ty of the new systems and the opportunities for rapid reloading and covert deployment. The question of how to control qualitative improvements plagued SALT II negotiators and, at best, only a partially satisfactory response was developed. Their difficulties pale in comparison to the complexities posed by the new systems. Adequate verification of both qualitative and quantitative limits would require access to storage facilities and even perhaps to production centers. As a consequence, it is realistic to conclude that for both political and technological reasons, for chances of a truly comprehensive agreement, which can be reliably verified, are rapidly fading. In that context, we are likely to see renewed attraction to war planners of a firststrike scenario. Since the mid-1950s, acquisition by the Soviets of a respectable nuclear capability meant that a first strike-inherently messy and unpredictable in its consequences—was until recently not an attractive option for either side. A messy attack with large and relatively inaccurate warheads (the only kind possible) would still precipitate an almost equally messy counterattack. But with the deployment of extraordinarily accurate systems, a first strike designed to paralyze the opponent's capacity to respond through the pre-emptive destruction of most of its forces and through the decapitation of its command structure can again become a viable planning option. From an offensive point of view, a sudden attack by highly precise and very numerous nuclear weapons is more profitable than an exchange resulting from a political crisis promoting both sides to gear their forces to maximum alert. In the years ahead, one can envisage several ways in which nuclear weapons might be used in anger and by deliberation. Four basic variants summarize the range of possibilities: (1) a massive surprise attack; (2) through crisis escalation; (3) by contagion from non-superpower conflicts; (4) by terrorist attack. Of those, in the years ahead probably the fourth is the most likely since it involves a relatively simple operation, and it can be undertaken by a limited group of individuals with little concern for society and motivated by their own peculiar brand of rationality. But while the employment of a nuclear device in a terrorist attack may be the most likely for the U.S. a surprise attack poses the greatest danger. It could in one stroke create circumstances beyond our capacity to foresee either its social or historical consequences. Of course such a sudden-attack scenario remains unlikely, but one can disregard it entirely only at the greatest peril. Given the relative openness of American society, the pricise location of key assets can be much more easily ascertained and effectively targeted than those of the Soviets. That makes the U.S. more vulnerable to such a strike and it would be escapist to assume that Soviet planners would choose to ignore such an option altogether. Moreover, a bolt out of the blue could create such initial disbelief among the U.S. decision makers that they would be unable to make a prompt response. Even without a special Soviet effort to disrupt or destroy U.S. decision makers, a sudden massive attack would put the American leaders under extraordinary psychological pressure, capable of inducing erratic behavior and hesitation. One can hardly imagine how utterly dumbfounding would be the situation in which the president would find himself awakened in the middle of some night, confronted with the following lifeand-death decision tree (as based on public sources): Time (minutes) 0 Massive attack launched. 1 SLBMs detected. 2 ICBMs detected. 4-6 Confirmation of attack; uncertainty over scale; U.S. decision process begins. 6-10 First SLBMs detonate in High Altitude EMP attack; SAC launched preemptively; confirmation of scale of attack; final U.S. decision process. 10-12 U.S. decision needed: Ride-out or respond; first SLBMs detonate over U.S. SLBM bases and National Command Authority. 12-14 Final window for initiating response launch under attack. 16-20 Delta SLBMs launched from home ports hit SAC. 20-30 ICBM attack initiates possible X-ray pin-down and begins impact on targets. How in these circumstances would the president perform? How effective would be the chain of command? How rational would be the choices made in response to initially unbelievable information? Could incoming information regarding the nature of the attack be rationally related to the needed response? We are dealing here with truly sensitive and disturbing operational as well as psychological questions. The advent of increasingly numerous and accurate systems is making it possible for planners of a strategic attack to envisage a first strike that leaves the opponent strategically crippled, capable of only a spasmodic, disorganized and strategically aimless response-or none at all. This still does not make a first strike attractive from a moral or even political point of view, given the stakes, but the point is that gradually the military attractiveness of this option is again increasing. Accordingly, with the stalemate in arms control, the enhanced capacity of strategic offense must be offset-and it is likely to be offset by greater reliance on the part of both side on defensive strategic systems. The Times of London put it correctly when it stated editorially on June 13: "The Soviet Union is now natually worried about the consequences of a burst in American spending on missile defense. It casts doubt on Soviet plans for offensive systems since the possibility of any missile defense-even an incomplete one-would radically alter the cost calculation of offensive systems. In the long run a defensive program would enhance arms control by reducing the potential gains from building offensive weapons. It is ironic and paradoxical