out great effort four years later, did in spirit again take us back to the times of George III., in matters of army and navy patronage. Members of Congress have usurped the appointments to the national schools at West Point and Annapolis, to the great damage of those institutions; and have made their appointments, with the exception of a few competitive examinations conceded to public opinion, a part of their official perquisites, upon a theory which that King and his Minister would heartily approve. All the lessons of the past, reinforced by the fine conduct and high educational influence of the graduates of these schools, are none too strong for withstanding the demagogical, communistic demand for short terms and rotation in office in the army and navy, which the partisans and the spoilsman will forever seek to add to the vast plunder for which they wage the war of politics. Does any thoughtful man believe that if we continue to surrender civil appointments to mere favor and influence, we shall be able to confer naval and military appointments for merit? It is an interesting fact that in Great Britain, a stable tenure and the giving of office for merit was provided for in the Civil Service earlier than in the Military Service, while the reverse has been the case with us.

Turning next to civil administration, it stands before us under three great divisions: Legislative, Judicial and Executive. Within State jurisdiction in towns, villages and districts, these divisions are but imperfectly developed. Officials there may have duties not confined to one of these divisions. There, neither Civil Service reform nor the principles which should control the terms or tenure we are considering, have more than a limited and indirect application. Yet, while we are directly dealing only with federal officials, the same reasoning applicable to them is largely applicable to the official life of the States and municipalities.

The debates on the Constitution and the Federalist plainly show-what perhaps is obvious enough in itself-that the stable and independent tenure (of the federal judges, and the provision against diminishing their compensation), rather than a short, fixed term, were provided for the double reason, (1) that judicial duties are in objects and methods the same, and the judicial authority should be exerted in the same spirit and manner, at all times and under all circumstances; and (2) that such offices are in no sense represen

tative either of interests or opinions, or of times, classes or sections. The Constitution makes no provision bearing upon the terms or tenure of clerks, marshalls or other subordinates of the Courts, or those serving elsewhere in the judicial department, except what is involved in the declaration that "Congress may by law invest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, the courts of law, or in the heads of departments." But it needs no argument to make it plain that every reason in favor of stability in the tenure of a judge, applies with undiminished force to all those who aid him in the performance of his duties, or are required to serve anywhere in the judicial department.

The early statesmen unquestionably believed that the great principles of judicial independence which they had so plainly formulated would be applied to every minor official in that departIn most of the federal courts, that expectation has been realized. The federal judges have been given the power to appoint and remove their subordinates. They have been allowed a stable tenure more generally than the subordinates of either other department. And who will deny that the federal judiciary has better kept within its sphere, has fulfilled its great purpose more completely, has withstood the spoils system more effectually, and has consequently preserved itself more absolutely unstained, and added more to the strength and glory of the nation than either of the two other great departments? To this noble record, the history of the territorial judges and their subordinates, and of marshalls and the district attorneys, presents a painful contrast. Made dependent upon party politics, by a term of office in violation of the spirit, if not, as to the judges, in violation of the letter of the Constitution, they have been forced to yield to mere personal and political influences. But I have no space for the subject.

How great and lamentable has been the departure from the principles of that Constitution, in the judicial administration of the States, is known to all. The corrupt influences which enabled Jackson and Van Buren to set up the spoils system at Washington and to seek popularity by proclaiming the seductive doctrine of rotation in office as a principle of justice, had long been demoralizing the politics of the States, and, worst of all, the politics of New York where that system originated.

As early as 1808, Van Buren bartered his services to Tompkins.

for a judicial office. In the great contest between himself and Clinton, for the first time in our history the bench was dragged into the defiling pool of politics, and judges became reckless partisans. Judicial appointments thus made venal, respect for the judiciary thus impaired, and a voracious, insatiable appetite for office thus stimulated, a rapid revolution was accomplished in our State judiciaries. Before 1830, no State judge had ever gained his office by popular vote. Now the people of twenty-four states— equal to the whole number then in the Union-elect their judges for fixed terms and by popular vote. If in later years the first short terms have been lengthened at every opportunity for constitutional amendment, it has been by reason of the disgust and alarm caused by making judicial offices a part of the spoils for which parties contend. The average length of judicial terms now reached in the States is about ten years, and the demand for a more independent tenure is rapidly growing more potential where short terms exist.

