Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the Relation of Cause and EffectMundell and Son, 1806 - 220 pagina's |
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Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr. Hume ... Thomas Brown Fragmentweergave - 1806 |
Observations on the Nature and Tendency of the Doctrine of Mr. Hume ... Thomas Brown Geen voorbeeld beschikbaar - 2018 |
Veelvoorkomende woorden en zinsdelen
able admitted altogether angles antece appear argument arise ascribe asserted assertors belief of causation belief of power bodies cause and effect circum circumstances co-existing combination common conception connection connexion conscious consequence considered cumstances customary deny derived discover doctrine doubts ence equally Essay evident existence experience external false feeling followed fore future gible gism Hume Hume's principles Hume's theory idea of necessary idea of power imagination immediately implied impossible impression infer instance intuitive ject knowledge language law of thought less lief liveliness loadstone matter ment muscular motion nature neral ness object observed original original belief passion peculiar perceived pheno phenomena of mind philosophers philosophy of mind preceding present prior produced proposition qualities quence reason Reid relation of cause rience scepticism sensation shew shewn similar simple single stance suggest supposed supposition term thing thought thousand guineas tion triangle truth ture vivid volition words
Populaire passages
Pagina 184 - So that, upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion which is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected.
Pagina 154 - To make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an inch in length: this, which in...
Pagina 171 - But when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event, we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion.
Pagina 125 - Tis certain, that not only in philosophy, but even in common life, we may attain the knowledge of a particular cause merely by one experiment, provided it be made with judgment, and after a careful removal of all foreign and superfluous circumstances.
Pagina 210 - This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries.
Pagina 192 - What is our idea of necessity, when we say that two objects are necessarily connected together? Upon this head I repeat, what I have often had occasion to observe, that as we have no idea that is not derived from an impression, we must find some impression that gives rise to this idea of necessity, if we assert we have really such an idea.
Pagina 132 - It is certain, that the most ignorant and stupid peasants, nay infants, nay even brute beasts, improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle, but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance.
Pagina 185 - But when one particular species of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing that reasoning, which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one object, Cause; the other, Effect.
Pagina 158 - The concurrence of these several views or glimpses imprints the idea more strongly on the imagination ; gives it superior force and vigour ; renders its influence on the passions and affections more sensible ; and in a word, begets that reliance or security which constitutes the nature of belief and opinion.
Pagina 193 - I immediately perceive, that they are contiguous in time and place, and that the object we call cause precedes the other we call effect. In no one instance can I go any farther, nor is it possible for me to discover any third relation betwixt these objects.