Only three years after his assumption of the office of Lord Chancellor, i. e., 1620, he is accused of "taking money while a suit was still in progress;" he was also accused of taking a "handsome present" in another case. The investigation, which resulted in his conviction, is so well known, and has been so graphically described by Lord Macaulay, that nothing more is needed in this connection than recalling the fact.

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Professor Fowler, whose friendship for Bacon is in rather sharp contrast with the latter's treatment of Essex, while not attempting to deny Bacon's guilt, strives to show that he should be leniently judged and that much allowance should be made for him, because the stream of English justice did not run so pure" then as now. In other words, because some of Bacon's predecessors in the seat of justice had prostituted their high office to their greed of gain, or other unworthy motive, he was, in a measure, at least, to be excused for following their footsteps! As though the very first principles of morality were not understood by England's great philosopher! One need but read Bacon's confession to find a ready answer to all this sophistical and shallow apology.

He says in this document: "Descending into my own conscience, and calling my memory to account, so far as I am able, I do plainly and ingenuously confess that I am guilty of corruption, and do renounce all defence, and put myself upon the grace and mercy of your Lordship."

Does this indicate any dimness of moral vision?

After his condemnation and subsequent pardon, it seems as though one might naturally look for an end of Bacon's career as an office-seeker; but, incredible as it may seem, we find him, in 1622-3, actually applying for the Provostship of Eton!

Even in our own day, when modesty can hardly be named as the distinguishing virtue, this last spectacle is something astounding. Before proceeding to the consideration of the second part of the inquiry proposed, it may be well to explain with some care the precise nature of that portion of it.

It is not to be an analysis of Bacon's writings, but only such a survey of them as will, with the greatest possible brevity, disclose what seems to have been, not his doctrines, but the guiding motive that impelled him in his career as a philosopher.

In order to keep within bounds, in no instance will any quotation of length be made, and when not made, the sense of the particular subject under consideration, as understood by the writer, will be stated, and, in addition, the reader referred to its source, where verification or confutation of his theory may be obtained. With this explanation, it is hoped the writer's purpose may be

clear.

In every age and in every place, over and above all mere particular questions and theories, there is at work one mighty irresistible force dominating the hearts and minds of men, with which they either maintain a death-struggle or become part and parcel of itself.

Therefore, to know any man, especially a teacher, one must first know what was or is the dominant tendency of his times.

The life of man, whether considered singly or collectively, may be roughly divided into two epochs, viz.: of construction and destruction. For examples of this, one need but look at the history of the Hebrews and Romans to see the truth of the remark proved in its collective sense, and at the development of any individual, from the first moment of his existence to the moment of his death, to see the great law revealed in its more particular application.

This process, in many instances, doubtless continues, like the swinging of the pendulum; so that the nation or individual that was great yesterday and insignificant to-day, may to-morrow equal or surpass its former glory.

The sixteenth century was certainly an age when destruction, with all of its grim attendants of crime and injustice in peoples and selfishness in persons, was master of the situation.

The centuries before it, from the termination of the struggle between Christianity, on the one hand, and Judaism and Paganism, on the other, had been marked by the phenomena attending construction; and, up to the sixteenth century, all appearances seemed to point to the time when, at least religiously, all the inhabitants of the world should be one.

Suddenly, the buzz of voices in discussion and disagreement is heard. It grows louder and louder, until it becomes an awful roar of anguish and anger combined; and then once more the dread leader of discord, destruction, takes the field, and threatens to overturn and trample underfoot everything in its pathway. England

had been the theatre of one of its greatest contests, followed by one of its most important victories.

At this moment, when the cause of destruction had so mightily prospered that its foe had become its captive, and hardly dared to mutter its pain and discontent, Bacon appeared on the scene.

Ever a close observer, and, as his life so abundantly shows, anxious to turn every circumstance to his own advantage, he looked about him and saw that success lay only in joining himself to the cause of the victor. He was not a religious man in the accepted sense of that word, but he discerned that with the conquered religion was bound up the scientific knowledge of the past.

Professor Fowler very aptly remarks that there was a striking likeness between Bacon and Luther in that they both " spurned all obstacles in existing opinion, and even exaggerated the differences between themselves and their opponents."

Unlike Luther, as has just been noted, Bacon did not take much interest in religion as such, but merely with reference to it as connected with everything upon which he could exercise his mental powers. Philosophy, not religion, was the subject that engrossed Bacon's attention and the one in which he determined to make for himself a name and reputation.

What was the state of philosophy at this moment?

Its professors and teachers were for the most part the clergy, as they were of nearly all branches of intellectual activity up to and before his day.

