower classes; and when such additional burdens had been imposed, it was impossible to call war a state of prosperity. Every new tax fell heavier than those which went before it, because its weight was added to that of all the preceding. Thus, the taxes for the American war fell heavier than those for the war preceding; those for the present heavier than the taxes for the American war; and those for any future war must be heavier still.

MR. ADAM'S MOTION RESPECTING THE TRIALS OF MESSRS. MUIR AND Palmer.

BY

March 10.

Y sentences of the court of justiciary at Edinburgh, and of the circuit court at Perth, Mr. Muir and Mr. Palmer, for the crime of leasing-making, were adjudged to transportation, and Botany Bay was understood at the time the sentences were passed to be the place to which they would be transported. These were the first instances in which transportation was imposed by the court of justiciary in Scotland for an offence of that nature. On the roth of March, Mr. William Adam called the attention of the House to the subject, by moving for a copy of the record of the trials of Thomas Muir and the Rev. Fysche Palmer. From the records demanded, his object, he said, was to question the legality of the sentences passed upon them. But as no appeal could lie from the decision of the court, however questionable, he proposed, in consequence of the doubtfulness of the case, to move for the