Nominations in this city are made by a few persons, who consult with each other and parcel out the offices amongst themselves and their creatures. The evil in this is, that the motives governing the consultation are impure, being a desire for personal gain, and the number of persons consulting is too small, being only four or five out of tens of thousands.

If we can, by any means, increase the number called in to consult, every citizen will finally be educated to claim his influence as an inalienable right. It is manifestly impossible for great communities to meet in mass for this purpose; but our admirable system of election divisions is ready at hand as a basis for true reform. Each one of these divisions contains about two hundred voters, of whom, on the average, a little more than one-half are Republicans, and a little less than one-half Democrats. These are manageable numbers. They are small enough to authorize the belief that consultation among them is not only practicable, but easy, when we consider that they are each other's immediate neighbors.

If the Republicans in each election division could be got together, so as to discuss the nominations intelligently, and the Democrats could be made to do the same, the mystery would be solved,

One method of accomplishing this end would seem to be the abolition of primary elections, and the election of nominating delegates for each of two parties at the regular elections. There is no reason why our voting tickets should not be lengthened by the addition of the names of such delegates, as officers, to be voted for like the others, and to hold their offices for one, or even two years. These delegates should be sworn, their meetings should be public, and be held in their own divisions; neglect and corruption should be indictable; and with the full gaze of their constituencies upon them, and the sense of responsibility, thus engendered, heightened by the grave sanctions of law, it would be contrary to human experience if their functions were not performed better and better from time to time. Then one check on inefficiency and dishonesty, which has never yet been attempted in this connection, could be tried. Instead of having few delegates, there should be many.. Each party should elect ten nominating delegates in a division, instead of one. The mode of election might be made exceedingly simple. Under the head of "nominating delegates," there should be put on each voter's ticket twenty names, ten of which should

be marked in a brace, Republican, and the other ten, Democratic, or whatever the party names might at any time happen to be. Each voter should vote for only ten, which, except in a few instances, so unimportant as to be inappreciable, would result in the choice of ten of each party in each division. The ten representatives of each party in each division should meet the ten representatives of the same party from every other division in the same ward at times stated by law, and should at such ward conventions nominate candidates for ward officers to be voted for at the next election, and they should likewise elect, from among their own number, a certain number of delegates to act as delegates to a city and county nominating convention, whose duty should be to present the party's nominations for city and county officers. This city or county convention could elect delegates to State and national conventions, and thus the people could always be sure that the nominating system would be in the hands of their representatives.

Of course, the life of such a system would be in the division organization. So long as it could be kept pure and honest, everything would work well. To keep up the interest of the public in the matter, it would be advisable to procure joint meetings of the Republican and Democratic delegates in each division, at stated periods, not only for the purposes of organization and mere consultation, but also for certain limited police and legislative purposes.

Who could so well advise the Mayor of the remissness of the police officers in a locality, or the Board of Health of a failure to clean the streets, or the Highway Department of neglected thoroughfares and culverts, as such a local Senate, evenly divided as regards parties? Who, again, would be such a Board of Revision to determine whether an assessor has made a favorably low assessment of real estate, or has placed mythical voters on a list, or left lawful ones off, as these inspectors of the vicinage? Doubtless, many other important services could be rendered by such a body, but the greatest of all would be the political education thereby afforded to great masses of our people, and the steady interest awakened in public affairs. With one-tenth of the whole voting. population continually engaged in supervisory, unsalaried public duty, corruption in office would become more dangerous and more impracticable year by year, and this advantage could be doubled. by denying to these delegates the right to become their own im

mediate successors, thus drafting into this civil militia another tenth of the whole voting population.

Thus far it has been supposed that the honor and the responsibility of the position would ensure the service of a sufficient number of citizens; but there is no sound reason, moral, legal or practical, why the failure of a citizen to attend to this duty should not be punished by a reasonable fine for every delinquency, just as the failure to do jury duty is punished. Nothing in the nature of the office would require a citizen to lose any part of his working-day, and it is not at all probable that the office now so sought for would become onerous or odious to good citizens.

But this system, like all things, must have a beginning. Who shall designate the twenty citizens put on the ticket for nominating delegates at each election? Shall we have a convention for that purpose? Certainly not. The nominating delegates of each party in each division shall nominate their own successors, themselves being ineligible. To make a clique by this means is impossible, on account of the vastness of the numbers; the whole number of nominating delegates in Philadelphia, during any two years, being more than 30,000 persons of the two parties, and rendering the idea of a combination for evil purposes utterly absurd and impracticable. In short, the incomparable superiority of the power of the people, when organized, over the power of a selfish clique, is here shown by the magnificent figures.