that the age of deterrence has so confused the strategic mentality of many commentators that their reaction to a purely defensive system is to suggest that it increases danger." The fact is that strategic defense has become feasible not in the sense that it can safeguard society but because it can increasingly complicate the planning and execution of an effective first strike. In other words, strategic defense can somewhat negate the offensive advantages of increasingly sophisticated strike systems, restoring the element of deterrence simply by creating again greater uncertainly as to the consequences of a first strike. RESPECTIVE VULNERABILITY For the U.S., it is an especially attractive option for it permits us to exploit the advantages of high technology, an area of U.S. superiority. This provides us with genuine potential for offsetting the military advantages gained in recent years by the Soviet Union, and would put pressure on the Soviet Union to return to serious arms-control regotiations. But even with such negotiations, the development of some defensive strategic capability will remain desirable. It is often said that an imbalance might arise when one side sees the other side acquiring a relatively invulnerable shield while itself remaining vulnerable. Pre-emption might therefore become tempting. In fact, that is not likely to happen. The acquisition of a defensive strategic capability is not like purchasing an umbrella, which one can unfold against the rain upon leaving the store. It is bound to be a protracted trial-and-error piecemeal process, with both sides experimenting, deploying partially, and adjusting their capabilities, with neither one at any point in the next 15 to 20 years feeling it is truly invulnerable to the other side, even though over time the respective vulnerability of each side to a first strike by the other will gradually be declining. Through such a process, a measure of reciprocal stability will be acquired and security of both sides will gradually be enhanced, though the process will not yield the kind of restraint in defense expenditures that many have associated with the hopedfor arms controls. But the time has come to lay to rest the expectation that arms controls is the secret key to a more amicable American-Soviet relationship or even to the enhancement of mutual security. The maintenance of such security will remain an ambiguous and protracted process requiring unilateral actions by both sides, and increasingly so in the area of strategic defense. APPENDIX 34 LETTER TO CHAIRMAN FASCELL FROM GERARD SMITH CONCERNING LIEUTENANT GENERAL ABRAHAMSON'S TESTIMONY NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO SAVE THE ABM TREATY 1346 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W., SUITE 903, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 (202) 463-3213 Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs 2170 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, DC 20515 Dear Chairman Fascell: I read with great interest the testimony of Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Program, before your subcommittee on Jul 26th. Although I have already had an opportunity to present my views on the SDI and its arms control implications to your International Security and Scientific Affairs Subcommittee a few months ago, a number of assertions made by General Abrahamson should not be left without specific challenge. - Contrary to his contention, it seems to me that the Administration's multi-billion dollar accelerated research and development program is simply a renewal of the unavailing search for a technological escape from the central fact of the nuclear age that nuclear conflict is deterred because the US and USSR have the capacity to annihilate each other no matter which nation initiates a nuclear exchange. This is what the President called for in his "Star Wars" speech when he challenged the scientific community to develop a system to "render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." There is a central contradiction in General Abrahamson's statement. He seems to suggest that the effort to build strategic defenses is justified on the grounds that it will strengthen nuclear deterrence, but he also argues that such a system will allow us to move away from relying on nuclear deterrence to maintain the peace. Rather than paving the way for reductions in offensive strategic arms, development of a ballistic missile defense by both sides will cause each to increase its offensive arsenals in order to counter the other's defensive systems. Several Administration officials have already admitted that the SDI is meant to supplement, not replace our offensive forces. It seems pernicious for SDI proponents to argue that this program will enhance the prospects for negotiating meaningful arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. One can be sure that the Soviets will not cooperate in any effort to render their nuclear deterrent forces impotent. The pursuit of a nationwide system to defend against ballistic missiles will not only jeopardize the chances for securing future arms treaties, but will destroy the single most important US-Soviet arms agreement. The trajectory and momentum of the SDI place it on an unavoidable collision course with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty which explicitly bans such nationwide defenses. By preventing a dangerous and costly competition in defensive systems that would stimulate an even greater build-up in offensive nuclear weapons, the Treaty has contributed to strategic stability and reduced the risk of nuclear conflict. Termination or abrogation of the Treaty can only compromise US security interests. General Abrahamson stated that the US intends to continue to observe its treaty obligations and is in no way