Arms Control in Outer Space: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, November 10, 1983, April 10, May 2, and July 26, 1984, Volume 4U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984 - 480 pages |
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... officials with knowledge in this area . The subcommittee will continue its careful scrutiny of this sub- ject and so far has released a May 18 subcommittee " Interim Report on the Administration's Space Arms Control and Defense Policy ...
... officials with knowledge in this area . The subcommittee will continue its careful scrutiny of this sub- ject and so far has released a May 18 subcommittee " Interim Report on the Administration's Space Arms Control and Defense Policy ...
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... Officials Opposing U.S. Actions on Arms Control " . 346 33. Wall Street Journal article of July 10 , 1984 , entitled “ From Arms Control to Controlled Security " . 347 34. Letter to Chairman Fascell from Gerard Smith concerning ...
... Officials Opposing U.S. Actions on Arms Control " . 346 33. Wall Street Journal article of July 10 , 1984 , entitled “ From Arms Control to Controlled Security " . 347 34. Letter to Chairman Fascell from Gerard Smith concerning ...
Page 17
... official posture up to now , at least as far as the administra- tion is concerned , is that we are not interested in negotiating . So we are not in a very good position to test their good faith when our position is that we won't ...
... official posture up to now , at least as far as the administra- tion is concerned , is that we are not interested in negotiating . So we are not in a very good position to test their good faith when our position is that we won't ...
Page 21
... official interpretation of these trea- ties , the use of chemical lasers , for example , or directed energy weapons in antisatellite roles would not be prohibited even if they were ultimately being designed for a ballistic missile ...
... official interpretation of these trea- ties , the use of chemical lasers , for example , or directed energy weapons in antisatellite roles would not be prohibited even if they were ultimately being designed for a ballistic missile ...
Page 26
... patterns of development , destruction of any given space satellite would be much more damaging to the United States than it would be to the Soviet Union . Three rounds of official negotiations were conducted with the Soviet 26.
... patterns of development , destruction of any given space satellite would be much more damaging to the United States than it would be to the Soviet Union . Three rounds of official negotiations were conducted with the Soviet 26.
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Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM systems ABM Treaty ABRAHAMSON activities ADELMAN Administration administration's agree American Anti-Ballistic Missile anti-satellite weapons arms control arms control agreements arms race Article ASAT arms control ASAT capability ASAT program ASAT system ASAT testing ASAT's attack ballistic missile defense beam billion Chairman FASCELL chemical lasers Committee Congress defense system Defensive Technologies deploy destroy deterrence early warning effective effort energy ground-based HYDE ICBM infrared intercept interceptor missiles issue laser weapon launch launchers limited ment military moratorium national security national technical means negotiations nuclear weapons offensive operational orbit outer space Outer Space Treaty Pentagon PMALS potential President President's problems prohibited proposed protect question Reagan reentry vehicles rocket RORSAT scientists sensors side silos SLBM Soviet ASAT Soviet Union space arms control space cooperation space weapons space-based Star Wars statement Strategic Defense Initiative subcommittee talks target threat tion tracking United verification warheads X-ray laser
Fréquemment cités
Page 164 - Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 375 - The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties", Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive...
Page 297 - I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.
Page 385 - Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 375 - Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense...
Page 164 - XVI 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.
Page 196 - I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles.
Page 375 - Declaring their Intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.
Page 163 - Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21.
Page 382 - In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles.