Q23. How do you respond to the following statement by the Union of Concerned Scientists?

"The best 'deterrent' to Soviet ASAT attacks is Soviet awareness that US satellite functions are so well-diversified and hardened, and so supplemented by non-satellite systems, that no attack on satellites could succeed in cripping the overall US military capability.

A.

Although the functions of some US satellites also can be performed by alternate and diverse means, these satellites remain the most effective means of performing global reconnaissance, communications and other functions vital to deterrence and military operations.

As discussed in the March 31 Report to Congress, the US is
pursuing satellite survivability. Hardening and other measures
could provide some increase in satellite survivability under
active attack. These measures are expensive in both dollars
and mission penalties and no single measure is effective
against all threats. Thus they cannot provide the same
deterrence value as can a US capability to respond in kind
to Soviet ASAT attack.

Q24. The GAO has estimated the cost of the ASAT to be in the "tens of billions of dollars."

What has this Administration estimated the cost to be?

How do you respond to the statement that the cost of the ASAT program could be a serious drain on overall US military preparedness?"

A.

My understanding is that the MV system is expected by DOD to cost about three and one-half billion dollars. I believe that the GAO estimate is based on a postulated requirement to be able to attack all Soviet satellites, whereas the much more restrained planned system will only be capable of attacking low altitude satellites which pose the most significant threats to US and Allied forces. DOD would, of course, be able to furnish much more detail on this subject.

Q25. An ASAT test ban treaty would not erase uncertainty, but it could be a step in preventing the militarization of space.

A.

Do you agree that in a world with an ASAT test ban treaty where we continued to upgrade our monitoring capability and hardened our satellites, we would lessen the chances of an unconstrained arms race in space?

An ASAT test ban treaty at this time would prevent the US
from completing the development and testing of the MV ASAT,
eliminating the confidence required for operational deployment.
The Soviet ASAT is a mature and effective system, proven
with many years of development and operational testing.

There are in addition difficulties with verification of Soviet
compliance. Finally, hardening and other measures, while
they could provide some increase in satellite survivability
under active attack, are expensive in both dollars and mission
penalties and ultimately futile if satellites are attacked

by a capable and determined adversary.

In view of these considerations I believe that, while some kinds of testing limitations could turn out to be in the US interest, there is a need for considerable analytical work in this area to try to identify equitable verifiable

proposals compatible with US security.

APPENDIX 37

RESPONSES BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL ABRAHAMSON,

STRATEGIC

DEFENSE INITIATIVE ORGANIZATION, TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN FASCELL

Question: If the United States and the Soviet Union enter into negotiations to ban space weapons, what will be your role in the negotiations?

- Do you feel the United States should discuss barring all space weapons--including those applicable to antiballistic missile defense--in the proposed upcoming space talks--or do you feel such talks should be limited to antisatellite weapons?

There has been some discussion that the Soviet proposed space talks include discussion of other nuclear arms control talks.

-

Do you favor this approach or do you believe that space talks should stand on their own merits?

Answer: The primary responsibility for formulating the position of the Department of Defense with respect to arms control negotiations rests with the Secretary of Defense and, under him, with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. I will, of course, be available to provide advice on the technical implications of proposed arms control agreements.

Given my role in the process of preparing for arms control talks, I do not think that it would be

appropriate for me to comment on the scope of possible talks.

Question: A June 1984 "Report on the Impact of U. S. and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty, "prepared by Thomas Longstreth and John Pike, characterizes the administrations's definition of the term "component" and its interpretation of a violation under the ABM Treaty in the following way:

Official policy is that a device is not an ABM
component unless it can perform the complete
function or substitute on a 'stand alone'
basis for an ABM component as defined in Article
II of the Treaty. If a device can only perform
part of the function of an ABM radar, launcher,
or interceptor then it is not constrained as a ABM
component under the administration's
interpretation.

In other words, according to the administration, a violation will occur only when individual technical demonstrations are tested together as part of the total system. In this respect please comment on the Talon Gold project the program designed to develop the pointing and tracking component of a space-based laser. Many experts have stated that demonstrations of the Talon Gold project will indeed violate the ABM Teaty in particular Article V (I) which bans the testing or deployment of space-based ABM systems or components.

Answer: The ABM Treaty doesn't define the term 'component of an ABM system" as it would apply to future ABM systems. Consequently, the U.S. Government has turned to Agreed Statement D, which refers to "components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars," for guidance.

It is incorrect to describe the Talon Gold device as the "pointing and tracking component of a spacebased laser." The device is so limited both in its range of functions and its designed level of performance that it cannot be considered to be capable of substituting for an ABM component. The Talon Gold experiment will continue to be planned and reviewed to ensure that it is consistent with the ABM Treaty.