engaged in actions which would be inconsistent with or undermine the ABM Treaty. Unfortunately he offers no evidence to support this view such as a technical study assessing the arms control impact of various SDI programs on specific Treaty provisions. By contrast, the National Campaign To Save The ABM Treaty has undertaken such an analysis copies of which have been made available to the subcommittee concluded that programs such as "Talon Gold," a pointing and tracking component of a space-based laser system, threaten to violate the Treaty in the near future. The Administration has yet to produce a technical study which evaluates SDI programs to see if they are consistent with the Treaty. - - and I suggest Mr. Chairman, that it would be useful for your committee to explore the issue of whether specific SDI programs can be reconciled with the ABM Treaty as well as the Executive Branch procedures for ensuring compliance with the Treaty. Such a hearing should help clarify questions about the SDI and its arms control implications. On the issue of anti-satellite weapons, General Abrahamson neglected to discuss the potential overlap in ASAT and ballistic missile defense technologies. This overlap prompts concerns that failure to secure a ban on ASAT weapons would permit circumvention of restrictions of the ABM Treaty. The Administration appears to be unwilling to try to explain how its ASAT program can be pursued within the ABM Treaty regime. Another issue of concern involves the effect of the SDI on our European allies. The offer to extend any defenses to protect Western Europe has done little to allay Alliance fears that development of missile defenses will "decouple" US and NATO Europe and diminish Alliance security. Lastly, General Abrahamson stated that some critics "say we should not proceed with a research effort." Since 1972 when the ABM Treaty was concluded I have supported a vigorous ABM research and development program, but one that is designed as a hedge against a Soviet breakout from the Treaty rather than a prelude to an American breakout. Because of developing threats to the ABM Treaty and the consequences for our security should it be terminated, the US and USSR should soon consider together ways in which the Treaty could be strengthened. Mr Chairman, I would like to thank you for taking such a strong interest in the SDI and its implications for existing and future arms control agreements. You have been instrumental in helping to facilitate debate on this issue both in Congress and the general public. Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance. APPENDIX 35 JUNE 1984 NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO SAVE THE ABM TREATY REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSLE DEFENSE PROGRAMS ON THE ABM TREATY The Reagan Administration has launched a major program aimed at establishing defenses against the threat of nuclear attack. The Strategic Defense Initiative, as it is known, offers a superficially appealing solution to the nuclear dilemma, but it in fact, threatens to spur the arms race forward, destroy existing arms agreements and eliminate any chance for future arms control. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 bans nationwide systems that defend against ballistic missile attack. For over a decade, the ABM Treaty has enhanced our national security by preventing a costly and dangerous arms race in anti-missile weapons. Abandoning its prohibitions on large ABM systems would eliminate any possibility of significant limits on offensive nuclear forces. O Present and future U.S. and Soviet defense systems threaten the continued viability of the ABM Treaty. The development and testing of ABM components could violate the ABM Treaty well before the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. decide whether to initiate deployment of space-based missile defense systems. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. probably will not take the provocative step of formally abrogating the ABM Treaty. Each could choose simply to undertake activities that undermine the agreement, steadily eroding its restrictions until the Treaty has lost its significance. • Decision-makers in the executive and legislative branches appear to be largely unaware of, or indifferent to, the threat to the ABM Treaty, other agreements, and further arms control measures posed by present and planned U.S. and Soviet missile defense programs. This report, based on unclassified sources, provides a comprehensive analysis of U.S. and Soviet missile defense programs and their impact on the ABM Treaty. A private study, however, is no substitute for a thorough and authoritative review of the situation by U.S. Government agencies charged with evaluating the effect of military programs on existing arms agreements and U.S. national security. • The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have failed to make a serious, joint effort to preserve the ABM Treaty. Instead, each has defended its programs' conformity to the Treaty and disregarded the need for clarification of Treaty language so as to prevent exploitation of ambiguities and loopholes. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. must reach Common Understandings or Agreed Statements regarding certain ABM Treaty terms and definitions if the Treaty is to remain viable. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. must also reach agreement on limiting devices or systems that, although ostensibly designed for other purposes, could be used in an ABM role. Chief among these are large phased-array radars, anti-tactical missiles, and anti-satellite systems. For example, negotiations toward an ASAT agreement are needed to prevent further development, testing, and deployment of ASAT systems that will seriously undermine the ABM Treaty. |