The Fathers of the Church, commencing with St. Clement of Rome, and the other four known as the Apostolic Fathers, from the circumstance of their being contemporaries of the Apostles, and ending with St. Bernard, the last of this celebrated body of men, had published treatises on most subjects of interest in their day, especially, of course, touching religion, but had written without system.

Following the Fathers, came the schoolmen, that long line of scholars and teachers which was called into existence by Charlemagne, and which, commencing with Pierre Abelard and ending with Francisco Suarez, had been divided into two parties, the Platonists and the Aristotelians, following each other in this order.

The disciples of Plato, after him, gave but little heed to sensuous erception, regarding "ideas" alone as the means of supplying

truth to the inquirer; those of Aristotle, on the contrary, following the precepts of their great master, taught that the observation of external phenomena was necessary, and not, as their predecessors had contended, delusive and unsatisfactory.

In other words, these adherents of Aristotle, like himself, professed the method of induction. To say, and even to prove, that they were not perfect in the use of the method, does not seem a very complete confutation of their title to be included in the ranks of those who have accepted and inculcated its employment.

Hence, to style Bacon the "father of the inductive method,” as many of his over-zealous worshippers and admirers have not scrupled to do, is nearly as accurate and discriminating use of lan⚫guage as describing one who merely improves the manner of using a machine as its inventor. One need but glance through Bacon's references to Aristotle to discover that the language he applies to him is scarcely concealed contempt, and for examples of this the reader is referred especially to " Novum Organum," Book I., Aphorisms 71 and 77, and also to a letter from Bacon to Lord Mountjoy, quoted by Craik in his abridged work on Bacon, p. 324.

How is this to be accounted for? What explanation is to be offered of the extraordinary spectacle of a writer, and, above all, a writer on philosophy, throwing discredit on the teacher from whom he has derived the knowledge of his system?

That Bacon owed this debt of literary gratitude to the intellectual giant of Stageira, anyone acquainted with the latter's writings will recognize. In connection with this subject, the opinion of the late Mr. Lewes, in his very valuable and interesting volume on Aristotle, (London, 1864, Chapter III., p. 47,) is most just, when, in discussing the merits of the two authors, he says that the inductive method" was systematically proclaimed by Aristotle with a precision and an emphasis unsurpassed by Bacon himself." And again, in Chapter VI., p. 108, he remarks that Aristotle may be truly styled the father of the inductive philosophy, since he first announced its leading principles. Again, “in direct opposition to Plato, who, denying the validity of the senses, made intuition the ground of all true knowledge, Aristotle sought his basis in sensuous perceptions."

Plagiarism, when it merely extends to unacknowledged excerpts from another's writings, is certainly petty and despicable enough;

but, when it extends to the appropriation of the entire system of another, where is to be found the term wherewith to accurately designate it? It does seem as though the only correct answer to this question of motive must be that Bacon, with his usual desire to increase his own importance, thought that he could so far count on the ignorance of his age, and even posterity, as to be able to secure for himself the magnificent reputation of being, not the improver, but really the inventor of the inductive method. And, as an evidence of his shrewdness, one need but look through the writings of his admirers and panegyrists down to our own time.

Surely, one need not wonder at the skill and cleverness that he evinces in his Essay on Cunning."

In his "Essay on Superstition," he declares very boldly that he prefers atheism to what he calls superstition, and elsewhere he declaims against too great reverence for authority. Why was this? What did it mean? As has been noted before, the schoolmen were the teachers of Europe and were also the disciples of Aristotle; having struck his blow at the apostle, he next directs his arm against the disciples. When engaged in this warfare against superstitious and inaccurate thinkers, he might, with possible benefit to himself, have reflected on the definition of truth, as formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas, and, from him handed down by the succeeding schoolmen, viz.: "Veritas intellectus est adæquatio intellectus et rei secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est, dicit esse, quod est, vel non esse, quod non est.”

Does this not seem to hint at verification?

Sir W. Hamilton,

P. 378 of his "Logic," quotes the above, with the added remark that it has been generally adopted by modern philosophers without a suspicion on the part of many of them from whom it is derived.

Having in mind Bacon's indifference to religion as a practical matter, his attitude in this case appears to have been prompted either by a desire to withdraw attention from the works of the schoolmen, lest acquaintance with them should disclose the fact of their having already employed the inductive as well as the deductive method, and by consequence that he was not, as he would have the world believe, its originator; or that, discrediting them as the teachers of the old faith, he might multiply his chances of advancement by doing what he knew would be acceptable to his rulers. Another significant circumstance may be noted as appearing to