But suppose that the sitting delegates should nominate as candidates for the succession, one or more improper persons. The people would still have in their own hands all the remedies they now possess, with a hundred times the opportunity to apply them. It being fixed by law that the nominations are to be announced a reasonable time before the election, the citizens of the division who believe that a mistake has been made, consult together, and put up such other names as they may desire; and if they can induce enough of their neighbors to vote for the outside nominees, they may at least be sure of having the votes counted and their candidates. elected, which now is impracticable.

But there is still one thing to do, and that is to start the work. How are the first set of delegates to be appointed?

This is a serious difficulty, only because the ordinary channels of expressing popular opinion are clogged by corruptionists. Two

courses are open. One is to make a tremendous effort at organization in each division, and by the personal presence of the voters overawe the primary election officers into certifying the truth,—a way obnoxious to the objection that it will inevitably result in bloodshed if the people wish to maintain their rights, because no defiance of them is punishable by law. The other course is to impose upon the judges of our courts the disagreeable but patriotic duty of naming the first set of delegates, and thus laying broad and deep the foundations of freer and better government.

The system once established, the division delegates of each party would name the necessary election officers, the judge being elected by both parties from among the majority voters in the division. To avoid frauds, the ballots should be printed in one way for each party, and a distributor of tickets should be placed at the polls for each, and the expenses thereof should be borne by the public.

Something may be said about the expensiveness of such a system; but a little thought will dispose of this.

One of the most objectionable features of party domination is the assessment of candidates for office, to pay campaign expen

These are divided, in law and in fact, into two kinds, legitimate and illegitimate. Illegitimate are not to be considered here; but it is important to reflect that the payment of the legitimate entails the most serious evils on the people. How can we expect persons to lay out money for procuring offices, if the emoluments of these offices do not pay for the services to be obtained, plus the money so advanced to obtain them, with interest, plus insurance for the risk of losing the money so advanced? Nor is this the worst evil. Every officeholder, actual or expectant, is in favor of a scale of compensation totally out of proportion to the labor and talents required, and is an enemy of any change. It is safe to say that for every dollar expended in legitimate election expenses by candidates, more than a hundred dollars are taken out of the public treasury as a pretended means of paying the officials for their expenditures in obtaining office. Worse yet, poor men are rendered ineligible because they cannot pay their assessments; or if a good Samaritan steps forward and advances the money, he gets a mortgage on the office to be obtained, and gets his money back with usurious interest by taking a portion of the emoluments of an office to which he has not been elected.

Then, again, the system of lawful campagn expenses renders necessary the registration and assessment of candidates, and makes impossible of application the principle so loudly proclaimed in words, that the office should seek the man. The only remedy is the abolition of all legal election expenses, and their assumption by the community. In themselves they are trifling, and, as a measure of economy, we could well afford to pay them twice over, by simply deducting from all salaries the amounts of political assessments. . A potent source of the corruption of the press would cease with the disintegration of great campaign funds, and the community could easily spare the noisy processions and meetings.

The people being organized on a sound basis, voluntary movements of citizens for good government would become valuable and powerful. A body like the Committee of One Hundred, with branches in every ward, would be a critical agent of the highest usefulness. If evil nominations were made by either party, they could warn the districts concerned by facts, not partisan denunciations, and the time would soon come when a man unable to clear his character from such charges could never reach public office. To resume, then:

The public have never had a right of selection.

The so-called elections are merely ratifications.

The problem now is to assure the right of selection to the people.

The obstacle in the way is the potent organization of the officeholders.

The methods of removing it, are (1) fixity of tenure for officeholders for a limited but reasonably long time, and impossibility of immediate re-election.

2. Regulating nominations by law.

3. Abolishing private delegate elections, and voting for delegates at general elections.

4. Many delegates instead of few.

If, instead of the method proposed, it should be deemed better on the whole to have the nominating delegates themselves nominated by mass meetings of each party in each division, there is no doubt that this course would be practicable, though more liable to the danger of turbulence and fraud than the plan here suggested. It is admitted, however, that these dangers would be comparatively