The same influence which forced the judges into politics, and made their tenure precarious, was not less disastrous among judicial subordinates. In New York, especially, but in every State in proportion to the despotism and corruption of its politics-the true interests of the people have been spurned, and neither term nor tenure has been allowed which could interfere with the will of the chieftains or the interests of partisans. Salaries have been made high that they might be assessed to fill the party treasury. Terms have been made short that managers might have more profitable elections to conduct, that chieftains might have more offices for bribes, that their vassal lawyers might have more chances to get upon the bench. Tenure in subordinates was measured by servility. A new and demoralizing element was added to the excessive and feverish activity of municipal politics. Election bullies were made court officers, that they might be at hand when ordered to do the dirty work of politics. Character fit to serve in the temples of justice, and capacity and experience competent for the litigation of the people, were alike sacrificed to a scandalous demoralizing practice under which every place in the courts was apportioned, as if prizes of war, among the victors in the fights of faction. For years, the subordinate places in the Courts of New York have, as a rule, been so apportioned among the faction

generals who led the voters at the judicial elections. When Judge Barnard, on his trial under impeachment, answered on the subject in these words: This is my Court; I have won this office, this patronage is mine," he explained the whole system, which is yet only checked. Of all the sad consequences, perhaps the most lamentable have been the loss of popular respect for the courts, of a lofty ideal of what they ought to be. Can any man point to a single benefit which has come to litigants, to parties even, from this revolutionary departure from the principles of the Constitution and the fundamental conditions of justice?

II. Turning next to the legislative department, we find decisive reasons why the terms of those elected to represent the people should not be long. These officers represent interests, opinions and policies, which are constantly changing; and, at every phase, they have an equal claim to be represented in debate, and to be expressed in statutes. Permanency of tenure on the part of legislators would obviously defeat one of the great ends of representative government. Stability in office is inconsistent with absolute. representation. Yet, so manifest have been the advantages of that wisdom and facility which come from experience in legislation, and so deep the sense of peril from incompetent legislators, that a great portion of these officers,-notably Senators, both State and Federal, have been allowed to hold their places for terms during which great changes of interests and opinions have taken place. So strong has public opinion been in this direction of late that, in the States, the terms of Senators, Mayors, and school officers, and of various other officials, have been much extended within the last few years—perhaps nearly doubled since the reaction against the spoils system theory of rotation first began. Biennial sessions of the Legislature are due to this cause.

Despite these changes, the vast volumes of crude statutes,— more than a thousand pages a year in a single state,--causing distracting doubts and needless litigation in the courts, by which justice is made remote and uncertain, proclaim the incompetency of lawmakers. It will be in vain that a remedy will be sought in limiting legislative power by constitutional amendments. As the statutes become more intricate and life more complicated with our growing wealth and population, we shall more and more feel the need of larger experience and longer official terms-to be held. under a sterner responsibility-for the supreme work of legislation.

But, in the legislative department, there are inferior officers not elected by the people,--the clerks and other subordinates of Congress, State Legislators and municipal councils,-who are in no sense representative, but simply ministerial. Next to character and natural capacity, the highest qualification for these places is experience--invaluable experience-in the discharge of their duties. These duties have no honest relation to party politics, or to majorities in legislatures, but are the same at all times and under whatever dominant party. Our Constitution,--like that of Great Britain,-confers the power of their selection and removal upon the legislative chambers without restriction as to term or tenure. Who will deny that economy, efficiency, purity and dignity in legislation alike demand that these officials should hold their places so long as they fitly perform their duties, and that they should be made to feel it to be a disgrace to allow that performance to be influenced by partisan considerations?

Before the British spoils-system was suppressed by the reforms made within this generation, there had been as demoralizing contests in the British Parliament over the appointment and removal of such subordinates, as have ever disgraced our Congress or State Legislatures. Now, holding during good behavior and efficiency, the selection of these officials in Great Britain is by methods which no party controls, and the discharge of their functions is treated as having no political significance. Parliament has now more time for its great work, and its dignity is no longer dishonored by ignominious contests about clerkships and doorkeepers. I have no space for presenting the evils which have come to us from treating these offices as the mere spoils of legislative majorities and partisan chieftains. Demoralizing intrigues, corrupt bargains, acrimonious debates, disgraceful scenes in the halls of legislation, law makers discredited in the eyes of the people, years of time required for improving the laws worse than wasted, incompetence, and disastrious mistakes on the part of the partisan officials selected-all these darken the record of our legislation and bring discredit upon republican institutions. In Congress, of late, we have seen one party, in order to obtain offices for its henchmen and favorites, drive from their places worthy and experienced clerks, who had been made cripples for life on the battle field of their country; and the other, disregarding the needs of the public service, seeking