Arms Control in Outer Space: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, November 10, 1983, April 10, May 2, and July 26, 1984, Volume 4U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984 - 480 pages |
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Page 3
... question the wisdom of using the threat of total annihilation to maintain peace . But , I do not believe that we will find an alternative to MAD in a space - based BMD system . Aside from the many mechanical and technical drawbacks of ...
... question the wisdom of using the threat of total annihilation to maintain peace . But , I do not believe that we will find an alternative to MAD in a space - based BMD system . Aside from the many mechanical and technical drawbacks of ...
Page 17
... question . We have seen some of the recent Soviet actions going back to the time we lost our comrade on a plane shot down by the Russians . I know they don't have the same type of mindset we do . But this is a different situation . Arms ...
... question . We have seen some of the recent Soviet actions going back to the time we lost our comrade on a plane shot down by the Russians . I know they don't have the same type of mindset we do . But this is a different situation . Arms ...
Page 21
... question was raised , why the ad- ministration appears to be avoiding any serious diplomatic attempt to engage in negotiations over a ban on antisatellite technology ? This has indeed been a matter of puzzlement in the outside com ...
... question was raised , why the ad- ministration appears to be avoiding any serious diplomatic attempt to engage in negotiations over a ban on antisatellite technology ? This has indeed been a matter of puzzlement in the outside com ...
Page 22
... question the legitimacy of U.S. activities they consider to be aggressively hostile and at the extreme , they might physically interfere with such activities over Soviet territory . Second , the Soviets will predictably initiate ...
... question the legitimacy of U.S. activities they consider to be aggressively hostile and at the extreme , they might physically interfere with such activities over Soviet territory . Second , the Soviets will predictably initiate ...
Page 31
... question the legitimacy of US activities they consider to be aggressivly hostile and at the extreme they might physically interfere with such activities over Soviet territory . Second , the Soviets will predictably initiate elaboration ...
... question the legitimacy of US activities they consider to be aggressivly hostile and at the extreme they might physically interfere with such activities over Soviet territory . Second , the Soviets will predictably initiate elaboration ...
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Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM systems ABM Treaty ABRAHAMSON activities ADELMAN Administration administration's agree American Anti-Ballistic Missile anti-satellite weapons arms control arms control agreements arms race Article ASAT arms control ASAT capability ASAT program ASAT system ASAT testing ASAT's attack ballistic missile defense beam billion Chairman FASCELL chemical lasers Committee Congress defense system Defensive Technologies deploy destroy deterrence early warning effective effort energy ground-based HYDE ICBM infrared intercept interceptor missiles issue laser weapon launch launchers limited ment military moratorium national security national technical means negotiations nuclear weapons offensive operational orbit outer space Outer Space Treaty Pentagon PMALS potential President President's problems prohibited proposed protect question Reagan reentry vehicles rocket RORSAT scientists sensors side silos SLBM Soviet ASAT Soviet Union space arms control space cooperation space weapons space-based Star Wars statement Strategic Defense Initiative subcommittee talks target threat tion tracking United verification warheads X-ray laser
Fréquemment cités
Page 164 - Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 375 - The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties", Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive...
Page 297 - I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.
Page 385 - Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 375 - Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense...
Page 164 - XVI 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.
Page 196 - I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles.
Page 375 - Declaring their Intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.
Page 163 - Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21.
Page 382 - In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles.