Arms Control in Outer Space: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-eighth Congress, November 10, 1983, April 10, May 2, and July 26, 1984, Volume 4U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984 - 480 pages |
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... [ ASAT ] weapons policy . * * Shortly after the President's March 23 , 1983 , speech in which he initiated the ... [ ASAT ] weapons policy , the subcom- mittee learned that while the administration does not view ASAT's as part of the SDI ...
... [ ASAT ] weapons policy . * * Shortly after the President's March 23 , 1983 , speech in which he initiated the ... [ ASAT ] weapons policy , the subcom- mittee learned that while the administration does not view ASAT's as part of the SDI ...
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... ASAT technology and some of the technologies being investigated under the SDI program do overlap . There is a growing concern that administration reluctance to halt its ASAT flight testing program could be viewed as an administration ...
... ASAT technology and some of the technologies being investigated under the SDI program do overlap . There is a growing concern that administration reluctance to halt its ASAT flight testing program could be viewed as an administration ...
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... ASAT's . The United States first deployed an ASAT system in the early 1960's . That system was retired from service in 1975. The Soviets have been testing a crude ASAT since 1968 . The Russian antisatellite weapon is ungainly and ...
... ASAT's . The United States first deployed an ASAT system in the early 1960's . That system was retired from service in 1975. The Soviets have been testing a crude ASAT since 1968 . The Russian antisatellite weapon is ungainly and ...
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... ASAT weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union would pose an intolerable threat to our national security . I think not only this committee , but the Congress , has shown that it understands the dangers of a space weapons race ...
... ASAT weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union would pose an intolerable threat to our national security . I think not only this committee , but the Congress , has shown that it understands the dangers of a space weapons race ...
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... ASAT ban with the United States , and in June , Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko called on the United States and the Soviet Union to sit down and hammer out the details of a treaty prohibiting the deployment of space weap- ons . So ...
... ASAT ban with the United States , and in June , Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko called on the United States and the Soviet Union to sit down and hammer out the details of a treaty prohibiting the deployment of space weap- ons . So ...
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Expressions et termes fréquents
ABM systems ABM Treaty ABRAHAMSON activities ADELMAN Administration administration's agree American Anti-Ballistic Missile anti-satellite weapons arms control arms control agreements arms race Article ASAT arms control ASAT capability ASAT program ASAT system ASAT testing ASAT's attack ballistic missile defense beam billion Chairman FASCELL chemical lasers Committee Congress defense system Defensive Technologies deploy destroy deterrence early warning effective effort energy ground-based HYDE ICBM infrared intercept interceptor missiles issue laser weapon launch launchers limited ment military moratorium national security national technical means negotiations nuclear weapons offensive operational orbit outer space Outer Space Treaty Pentagon PMALS potential President President's problems prohibited proposed protect question Reagan reentry vehicles rocket RORSAT scientists sensors side silos SLBM Soviet ASAT Soviet Union space arms control space cooperation space weapons space-based Star Wars statement Strategic Defense Initiative subcommittee talks target threat tion tracking United verification warheads X-ray laser
Fréquemment cités
Page 164 - Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
Page 375 - The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "Original Parties", Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive...
Page 297 - I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.
Page 385 - Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms...
Page 375 - Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense...
Page 164 - XVI 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party.
Page 196 - I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles.
Page 375 - Declaring their Intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective.
Page 163 - Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission of December 21.
Page 382 - In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles.